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Preface 
This evaluation of the Research Council of Norway (Norges Forskningsråd) has been 
undertaken under a contract to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Education and 
Research (KD) by a team from Technopolis, the Universities of Leiden (CWTS) and 
Manchester (MIoIR), and from NIFU and SSB in Norway.  Our panel of expert 
advisors served as an internal sparring partner for the team and comprised 
• Prof em, Irwin Feller, Penn State University  
• Prof Stefan Kuhlmann, University of Twente  
• Prof Marja Makarow, Vice President for Research of the Academy of Finland, 
former Chief Executive of the European Science Foundation 
• Prof Ben Martin, SPRU, Sussex University  
• Dr Dorothea Sturn, Director General of the Austrian research council, FWF   
During the work, we have received constant and friendly help from RCN, especially 
Finn Simonsen and Tone Vislie, who were appointed to be our main points of contact, 
as well as the rest of the management and staff.  Arvid Hallén went out of his way 
constantly to be available to us.   
KD kindly organised a reference group to help us as the work progressed, comprising 
Arne Benjaminsen, FKD; Carl Gjersem, NHD; Gunnar Jordfald, FFA; Keith Smith, 
BIS; Bente Lie, KD; Sigmund Grønmo, UiB; Hjordis Møller Sandborg, HOD; Tore Li, 
NHO; Tone Westlie, AD; Kari Balke Øiseth, KD; Geir Arnulf, KD; Sidsel Aarnæs Arbo, 
KD; Asgeir Fløtre, KD.   
We have interviewed something over 200 people as well as running surveys.  We are 
grateful to all the people who contributed for their helpful and friendly support.  We 
hope our report justified they effort they put in and will be of use in the next chapter of 
RCN’s development.  While various people have kindly checked and commented on 
our work, naturally the final responsibility for it (including eventually any mistakes) 
rests with the authors.   
 
 
Erik Arnold and Bea Mahieu 
Brighton 31 August 2012, for the evaluation team 
 
Erik Arnold, Bea Mahieu. Malin Carlberg, Andrej Horvath, Cristina Rosemberg, 
Tobias Fridholm, Göran Melin, Patries Boekholt – Technopolis Group 
Thed van Leeuwen - Center for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS), Leiden 
University 
Liv Langfeldt, Fredrik Piro, Inge Ramberg and Hebe Gunnes – NIFU 
Ådne Cappelen, Arvid Raknerud_and Marina Rybalka – Statistics Norway 
John Rigby, Deborah Cox, Paul Cunningham, Jakob Edler, Abdullah Gök, Philip 
Shapira, Thordis Sveinsdottir  - Manchester Institute of Innovation Research 
 
 
  
A Good Council? i 
Table of Contents 
Preface ii	  
Sammendrag 1	  
Summary 10	  
1. Introduction 19	  
1.1 Evaluating RCN 19	  
1.2 RCN’s goals and tasks 20	  
1.3 Approach and methods 20	  
1.4 Guide to the report 22	  
2. International and domestic challenges in research and innovation 23	  
2.1 The international context 23	  
2.2 Research and innovation in the Norwegian economy 24	  
2.3 Norwegian performance on bibliometric measures 28	  
2.4 Conclusions 29	  
3. RCN and governance in the Norwegian research and innovation system 30	  
3.1 The role of RCN 30	  
3.2 The Fund for Research and Innovation 32	  
3.3 The governance and policy context 34	  
3.4 Autonomy and external funding 37	  
3.5 Conclusions 38	  
4. The role of basic research 39	  
4.1 Basic research in the innovation system 39	  
4.2 Finding the right mix 41	  
4.3 Conclusions 45	  
5. Strategic intelligence and advice to government 46	  
5.1 Strategic intelligence 46	  
5.2 Advice to government 48	  
5.3 Advice to the research performers and strategic responsibility for the research 
institutes 49	  
5.4 Conclusions 50	  
6. RCN organisation and governance 52	  
6.1 RCN’s internal organisation and steering 52	  
6.2 The funding process 57	  
6.3 Ministry steering and the new management by objectives system 59	  
6.4 RCN’s organisational boundaries 61	  
6.5 Conclusions 62	  
  
ii A Good Council? 
7. Implementing and adding value to national priorities and developing the national 
research and innovation system 64	  
7.1 Research strategy 64	  
7.2 How RCN used the budget 64	  
7.3 Other effects on the research and innovation system 82	  
7.4 Conclusions 87	  
8. Internationalisation 90	  
8.1 Strategy 90	  
8.2 Findings 92	  
8.3 Recommendations 94	  
9. Policy conclusions and recommendations 96	  
9.1 Challenges 96	  
9.2 Getting the balance right 97	  
9.3 Recommendations 100	  
Appendix A Terms of reference 101	  
Appendix B The evaluation questions 108	  
Appendix C List of background reports 111	  
 
  
A Good Council? iii 
 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1 How work packages interrelate ........................................................................ 21	  
Figure 2 Gross Expenditure on R&D per capita and as a share of GDP, 2009 .............25	  
Figure 3 Number of Norwegian and other papers in the Web of Science, 2001-9 .......28	  
Figure 4 Field normalised impact scores of Norwegian and other countries’ 
publications in the WoS, 2001-9 ....................................................................................29	  
Figure 5 Trend in RCN’s sources of income (current prices) ........................................ 31	  
Figure 6 Funding of research through the programmes................................................ 31	  
Figure 7 RCN funding by beneficiary category ..............................................................32	  
Figure 8 RCN spend by discipline, 2000-2010..............................................................32	  
Figure 9 How RCN used income from the Research and Innovation Fund (FFN), 
2006-2011, MNOK..........................................................................................................33	  
Figure 10 The RD&I Governance system in Norway .....................................................35	  
Figure 11 Norwegian Research Governance and Steering Structure ............................. 37	  
Figure 12  Programme 1 and Programme 2.................................................................... 41	  
Figure 13 Relative importance of BERD and HERD, 2006-9........................................42	  
Figure 14 Absolute and Relative Development of Research by Type over Time and in 
2006-9 for a Basket of Countries ...................................................................................43	  
Figure 15 Proportion of Basic Research in the main Departments and Agencies 
involved in R&D funding (1986-2009) ..........................................................................43	  
Figure 16 Government Funding of HERD: Institutional Funding vs. Project Funding 
(2008) .............................................................................................................................44	  
Figure 17 Share of GUF versus direct government funding of R&D expenditure in the 
Higher Education Sector, 2009 (in millions of €) .........................................................45	  
Figure 18 Type of committees or boards (2003-2010) (Percentages)........................... 47	  
Figure 19 Developments in the RCN organisational structure......................................53	  
Figure 20 Process for drafting annual budget proposals............................................... 55	  
Figure 21  Research budget per FTE, 2004-2010 ..........................................................56	  
Figure 22 The three-level hierarchy in the governance structure ................................. 57	  
Figure 23 Visibility of RCN-funded and other Norwegian researchers in top journals, 
2001-2007.......................................................................................................................58	  
Figure 24 The main components of the research budget ..............................................66	  
Figure 25 Intervention categories for competitive funding........................................... 67	  
Figure 26 Focus of support to the RD&I system – competitive funding....................... 67	  
Figure 27 Policy mix for the competitive funding of RD&I ...........................................68	  
Figure 28 RCN view of basic research content in Large programmes ..........................68	  
Figure 29 The policy mix of competitive funding in RCN’s three divisions..................68	  
  
iv A Good Council? 
Figure 30 Policy-mix for competitive funding in the Division for Strategic Priorities 
(2004-2010) ................................................................................................................... 69	  
Figure 31 Policy-mix for the systemic initiatives........................................................... 70	  
Figure 32 Trend in systemic initiatives for the research and innovation system......... 70	  
Figure 33 Stakeholder involvement in the Systemic initiatives..................................... 71	  
Figure 34 Funding of collaborative research.................................................................. 71	  
Figure 35 Inter-regional research collaborations – project ‘owners’ versus partners, 
2010 .................................................................................................................................72	  
Figure 36 Institutional funding channelled through RCN.............................................72	  
Figure 37 Instruments for competitive funding .............................................................73	  
Figure 38 Stakeholder involvement in competitive-funded measures..........................74	  
Figure 39 Stakeholder involvement in innovation-orientated, mission and basic 
research ...........................................................................................................................75	  
Figure 40 Disciplinary focus of competitive research....................................................76	  
Figure 41 Disciplinary focus & level of interdisciplinary research in the programmes.77	  
Figure 42 Funding of mono- versus inter-disciplinary research projects in the specific 
Large-scale programmes................................................................................................ 78	  
Figure 43 Bottom-up versus programme-based competitive research ........................ 78	  
Figure 44 Focus on the national priorities in RCN programmes (current MNOK and 
%).................................................................................................................................... 80	  
Figure 45 Instruments for the funding of participation in EU programmes/initiatives
.........................................................................................................................................81	  
Figure 46 Involvement of foreign partners in ‘mainstream’ collaborative research 
programmes ................................................................................................................... 82	  
Figure 47 Gender equality in project leadership ........................................................... 82	  
Figure 48 Involvement of stakeholders in international cooperation activities........... 93	  
 
  
A Good Council? 1 
Sammendrag 
Norges forskningsråd skiller seg fra tilsvarende organisasjoner i andre land ettersom 
rådet både finansierer forskning ved universiteter og institutter og samtidig støtter 
forskningsdrevet innovasjon i næringslivet. En annen av rådets hovedoppgaver er å 
være regjeringens rådgiver i forsknings- og innovasjonspolitiske spørsmål. 
Forskningsrådet skal også fungere som møteplass for aktører og interessegrupper 
innen forskning og innovasjon. 
Forskningsrådet ble opprettet i 1993. Et hovedformål var å redusere fragmenteringen i 
finansieringen av forskning og innovasjon, og å legge til rette for en mer koordinert 
forsknings- og innovasjonspolitikk. Den første evalueringen av Forskningsrådet i 2001 
konkluderte med at samordningen av flere funksjoner i ett råd ga en unik mulighet til 
å samordne og integrere forskning og innovasjon. Men evalueringen fant samtidig at 
denne muligheten ikke var godt nok utnyttet. Organiseringen internt i 
Forskningsrådet videreførte langt på vei den tidligere inndelingen i flere 
forskningsråd. Eksternt var rådet overstyrt, med finansiering og styringssignaler fra 16 
ulike departementer. Dette kombinert med begrensete «strategiske» ressurser gjorde 
at rådet hadde lite rom til å håndtere og være pådriver for endringer. Som svar på 
evalueringen ble Forskningsrådet omorganisert. Regjeringen hadde da allerede 
adressert problemet med manglende strategiske ressurser gjennom opprettelsen av 
Fondet for forskning og nyskaping. Styringen av fondet var lagt til kirke-, utdannings- 
og forskningsdepartementet (nå Kunnskapsdepartementet), og fondet var ment som et 
virkemiddel for å støtte langsiktig forskning og prosjekter på tvers av departements- 
og sektorgrenser. Gjennom den siste tiårsperioden har fondet bidratt til å finansiere en 
rekke nye initiativer i regi av Norges forskningsråd, blant annet opprettelsen av nye 
sentra ved norske universiteter og høyskoler og nye store forskningsprogrammer for å 
adressere nasjonale mål og behov. Fondet har også finansiert andre forsknings- og 
innovasjonsaktiviteter, blant annet norsk kontingent for deltakelse i EUs 
rammeprogrammer for forskning og teknologisk utvikling.  
Hovedkonklusjonen i denne evalueringen fra 2011-12 er at Forskningsrådet nå 
fungerer godt og kan fortsatt gjøre det, forutsatt at man evner å balansere 
departementenes sektorinteresser med kollektivets samlede behov og interesser. En 
slik balanse vil kreve en kontinuerlig avveining mellom sektorinteresser og strategiske 
ressurser. 
 
Norges resultater innenfor innovasjon og forskning 
Det norske velferds- og inntektsnivået er blant verdens høyeste. Dette innebærer at 
lønninger og andre innsatsfaktorer er svært høye og Norge har større muligheter til å 
konkurrere på kunnskap enn på pris. Sammenlignet med andre land investerer Norge 
lite i forskning og utviklingsarbeid (FoU) som andel av BNP. Samtidig er store deler av 
økonomien teknologibasert og teknologiintensiv. Målt per innbygger er norske FoU-
utgifter på et høyt internasjonalt nivå, men bak ledende land som Sveits og USA og de 
nordiske nabolandene. Norsk næringsliv investerer fortsatt lite i FoU sammenlignet 
med næringslivet i andre land. 
Publiserings- og siteringsdata viser at norske forskningsresultater holder et godt nivå, 
uten å være blant de aller beste. Generelt er forskningsrådsfinansiert forskning bedre 
og mer synlig enn forskning med annen type finansiering, men dette gjelder ikke alle 
fagfelt. Innenfor enkelte områder skårer norsk forskning høyt, men det er få felt hvor 
Norge virkelig er verdensledende. En annen indikator som viser relativt beskjedne 
resultater av norsk forskning er det lave antall stipend finansiert av det nye Europeiske 
forskningsrådet (ERC) som har blitt tildelt norske forskere.  
  
2 A Good Council? 
En stor og ressurskrevende råvareproduserende sektor tiltrekker seg gjerne både 
oppmerksomhet, kapital og arbeidskraft som kan føre til et økt kronekurs, noe som 
igjen kan gjøre det vanskelig for andre deler av økonomien å konkurrere 
internasjonalt. Dette vanskeliggjør konstante omstilling og fornyelse som er 
nødvendig i alle deler av økonomien. Andelen innovative foretak i norsk industri viser 
en langsom nedadgående tendens, mens oppstartstakten blant nye, forskningsbaserte 
bedrifter er langsom og utenlandske investeringer er lave med få impulser til endring. 
Næringslivets evne til fornyelse virker således for lav til å konkurrere på bakgrunn av 
kunnskap. Fornyelse innenfor forskningssystemet er minst like viktig, ikke bare som 
støtte for næringslivet og for å takle vår tids store utfordringer som klimaendringene, 
men også ut fra en sosial og kulturell begrunnelse.  
Behovet for et solid kunnskapsgrunnlag kombinert med kontinuerlig omstilling og 
fornyelse betyr at forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet må fylle to roller. Den ene er å 
være en «aggregerings-maskin» som velger ut de beste prosjektene til finansiering og 
som reflekterer eksisterende samfunnsbehov, ikke minst slik departementene 
uttrykker dem på vegne av samfunnssektorene de representerer. Den andre rollen er å 
være «endringsagent», å støtte fornyelsesprosessen ved å fremme endring og 
innovasjon i vitenskapen og industrien. Dette er en vanskelig oppgave. En 
organisasjon som Norges forskningsråd må arbeide systematisk og samtidig kunne 
sprenge grenser.  
 
Forskningsrådets resultater  
Norges forskningsråd er del av et sammenvevd norsk policy-system. Mennesker og 
organisasjoner er i hyppig dialog, og Forskningsrådet er underlagt departementenes 
overordnede beslutninger og føringer, og arbeider slik ikke alene. Gjennom det siste 
tiåret har Forskningsrådet oppnådd betydelige resultater. Noen av disse følger av en 
generell omlegging av forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet initiert av myndighetene for 
å øke offentlige forskningsinstitusjoners autonomi. En del resultater avhenger dermed 
mer av generelle incentiver enn av spesifikke kvalitetstiltak. Resultatene omfatter 
• Bidrag til utvikling av en rekke nasjonale forskningsstrategier – som på 
overordnet nivå kommer til uttrykk i Stortingsmeldinger, i strategier for enkelt- 
departementer og grupper av departementer og i Nordområdestrategien.  
• Bidrag til koordinering av den nasjonale forskningsinnsatsen gjennom å slå 
sammen flere forskningsprogrammer og utvikle programmer som svarer på 
behovene til flere departementer.   
• Økning av andelen midler til forskning og innovasjon som ikke er tematisk styrt, 
og dermed en bedre balanse mellom forskerinitierte prosjekter og innsats initiert 
av andre samfunnsinteresser.  
• Bidrag til fornyelse, økt kvalitet og mindre fragmentering i forskningssystemet 
gjennom senterordninger – SFF, SFI og FME – og gjennom etablering av Store 
programmer.  
• Utviklet virkemidler som fremmer fornying, herunder Nærings-PhD og Yngre 
fremragende forskere (YFF).  
• Redusert fragmentering ved å legge mer vekt på å finansiere grupper og samarbeid 
og mindre vekt på individstøtte. 
• Økt den internasjonale deltakelsen i norsk forskning og støttet norsk deltakelse i 
internasjonalt samarbeid, spesielt gjennom EUs rammeprogrammer for forskning 
og teknologisk utvikling hvor Norge er en høyt respektert deltaker selv uten å være 
en medlemsstat.  
• Utviklet og iverksatt en strategi for store forskningsinfrastrukturer. 
• Bidrag til utvikling og iverksetting av et system for resultatbasert finansiering for 
instituttsektoren. 
• Utviklet og vedlikeholdt systemer for god og effektiv søknadsbehandling og 
administrative prosesser som er i tråd med god internasjonal praksis.  
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I flere fall har Norges forskningsråd sammen med KD fungert som en  endringsagent i 
forskningssystemet. Store endringer slik som senter-ordningene og Store programmer 
er i stor grad iverksatt ved hjelp av Fondet for forskning og nyskaping. Dette 
understreker betydningen av strategiske ressurser for å fornye forsknings- og 
innovasjonssystemet.   
 
Forskningsrådets rådgivningsfunksjon 
Forskningsrådet er en viktig leverandør av forskningspolitiske råd til regjeringen.  Det 
produserer både kunnskapsgrunnlag som basis for strategidannelse og råd i form av 
policyforslag.   
Forskningsrådet bidrar til å skape og publisere kunnskapsgrunnlag for 
forskningspolitikk gjennom en rekke forskjellige studier som instituttsundersøkelsen 
og indikatorrapporten som legges frem hvert år.  Rådet er i ferd med å øke og forbedre 
bruken av interne datakilder om sin finansieringsportefølje.  Forskningsrådet har en 
stor og bred kontaktflate gjennom sine møteplasser, som det bruker for å støtte 
planlegging og design av programmer.  Fra 2004 tok Forskningsrådet i en periode i 
bruk foresight, som er en måte å finne frem til andre perspektiv og visjoner enn de 
man får fra interessenter.  Dette er en sunn måte å begrense risikoen for at 
interessentenes lokale synspunkter leder til innlåsning.  I dag skapes flere store 
forskningsstrategier på departementsnivå.  Det er viktig fortsatt å bruke foresight og å 
involvere utlendinger i disse prosessene for å hente inn alternative perspektiver.   
Forskningsrådet har en sterk fagevakueringstradisjon og er i ferd med å øke bruken av 
programevalueringer.  Men det brukes for få ressurser på evaluering i det hele tatt, 
særlig i henhold til å undersøke effektene av egne virkemidler og tiltak.  Evaluering er 
ikke enda systematisk festet i Forskningsrådets planleggingsrutiner.   
Forskningsrådet bidrar i utviklingen av departementenes forskningsstrategier 
gjennom den årlige budsjettdialogen og leverer ofte større bidrag til produksjonen av 
forskningsmeldinger og andre strategier på nasjonalt nivå.  KD skal koordinere 
forskningspolitikk på departementsnivå og har tatt ansvar for å finansiere mange 
forskjellige typer av forskning.  Men KD kan ikke bestemme hva andre departement 
skal gjøre.  At det ikke finnes en koordineringsinstans på høyere nivå, så som det 
finske Rådet for forsknings og innovasjon, gjør det vanskelig å skape en forpliktende 
nasjonal forskningsstrategi og øker de interne koordineringskostnadene i 
Forskningsrådet.   
Forskningsrådet har strategisk ansvar for instituttsektoren og har tidligere evaluert 
dem systematisk og regelmessig.  Det bidro til det nye resultatbaserte 
finansieringssystemet for instituttene, som ikke enda er implementert fullt ut.  
Insentivene for fornyelse og restrukturering i instituttsktoren er fortsatt svake og få 
departement synes å være opptatt av instituttpolitikk.  At Forskningsrådet nå stort sett 
ikke lenger bestiller instituttevalueringer betyr at hverken instituttene selv eller andre 
får et godt overblikk av instituttene som organisasjoner.  I andre land som har innført 
resultatbasert forskningsfinansiering som bygger sterkt på tellekanter har man erfart 
at disse kan lede til perverse effekter og innlåsninger.  Vi ville derfor heller se en 
blanding av resultatmåling og skjønn utført av en eller flere kompetente eiere av 
grupper av institutter enn at instituttsektoren behandles som ett kvasi- marked.  Men i 
dag henger instituttsektoren mellom det gamle (tannløse) evalueringssystemet og et 
resultatbasert system som ikke fullt er implementert.  Dette er ikke tilfredsstillende.   
 
Organisering og styring 
Forskningsrådet rapporterer til 16 departementer og har et bredt ansvarsområde som 
omfatter hele forskningssystemet. Rådet er dermed pålagt tunge organisatoriske og 
administrative oppgaver. Disse oppgavene blir ytterligere mer krevende ved at 
forsknings- og teknologifeltet blir stadig mer komplekst, og at problemer på tvers av 
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fag og sektorer får økende betydning. Samtidig må Forskningsrådet forholde seg til et 
stort antall interessegrupper. 
Forskningsrådet ble omorganisert etter den første evalueringen og på nytt i 2010. 
Omorganiseringen i 2010 var hensiktsmessig og vel gjennomført. Forskningsrådet er 
fortsatt en kompleks organisasjon, men dette henger i stor grad sammen med at rådet 
har 16 eiere. Den nye organiseringen har svart på behovet for mer tematisk og faglig 
ekspertise i divisjonsstyrene, og har lagt et grunnlag for at Forskningsrådet kan styrke 
sin rolle når det gjelder utforming av nasjonale forsknings- og innovasjonsstrategier. 
Ledelsen i linjen er styrket ved å redusere overlapp mellom divisjonene, samtidig som 
strukturen i Forskningsrådet nå framstår som mer transparent. Men 
omorganiseringen har etterlatt for lite analysekapasitet sentralt i organisasjonen. 
Dette er noe Forskningsrådet trenger hvis det skal spille en sentral rolle som 
forskningspolitisk rådgiver og pådriver for endring. En nylig opprettet analysegruppe i 
direktørens stab er ment å fylle denne rollen. 
Forskningsrådet har tre styringsnivåer: Hovedstyret, divisjonsstyrene og 
programstyrene. Enkelte medlemmer av Hovedstyret og divisjonsstyrene uttrykker 
frustrasjon over at beslutningsmakten er begrenset gjennom de detaljerte føringene 
fra de 16 departementene. Etter vårt syn er alle de tre styringsnivåene nødvendige 
(hovedstyre, divisjons- og programstyrer) . Den nye organiseringen bør styrke den 
strategiske funksjonen til de to øverste styrene – særlig hvis styrene blir understøttet 
av mer uavhengig analysearbeid. 
Forskningsrådets administrasjonsutgifter har gått ned fra 8 prosent av totalbudsjettet 
i 2003 til 7 prosent i 2010. Samtidig med denne effektiviseringen har det vært en 
rasjonalisering i antall programmer og virkemidler (fra 229 til 178), mens 
gjennomsnittlig størrelse på hvert prosjekt har økt med om lag 10%. Det er gjort 
betydelige investeringer i ny informasjonsteknologi og standardisering av søknads- og 
behandlingsprosessene. Forskningsrådet har også styrket rutinene for behandling av 
habilitetssaker og andre konfliktsaker.  
Forskningsrådet har gjort betydelige forbedringer av kvalitet og effektivitet i 
søknadsbehandlingen. Disse prosessene er nå så åpne som de kan være og på nivå med 
god internasjonal praksis. Bibliometriske undersøkelser viser at forskere med 
finansiering fra Forskningsrådet skårer generelt høyere på sitering enn forskere som 
har fått avslag på sine søknader. Forskere med mye støtte fra Forskningsrådet skårer 
også høyest på sitering. I likhet med andre forskningsråd bør Norges forskningsråd se 
nærmere på hvordan de skal håndtere søknader som går på tvers av disipliner og som 
søker å sprenge grenser. 
Innvilgelsesprosenten varierer mye mellom de ulike programmene. Den er særlig lav 
innen FRIPRO, av to grunner. For det første er det innenfor dette programmet en 
mindre, men likevel betydelig andel svake søknader som vi mener søkernes 
institusjoner burde ha luket ut. For det andre mottar programmet langt flere søknader 
med høy kvalitet enn det er ressurser til å innvilge.  
Måten departementene styrer Forskningsrådet på er et sentralt spørsmål for denne 
evalueringen. Generelt er forholdet mellom eiere, i dette tilfellet departementene, og 
underliggende organ, i dette tilfellet Forskningsrådet, forbundet med betydelige 
styringsutfordringer. Gjensidig tillit mellom eier og underlagt organ samt klarhet om 
hva som er målene kan bidra til å redusere disse styringsutfordringene. Et organ med 
flere eiere har et særskilt krevende tillitsforhold, ettersom eierne vil unngå at ”deres 
bevilgninger” blir brukt til å tjene andre eieres interesser. Det er dermed en fare for at 
eierne ”overstyrer” organet og på den måten gjør det mindre effektivt. I praksis er 
styringsdialogen mellom Forskningsrådet og de ulike departementene preget av 
åpenhet og tillit, og noen departementer har av den grunn valgt å kanalisere en større 
del av forskningsbevilgningene sine gjennom Forskningsrådet. Dialogen ser også ut til 
å være mer toveis enn tidligere. Selv om detaljstyring ”låser inn” Forskningsrådet, er 
det ikke bare departementene som bidrar til dette – Forskningsrådet har også en 
interesse av å få detaljerte føringer som forplikter departementene.  
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Forholdet til Kunnskapsdepartementet (KD) omfatter mer enn eierskap. 
Departementets ansvar går langt utover utdanningsdepartementenes tradisjonelle 
ansvar for å ivareta grunnforskning. Kunnskapsdepartementet fungerer i større og 
større grad som et ”vitenskapsdepartement” med ansvar for forskning i hele systemet. 
Kunnskapsdepartementet, det tidligere Forskningsfondet og den nye budsjettposten 
som erstatter fondet utgjør de viktigste mekanismene for å håndtere systemsvikt. Slik 
systemsvikt kan blant omfatte strukturelle forhold, behov for kapasitetsoppbygging og 
forskning som havner i ”den grå sonen” mellom departementene. Forholdet til KD 
avhenger også av en felles oppfatning av hvordan man avgrenser departementenes 
ansvar for grunnforskning innen egen sektor, og dermed hvor vidt man skal definere 
sektoransvaret.    
Det er innført et nytt system med mål- og resultatstyring (MRS), hvilket vi oppfatter 
som et forsøk på å overføre tenkningen fra New Public Management inn i styringen av 
Forskningsrådet. Dette systemet skal bidra til å styrke departementenes utøvelse av 
sektoransvaret for forskning samtidig som det skal bidra til bedre koordinering og en 
mer strømlinjeformet styring og rapportering. Til forskjell fra praksis i en del andre 
land fokuserer den norske styringsdialogen mer på programmer og virkemidler enn på 
overordnede mål. Det nye mål- og resultatstyringssystemet har til hensikt å løfte 
styringen opp på et mer overordnet nivå, men i praksis handler styringsdialogen 
fortsatt mest om programmer og aktiviteter. De fleste departementene har tilpasset 
det nye MRS-systemet til den typen styring som de alltid har praktisert. De ser dermed 
liten merverdi med det nye systemet. Et problem med MRS-systemet er at det ikke 
vurderer effektene av forskningen. Ikke desto mindre gir systemet en mulighet til 
bedre, klarere og mer målrettet styring samtidig som det legger til rette for bedre 
koordinering mellom departementene. Departementene trenger sterkere incentiver til 
å utnytte disse mulighetene i systemet. Det er behov for at departementene samlet 
gjennomgår sine erfaringer med systemet i samråd med Forskningsrådet. På bakgrunn 
av det bør man gå i retning av å styre etter mer overordnede mål, sette klarere krav til 
resultater og innføre et enklere og mer transparent rapporteringssystem.  
I vårt mandat lå også en forventning om å se på Forskningsrådets organisatoriske 
grensedragning mot SIVA og Innovasjon Norge. Forholdet til SIVA er tydelig og 
avklart. På områder hvor Forskningsrådet samarbeider med Innovasjon Norge, kan 
det være tilfeller av overlappende aktiviteter. Men samarbeidet mellom de to 
organisasjonene er vel etablert og synes å forsterke seg. Det er lite som tyder på at 
brukerne er forvirret over arbeidsdelingen. Samarbeidet kan bli bedre når det gjelder 
informasjonsdeling, og det kan være potensial for bedre felles utnyttelse av 
organisasjonenes internasjonale nettverk. Alt i alt ser vi ingen grunn til å endre på 
arbeidsdelingen mellom Forskningsrådet, SIVA og Innovasjon Norge.  
 
Gjennomføring og videreutvikling av nasjonale prioriteringer 
Norges forskningsråd kan påvirke nasjonale prioriteringer gjennom innspill til 
Regjeringens Forskningsmeldinger. Rådet har en intern matriseorganisasjon som 
identifiserer og styrer ressursene inn mot prioriterte tema og områder. En effekt av 
dette er at Forskningsrådet i økende grad utarbeider tverrfaglige programmer. Siden 
departementene selv bestemmer hvor mye budsjett de skal bruke på de prioriterte 
områdene må Forskningsrådet implementere nasjonale prioriteringer gjennom 16 
parallelle forhandlinger. Forskningsrådets programmer skal matche prioriteringene, 
og være Forskningsrådets kanal til å rådgi  departementene i tildelingsbeslutningene. 
Departementene samarbeider i økende grad om felles finansiering av programmer i 
Forskningsrådet, over tid har man dermed oppnådd større samordning av de 
nasjonale prioriteringene. 
Ser man på det generelle utgiftsmønsteret, retter Norges forskningsråd pengebruken 
mot et mindre antall store programmer som er relevante for de nasjonale 
prioriteringene eller enkelt-departementers interessefelt. Dette er ledsaget av en viss 
økning i andelen ressurser som brukes innenfor de ikke-tematiske 
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finansieringsordningene. Denne skjerping av fokus er nyttig, men gjør det 
vanskeligere å håndtere mellomstore saker, for eksempel når nye trender innenfor 
forskning eller innovasjon trenger oppfølging. «Av-programmeringen» av en stor 
andel innovasjonsprosjekter og putte dem i én enkelt Brukerstyrt innovasjonsarena 
(BIA) innebærer en risiko for ikke å fange opp og bidra til å organisere nye 
interessenter, eksempelvis leveransekjeder eller klynger. Det reduserer muligheten til 
å drive mindre, innovasjonsrettede programmer nært knyttet til nye teknologier og 
brukerbehov som, i likhet med teknologiprogrammene til Tekes og VINNOVA, 
fremmer forskningsbasert kompetanseoppbygging og samhandling mellom industri-
forskning innenfor nye områder med store innovasjonsmuligheter. 
Norges forskningsråd har støttet regjeringens politikk for mer autonomi til 
institusjonene ved å øke andelen av ressursene som tildeles etter konkurranse, fra litt 
over 70 prosent ved begynnelsen av tiåret til over 80 prosent. Det nye finansierings-
systemet for instituttene ser ut til å ha økt deres publiseringsrate, og i mange tilfeller 
også påvirket forskningsledelse og oppmerksomhet omkring publisering.  
Forskningsrådet har økt andelen ressurser som brukes på systemtiltak: 
kapasitetsutbygging, strukturtiltak som senterordninger og oppbygging av 
infrastruktur. Finansiering av større prosjekter og større programmer, samt nettverk, 
fremmer etablering av større grupper og en mer konkurransebasert arbeidsdeling i 
forskningssystemet. Ledere av forskingsinstitusjonene mener at Forskningsrådets 
insentiver påvirker deres forskningsfokus. Mer regionalt baserte forskere blir trukket 
inn mot forskningsnettverk i Oslo-regionen. Samtidig har Forskningsrådet tiltak på 
plass for å skjerme unge forskere mot konkurranse fra de etablerte forskerne, slik at 
neste generasjon av forskere skal få sjanse til å etablere seg.  
Mens om lag 40 prosent av stipendene tildeles kvinner, er bare om lag 20 prosent av 
prosjekt-teamene ledet av kvinner. Den store vekten på teknologi, og matematiske og 
naturvitenskapelige fag i Forskningsrådets portefølje kan være en delvis (men ikke 
tilfredsstillende) forklaring på dette.  
I det store og hele er Forskningsrådets finansiering innenfor næringslivsrelevante 
områder i tråd med profilen på næringslivets FoU. Forskningsrådet «overinvesterer» i 
nanoteknologi og bioteknologi, dette er ikke uventet da det er generiske teknologier 
man forventer vil få stor betydning. IKT er i så måte et unntak, der Forskningsrådets 
finansiering virker lav sammenlignet med næringslivets aktivitetsnivå. 
 
Utvikling av forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet  
Spørreundersøkelsene viser at både forskerne og lederne ved forskningsinstitusjonene 
mener Forskningsrådets støtteordninger er attraktive, men ikke alltid like attraktive 
som relevante internasjonale finansieringskilder.  For universitetsforskerne er fri 
prosjektstøtte (FRIPRO) Forskningsrådets mest attraktive støtteordning, i 
instituttsektoren er de store programmene mest populære. Spørreundersøkelsene og 
intervjuene viser at forskerne er middels fornøyde med søknadsbehandlingen og 
vurderingsprosessene, og det er økende tilfredshet med Forskningsrådets forvaltning 
generelt.  Som en kan forvente er de som har fått tilslag på sine søknader mer positive 
enn de som har fått avslag. Sammenliknet med resultatene fra surveyene for den 
foregående evalueringen av Forskningsrådet, synes forskerne nå noe mer fornøyde.     
Det finnes begrenset informasjon om effekter av Forskningsrådets aktivitet. 
Forskningsrådets primære rolle innen forskerinitiert, grunnleggende forskning 
(FRIPRO) er å være en «aggregeringsmaskin» – rådet finansierer prosjektsøknader og 
setter en kvalitetsterskel som hever kvaliteten på norsk forskning. Foreliggende 
evalueringer tyder ikke på at Forskningsrådet her har rollen som endringsagent eller 
systematisk finansierer grensesprengende forskning. Både FUGE og NAMOMAT 
startet som grunnforskningsprogrammer som skulle hjelpe norsk forskning til å holde 
tritt med den internasjonale utviklingen innen to av de tre «nye teknologiene» som 
resten av verden lenge hadde regnet som generiske. Med andre ord finnes i det minste 
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anekdotisk grunnlag for å hevde at rollen som aggregeringsmaskin ikke er tilstrekkelig 
for norsk forskning.  
Å involvere brukere og andre interessenter er nødvendig for å sikre at forskningen er 
knyttet opp mot behov og marked. Samtidig trengs mekanismer for å unngå 
incentivproblemer (moralsk risiko) og forebygge skjev utvelgelse. Forskningsrådets 
økte fokus på habilitet viser at det er svært oppmerksom på dette. Samtidig innebærer 
underinvolvering av potensielle brukere at forskningsprogammer blir utviklet uten 
tilstrekkelige signaler om hva som er viktig og relevant å satse på for å knytte 
forskningen opp mot praksis. Dette ser vi blant annet i evalueringene av NANOMAT 
og FUGE.  
Senter-ordningene synes å anspore mer strategisk forskningsledelse og noe omstilling, 
spesielt ved universitetene. Det kan samtidig forventes at SFI-ene også vil gi bedre 
samarbeide mellom næringslivet og akademia og mer industriell innovasjon. Her ser 
vi at Forskingsrådet fungerer som en endringsagent.  
Evalueringer viser at brukerstyrt FoU er et godt virkemiddel for å øke næringslivets 
FoU-innsats. Den gir innovasjon i næringslivet (og nok økonomisk suksess til å gi 
bedriftene betydelig avkastning), viktig kunnskap som også generer spillovereffekter, 
og bidrar til at bedriftene (spesielt de små) ønsker å investere mer i FoU. Både den 
privatøkonomiske og offentlige avkastningen av næringslivets FoU er høy. Mens 
økonomer ofte forutsetter at offentlig finansering fortrenger private investeringer og 
sporer næringslivet til gale investeringer (‘picking winners’), viser data det motsatte. 
Forskningsrådets finansering tiltrekker private investeringer; den privatøkonomiske 
avkastningen som genereres er omtrent den samme som næringslivet får fra FoU de 
selv har finansiert; den samfunnsøkonomiske avkastningen er høyere. Skattefunn er et 
godt virkemiddel for små bedrifter for å øke FoU-innsatsen, og genererer høy 
privatøkonomisk avkastning, men begrensede eksternaliteter. Når bedriftenes FoU-
utgifter vokser  er Forskningsrådets tilnærming med søknadsbehandling og 
seleksjonsprosess bedre og gir økte eksternaliteter. Forskningsrådet kan fremme 
akkumulering (bl.a. rundt nasjonale prioriteringer) og en unngår problemet med at 
større bedrifter kan være gratispassasjerer i Skattefunn.  
De «teknologi-push»-satsingene som er evaluert har ikke vært så gode som forventet – 
verken når det gjelder teknologioverføring (FORNY) eller store programmer (FUGE og 
NANOMAT).  Det er behov for en mer integrert tilnærming til kunnskapsutveksling, 
med mer involvering fra etterspørselssiden.   
Deltakere i Forskningsrådets «møteplasser» har generelt et positivt bilde av rådets 
kommunikasjons- og formidlingsaktiviteter. Informantene satte pris på å bli involvert 
i Forskningsrådets møter, men flere – eksempelvis de intervjuene medlemmene av 
Hovedstyret og Divisjonsstyrene – mente at deres innflytelse var nokså begrenset 
gjennom rammebetingelsene som var satt av departementene.  
Næringslivet søker finansiering fra Forskningsrådet for å løse utfordringer knyttet til 
innovasjon og redusere teknologisk risiko. Her var informantene opptatt av kvaliteten 
på Forskningsrådets søknadsbehandling, som de mente kunne bli for akademisk, og 
de var ikke fornøyd med søknadsfristene. Én søknadsrunde i året er ikke nok for 
næringslivets beslutningstakt og hyppigere søknadsrunder er ønskelig. 
Næringslivsinformantene så Forskningsrådet som støttende og god rådgiver, men var 
overrasket over at rådet ikke syntes interessert i prosjektresultatene etter at 
rapporteringsskjemaene var ferdig utfylt. Forskningsrådets åpenhetskultur ble sett 
som en viktig styrke som bør ivaretas.  
Vårt generelle inntrykk er at Forskningsrådet er flink til å ivareta definerte behov og 
tjene sine brukere, men mindre god på å være proaktiv. Gitt Forskningsrådets 
styringsstrukturer, er dette trolig ikke overraskende, og rådet trenger muligens andre 
mekanismer for å håndtere det som brukerne ennå ikke vet at de trenger, inklusiv evne 
til diagnostiske og prospektive studier, finansiering av små-skala utvikling av egne 
lovende initiativ, og vurdere å eksplisitt adressere høy-risiko og tverrfaglig forskning. 
Rådets rolle som endringsagent kunne slik bli klarere.  
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Internasjonalisering 
Norge har lenge vært internasjonalt orientert, både når det gjelder handel, industri og 
forskning. I løpet av de siste ti årene har globaliseringen fått stor betydning både for 
økonomien og det vitenskapelige samarbeidet. Utviklingen innenfor EU-samarbeidet 
står sentralt i denne sammenhengen. Det samme gjør den sterke framgangen i store 
land som Kina, Russland, India og Brasil. Dette er land som tradisjonelt har vært 
mindre framtredende, men som nå hevder seg på den internasjonale arena både innen 
industri og vitenskap. 
Forskningsrådets virkemidler bidrar i betydelig grad til å fremme internasjonalisering. 
Virkemidlene har også bred støtte, men bør i større grad gjøres kjent i 
forskningsmiljøene. Forskningsrådet har satset sterkt på å støtte og stimulere norske 
forskere til å delta i EUs rammeprogrammer for forskning og øvrig europeisk 
forskningssamarbeid. Det er behov for mer kunnskap om hva som skal til for at flere 
forskere skal bli interessert i å delta i slikt samarbeid. Norge får fortsatt mindre midler 
tilbake fra EUs rammeprogram enn det landet bidrar med av finansiering. Derfor kan 
det være behov for å forsterke Forskningsrådet virkemidler. Samtidig beregnes Norges 
kontingent til EU på grunnlag av bruttonasjonalprodukt, hvilket betyr at det trolig er 
urealistisk å forvente at hele kontingenten skal hentes hjem. Deltakelsen i EUs 
rammeprogrammer har også videre effekter som gjør det vel verdt å opprettholde 
deltakelsen i det europeiske forskningssamarbeidet. 
Internasjonalisering er et overordnet mål i norsk forsknings- og innovasjonspolitikk, 
og man ser et økende innslag av utenlandsk deltakelse i Forskningrådsprosjekter. Hvis 
denne utviklingen fortsetter, vil en tredel av Forskningsrådets prosjekter ha 
utenlandsk deltakelse innen 2015. Forskningsrådet bør derfor se mer spesifikt på 
hvilke mål de skal ha for internasjonaliseringsarbeidet. Et gjennomgående fokus på 
internasjonalisering bør kombineres med et bevisst forhold til hva man får ut av 
internasjonaliseringen, hvilke fagområder man skal fokusere på og hvilke land man 
skal prioritere. Internasjonaliseringens rolle bør diskuteres mer åpent og på tvers av 
sektorer. Departementene bør også være mer konkrete og målrettede i sine 
internasjonaliseringsstrategier. For øyeblikket er det trolig for lite samarbeid med land 
utenfor Europa og Nord-Amerika. 
 
Anbefalinger 
Forskningsrådet kan ikke operere uavhengig av andre. Våre anbefalinger gjelder 
derfor ikke bare Forskningsrådet selv, men også andre relevante aktører, ikke minst 
departementene og regjeringen.  Våre sentrale anbefalinger er 
• Fraværet av et overordnet forsknings- og innovasjonspolitisk råd gjør det 
vanskelig å koordinere forsknings- og innovasjonspolitikk på nasjonalt nivå. Vi ser 
problemene forbundet med å opprette et slikt råd innenfor det norske 
regjeringsapparatet. Men som et minimum anbefaler vi at regjeringen utreder 
konstitusjonelt akseptable måter å styrke den forskningspolitiske koordineringen 
på nivået over departementene.  
• En nasjonal politikk og strategi for forskning og innovasjon er mer enn summen 
av viljen til 16 departementer. Fondet for forskning og nyskaping var en viktig 
mekanisme for å sikre strategiske ressurser til å skape endringer i det norske 
forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet. Fondet utgjorde en motvekt til 
sektorinteressenes tendens til å «låse inn» Forskningsrådet og forhindre 
nødvendig fornyelse av forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet. Selv om regjeringen 
hadde gode grunner til å legge ned fondet, er det avgjørende at den 
finansieringsmekanismen som erstatter fondet kan sikre den langsiktige 
forskningen og behovet for strukturelle endringer i systemet. 
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• Samlet sett er kvaliteten på norsk forskning god. Men den er trolig ikke god nok 
sett i lys av at kunnskap får stadig økende betydning for konkurranseevnen. Målet 
om økt kvalitet bør derfor vektlegges enda sterkere hos Forskningsrådet.  
• Forskningsrådet bør ha strategiske ressurser og handlingsrom til å utvikle og 
finansiere nye satsinger på eget initiativ og dermed være i forkant av samfunnets 
og politikernes behov og forventninger. Dette er viktig for å unngå at 
Forskningsrådet kommer sent på banen og blir hengende etter i utviklingen. 
• Forskningsrådets vekt på forskerinitiert «fri» forskning når det gjelder 
finansiering av grunnforskningsprosjekter gjør at dagens aktivitetsmønster i stor 
grad blir bestemmende for innretningen av framtidig aktivitet. Det er lite rom for 
eksplorative satsinger, og det kan virke som at Norge har kommet sent i gang med 
satsing på generiske teknologier. Forskningsrådet bør derfor etablere mekanismer 
som kan fremme og utvikle mer grensesprengende virkemidler, både innen 
grunnforskning og anvendt forskning. 
• Et viktig forskningspolitisk mål er å øke FoU-investeringene i næringslivet. 
Skatteinsentivordningen, tematiske programmer og det brukerstyrte BIA-
programmet er sentrale virkemidler i så måte. Samtidig er det få virkemidler som 
fanger opp behovet for mindre, mer tidsavgrensete satsinger som treffer behovene 
til bransjer eller klynger som er for store til å utgjøre konsortier for en BIA-
søknad. Forskningsrådet bør se nærmere på hvordan rådet konkret kan involvere 
relevante brukere i utformingen av slike teknologiprogrammer og eventuelt utvikle 
en større mekanisme for slike satsinger.   
• Forskerinitiert forskning utgjør et viktig element i ethvert velfungerende 
forskningssystem – særlig i et rikt land som trenger å ligge i eller nær fronten 
innen vitenskap og teknologi. Midlene til frie prosjekter (FRIPRO) bør styrkes, 
særlig til bedre å behandle tverrfaglig og høy-risiko forskning og å øke kvalitet. I 
tillegg kan Store programmer utvides til også å inneholde en dimensjon som 
eksplisitt ivaretar mer grunnleggende forskning. 
• Forskningsrådet og departementene bør vurdere om Forskingsrådet investerer 
nok i grunnforskning og anvendt forskning innen IKT. Dette bør ses i 
sammenheng med utviklingen av en ny strategi for IKT som generisk teknologi. 
• Forskningsrådet har for lite systematisk bruk av evalueringer og framtidsstudier. 
Evaluering bør være en integrert del av programsyklusen, og det bør rettes mer 
innsats mot å kartlegge og forstå effektene av Forskningsrådets egne aktiviteter. 
Det trengs mer ressurser og innsats rettet mot framtidsstudier som kan utfordre 
grensene, blant annet gjennom Foresight-studier. Dette trengs som en motvekt 
mot de naturlig konserverende (men absolutt nødvendige) effektene som følger av 
Forskningsrådets brede involvering av brukerne. 
• Det resultatbaserte finansieringssystemet for instituttene har allerede hatt positive 
effekter, og det på grunnlag av ganske små ressursallokeringer. Systemet bør 
implementeres fullt ut innenfor nåværende rammer. På dette stadium ser det ikke 
ut til å være noen åpenbar gevinst å hente ved å gjøre mer av basisfinansieringen 
konkurranseutsatt. Forskningsrådet bør følge opp sitt strategiske og 
finansieringsmessige ansvar overfor instituttene ved å tilby jevnlige evalueringer 
av enkeltinstitutter eller grupper av institutter. 
• Det nye systemet med Mål- og resultatstyring (MRS) er ment å bidra til en bedre 
styring av Forskningsrådet ved å løfte styringen opp på et mer overordnet plan. Så 
langt har dette hatt begrenset effekt. I samråd med Kunnskapsdepartementet og 
øvrige departementer bør Forskningsrådet jobbe for å løfte styringen fra 
aktiviteter til mål. 
• Forskningsrådets arbeid med å fremme internasjonalisering har vært svært 
vellykket. Internasjonaliseringsstrategien bør nå revideres med sikte på å gjøre 
internasjonaliseringsarbeidet mer målrettet.  
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Summary 
The Research Council of Norway (RCN) is an internationally unique organisation that 
combines the functions of a research council that funds research in universities and 
institutes and an innovation agency that pays for research to support innovation in 
business.  Its other main task is to advise the government on research and innovation 
policy.  It should also act as a ‘meeting place’ for stakeholders with an interest in 
innovation and research.   
The government set RCN up in 1993 to reduce fragmentation in the research and 
innovation funding system and enable implementation of a coordinated policy for 
research and innovation.  The first evaluation of RCN in 2001 found that a single 
funding organisation offered unique opportunities to coordinate and integrate 
innovation and research activities but that the government’s ambitions had not been 
well realised.  Internally, RCN still reproduced the fragmentation of its predecessor 
organisations.  Externally, it was over-steered.  Having sixteen ministries giving it 
money and instructions without itself having significant ‘strategic’ resources made it 
hard to tackle change.  RCN re-organised in response to the evaluation. The 
government had already identified the problem of strategic resources and established 
the Fund for Research and Innovation, managed by the predecessor of today’s 
Ministry of Education and Research (KD), as a way to address issues like long-term 
research and other matters that tended to fall outside the interests of the ministries.  
The Fund provided a way to pay for many of the important new activities launched 
through RCN during the last decade, such as new research centres in the universities 
and institutes and Large programmes tackling national needs.  It also financed other 
research and innovation related activities, for example by paying Norway’s 
contribution to the European Union’s Framework Programme of research and 
technological development.   
The overall conclusion of this new evaluation done in 2011-12 is that RCN now 
performs well and is likely to continue to do so provided a balance can be maintained 
between the individual interests of the ministries and the collective interest, 
represented by a continuing balance between sectoral and strategic money.  
 
Norway’s performance in innovation and research 
Norway enjoys one of the highest levels of welfare and income in the world. This 
means wages and other factors of production are very expensive so Norway has to 
compete on knowledge.  Measured in conventional terms, Norway devotes little of 
gross domestic product (GDP) to research and development (R&D) but a lot of the 
economy is technology-using and technology-intensive.  Measured per head, Norway’s 
spending on R&D is above the normal international level, but lags a long way behind 
the leaders such as Switzerland and the USA as well as Norway’s Nordic neighbours.  
Norwegian business still invests little in R&D compared to business abroad.   
Measured in bibliometric terms Norway’s research output is good but not outstanding.  
A high proportion is produced in international collaboration.  Overall, RCN-funded 
research is better and more visible than non-RCN funded research, though this is not 
the case in all disciplines.  There are high points in some fields but there are few places 
where Norwegian research ranks with the world’s very best.  Another sign that 
performance is modest is that Norwegian researchers have won few grants from the 
new European Research Council.   
Most countries with a big and important resource sector find that it attracts attention, 
capital and labour and may increase the value of the currency, so that other parts of 
the economy have work harder to compete internationally.  This makes the constant 
restructuring and renewal necessary in all economies all the more difficult.  The rate of 
  
A Good Council? 11 
innovation in Norwegian industry is slowly declining and the rate of entry into new, 
science-based industries is slow while foreign direct investment is so low that it 
provides little impulse to change.  The rate of industrial renewal therefore appears too 
low to be consistent with the need to compete on the basis of knowledge.  Renewal in 
the research sector is equally important, not only to support industry and tackle the 
great challenges of our time such as climate change but also for social and cultural 
reasons.   
The need for a strong knowledge base combined with continuous restructuring and 
renewal means that the research and innovation funding system has to play two roles.  
One is as an ‘aggregation machine’, sorting out the best projects to fund and reflecting 
existing needs, not least as the ministries express them on behalf of their sectors of 
society.  The other is as a ‘change agent’, supporting the process of renewal by 
encouraging change and innovation in science and industry.  That is a difficult job.  An 
organisation like RCN has to be orderly and disruptive at the same time.   
 
RCN achievements 
RCN is part of a close-knit policy system in Norway.  People and organisations work in 
constant dialogue, and RCN formally follows the instructions of the ministries at the 
overall level, so it does not act alone.  In the past decade, RCN has a substantial list of 
achievements to its credit.  Some of these fit into the bigger pattern of change in the 
research and innovation system made necessary by the government’s decision to 
increase the autonomy of the state’s research performing organisations and therefore 
to rely more heavily on incentives instead of entitlements to encourage good 
performance.  Achievements include 
• Contributing to the development of a range of national strategies for research – at 
the level of overall government policy as expressed in White Papers, in strategies 
of individual ministries and groups of ministries and in strategies for the High 
North  
• Helping coordinate the national research effort by consolidating the number of 
programmes and designing programmes that tackle the needs of multiple 
ministries  
• Increasing the proportion of resources for both research and innovation that are 
not thematically steered, in order to obtain a better balance between bottom-up 
and top-down initiative 
• Contributing to renewal, increased quality and reduced fragmentation in the 
research system through ‘centres’ programmes – SFF, SFI and FME and by 
starting Large programmes 
• Innovated other instruments such as industry PhDs and YFF young researcher 
grants that promote renewal 
• Reduced research fragmentation by shifting the focus of grants away from 
individuals and towards groups and collaborative research 
• Increased international participation in Norwegian research and supported 
Norwegian participation in international collaboration, notably the EU 
Framework Programme, in which Norway is a highly-respected participant despite 
not being a member state 
• Developing and implementing a strategy for large-scale research infrastructure 
• Helping develop and implement a performance-based research funding system for 
the institute sector 
• Developing and maintaining efficient and effective proposal selection and 
administration processes that match international good practice 
Many of these involve RCN acting with KD as an agent for structural change.  Large 
changes such as the centres programmes and the Large programmes have generally 
been implemented with help from the Fund for Research and Innovation, emphasising 
the importance of strategic resources in renewing the research and innovation system.   
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Strategic intelligence and advice to government 
RCN is an important source of research policy advice to government.  It produces both 
strategic intelligence – the information and analysis needed to make strategy – and 
advice.   
RCN contributes to creating and publishing strategic intelligence through a range of 
studies such as monitoring the research institutes and producing the annual national 
book of research and innovation indicators.  It is improving its use of internal data 
about its funding portfolio.  It consults extensively with relevant stakeholders in 
formulating its plans and designing programmes.  For a while from 2004, RCN 
actively used foresight, which is a way to provide alternative perspectives to those that 
stakeholders provide.  That is a healthy way to reduce the risk of becoming locked in 
by stakeholders’ local perspective.  Now that strategy formulation for large activities 
tends to be done at the level of one or more ministries, it is important to continue to 
look for ways to inject alternative perspectives into strategy through techniques such 
as foresight and by involving foreigners. 
RCN has a strong tradition of doing discipline evaluations and is increasing its use of 
programme evaluation.  However, it devotes too little effort to evaluation overall and 
especially to exploring the impacts of its actions.  Evaluation is not yet systematically 
embedded in the programming process.     
RCN contributes to the development of ministries’ sector research strategies through 
budget dialogue and it makes various, often substantial, inputs to White Papers and 
other national research strategies. KD has the coordinating role for government policy 
on research and has increasingly assumed responsibility for funding a wide range of 
research. It is nonetheless one among many ministries and the lack of something like 
the high-level Research and Innovation Council in Finland makes it difficult to 
construct a strong national research strategy and imposes coordination costs on RCN.   
RCN has strategic responsibility for the research institutes and used to evaluate them 
on a regular basis.  It helped design a new partly performance based funding system, 
which is not yet fully implemented.  The incentives for restructuring the institute 
system remain rather weak and the interest of many ministries in addressing institute 
policy seems limited.  The end of regular institute evaluation means there is no 
rounded view of the individual institutes as organisations.  International experience 
with performance-based funding systems suggests that strongly formula-based 
steering leads to perverse behaviour and lock-ins.  We therefore would prefer to see a 
mix of measurement and judgement by one or more competent owners of clusters of 
institutes rather than treating the institute system as a quasi-market.  But whichever 
view one takes, the institute system currently hangs between the old evaluation-based 
system that had no ‘teeth’ and a performance-based system that is only partly 
implemented.  This is clearly not satisfactory.   
 
Organisation and governance 
Since RCN answers to sixteen ministries and has a broad set of system-wide 
responsibilities it carries a heavy organisational and administrative load.  This is 
further increased by the growing complexity of science and technology, the increasing 
importance of interdisciplinarity and cross-sectoral problems and the large number of 
stakeholder groups to which it must relate.   
RCN was reorganised after the first evaluation and again in 2010.  The reorganisation 
of 2010 was useful and well conducted. RCN remains a complex organisation but 
having sixteen principals drives much of that complexity. The new organisation 
addressed the need for thematic and disciplinary expertise at the Division Board level 
and allowed RCN the possibility to strengthen its position in relation to the generation 
of national research and innovation strategies.  It strengthened line management by 
reducing functional overlaps among divisions and made the structure of RCN more 
transparent.  But it left RCN with too little analytical capability at the centre –
  
A Good Council? 13 
 something it needs if it is to play a strong role as advisor and change agent. An 
analysis group recently set up in the Director’s staff is intended to take on this role. 
RCN has three levels of Board: the Executive Board; Division Boards; and Programme 
Boards. While some members of the Division and Executive Boards of RCN are 
frustrated that their power to take decisions is limited by the detailed agreements 
between RCN and the sixteen ministries, in our view all three levels (Executive, 
Division and Programme Boards) of RCN’s three-level steering hierarchy are 
necessary.  The new organisation structure should increase the strategic value of the 
two upper levels – especially if better supported by independent analysis.   
RCN’s administrative costs have declined from 8% of the total budget in 2003 to 7% in 
2010. This increasing efficiency has been accompanied by a rationalisation in the 
number of programmes or schemes offered (from 229 to 178) and an increase of about 
10% in average project size.  There has been substantial investment in IT systems and 
standardisation of proposal and assessment procedures.  RCN has tightened its 
procedures for handling conflicts of interest.   
RCN has significantly improved the quality and speed with which it processes 
applications.  The process is about as transparent as such things can be and conforms 
with good international practice.  Bibliometric analysis shows that RCN-funded 
researchers generally have greater citation impact than those whose applications RCN 
rejects.  Those with larger numbers of RCN grants also have the higher impact factors.  
Like other research councils, RCN needs to review more carefully its handling of 
interdisciplinary and high-risk proposals.   
Success rates vary widely across programmes.  They are especially low in FRIPRO for 
two reasons.  First, there is a significant minority of poor proposals that in our view 
applicants’ institutions should have weeded out.  Second, there is a significant excess 
of high-quality proposals over money available.  Given the rather flat budget in this 
area over time combined with growth in the university system and increasing demands 
for high-quality research, there is a case for increased funding.  
The way RCN is ‘steered’ by the ministries was an important question for the 
evaluation.  In theory, the relationship between principals like the ministries and 
agents like RCN involves significant risks to the principal.  High levels of trust between 
principals and agents and the use of clear agreements about objectives can reduce 
these risks.  A multi-principal agency has a special problem of trust, in that principals 
do not want ‘their’ resources diverted to serve the interests of other principals.  There 
is a risk that, in order to prevent this, they ‘over-steer’ the agent and reduce its 
effectiveness.  In practice, the steering processes between RCN and individual 
ministries are cordial and based on trust and some ministries have increased the 
proportion of their research expenditure that they channel through RCN as a result.  
The dialogue appears to be more two-way than before. While detail tends to lock RCN 
in, the ministries do not uniquely cause it – RCN also has an interest in having 
detailed instructions that commit ministries to working through it.  
The relationship with KD has an importance that goes beyond ownership.  KD’s 
responsibilities go way beyond the traditional role of an education ministry in looking 
after basic research.  Increasingly, it functions more like a ‘science ministry’ with 
system-wide tasks.  KD, the Fund for Research and Innovation and the budget line 
that has replaced it represent the major opportunity to tackle systemic failures such as 
the need for restructuring, capacity building and research that falls into the ‘grey zone’ 
between ministries.  The nature of that relationship must also in part depend upon an 
understanding about the degree to which sector ministries have responsibility for 
basic research of relevance to their own sector and therefore how ‘wide’ the sector 
principle is held to be.   
A new Management By Objectives (MBO) system has been put in place that we 
understand as an attempt to integrate ideas from the New Public Management into the 
governance of RCN, supporting the ministries in the exercise of their sector 
responsibility with respect to research while at the same time enabling coordination 
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and a streamlined process of instruction and reporting. Unlike in some foreign 
systems, the ‘unit of analysis’ in the steering dialogue tends to be programmes or other 
activities rather than higher-level objectives.  The new MBO system represents an 
ambition to steer at a higher level but the real negotiations remain activity-based.  
Most ministries have simply overlaid the MBO system on what they were doing to 
instruct RCN anyway and see little added value in it.  A problem with the MBO system 
is that it does not consider impacts.  Nonetheless, it offers an opportunity for 
improving the quality, clarity and specificity of steering and reporting while enabling 
better coordination among ministries. The ministries need greater incentives to adopt 
it. There is scope for the ministries collectively to review their experience together with 
RCN and move towards steering through higher-level goals, set more specific 
performance expectations and implement a shorter and more transparent reporting 
system.    
Our mandate required us to look at RCN’s organisational boundary with SIVA and 
Innovation Norway.  That with SIVA is clear and well understood.  Areas of overlap 
exist with Innovation Norway, where the two organisations cooperate. Collaboration 
between the two agencies is long established and is increasing and there is no evidence 
that beneficiaries are confused.  Cooperation could be improved in relation to 
information sharing and there may be potential to make better common use of the 
organisations’ international networks.  We see no reason to change the boundaries 
between RCN and the other two organisations.   
 
Implementing and adding value to national priorities  
RCN plays a role in influencing national priorities through its inputs to the periodic 
White Papers on research. It maintains an internal matrix organisation that tracks and 
tries to manage the use of resources towards nationally prioritised themes and issues.  
One effect of this is that RCN increasingly works through multi-disciplinary 
programmes.  Since allocation of money to priorities is done by the ministries RCN 
can only implement the national priorities through sixteen parallel negotiations.  RCN 
programmes are in place to match the priorities, so RCN has the means to help the 
ministries make such allocation decisions.  Increasingly, ministries are jointly funding 
programmes at RCN, so a measure of coordination is being achieved towards the 
national priorities over time.   
Looking at the overall pattern of spending, RCN is focusing money on a smaller 
number of larger programmes relevant to national priorities or the concerns of 
individual ministries.  This is accompanied by a degree of increase in the proportion of 
resources spent in non-thematic funding schemes.  This sharpening of focus is useful 
but makes it more difficult to handle mid-sized issues, for example where new 
developments in research or innovation need to be fostered.  ‘De-programming’ most 
of the innovation projects and putting them into the single BIA arena runs the risk of 
failing to pick up and help organise emerging stakeholder groups such as supply 
chains.  It reduces the opportunities to run smaller innovation-focused programmes 
close to developing technologies and stakeholder needs that – like the technology 
programmes of Tekes or VINNOVA – nurture research-based capacity building and 
research-industry links in new areas with high opportunities for innovation.   
RCN has supported government policy on institutional autonomy by increasing the 
proportion of its resources that it allocates under competition from just over 70% at 
the start of the last decade to some 80%.  The new funding system for the institutes 
appears to have improved their rate of publication as well as in many cases their style 
of research management and the attention paid to publication.   
The share of RCN’s spending devoted to systemic initiatives – building capacity, 
shaping structure through centres or building infrastructure – has risen.  Funding 
larger projects and larger programmes as well as networks encourages the formation 
of larger teams and starts to enforce a competition-based division of labour in the 
research system.  Organisational managers confirm that RCN incentives are 
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influencing their research foci.  More regionally based researchers are being drawn 
into research networks with those in the Oslo region.  At the same time, RCN has 
measures in place to shelter young researchers from competition from their 
established peers early in their careers, otherwise the older generation would simply 
prevent the new one from developing.   
While about 40% of individual grant-holders have been female, only about 20% of 
projects are going to teams led by women.  The importance of technology, 
mathematics and natural sciences in RCN funding may be a partial (but not a 
satisfactory) explanation.   
By and large RCN’s spending across different fields relevant to industry is consistent 
with the pattern of industrial R&D.  RCN ‘over-invests’ in nanotechnology and 
biotechnology, as would be expected in developing generic technologies of expected 
future importance.  The oddity is ICT, where RCN’s spending appears low compared 
with the level of industrial activity.   
 
Developing the research and innovation system 
Researchers and managers surveyed find RCN grants attractive, though some 
international alternatives are more so.  University researchers like FRIPRO best.  The 
institutes prefer Large programmes.  Our surveys and interviews show increased 
satisfaction with RCN administration in general and researchers are moderately 
content with its proposal management and assessment process.  Not surprisingly, 
managers and researchers who won grants are more positive than those whose 
applications were rejected.  Compared with the equivalent survey in the 2001 
evaluation, it appears that the research community is more satisfied with RCN’s 
appraisal system than before.   
There is a limited amount of information in the evaluation record on impacts of RCN 
activities.  RCN’s primary role in bottom-up, ‘basic’ research (FRIPRO) is as an 
‘aggregation machine’ – responsively funding proposals and imposing a quality 
threshold that raises the average quality of Norwegian research.  Nothing in the 
evaluation record suggests that RCN is a change agent here or that it systematically 
funds disruptive research.  Both FUGE and NANOMAT began life as basic research 
programmes intended to help the research community ‘catch up’ with international 
developments in two of the three technologies that the rest of the world has long 
regarded as generic. Hence there is at least anecdotal evidence that the aggregation 
machine role is not enough to keep Norwegian science in constant motion.   
While the involvement of stakeholders and users is necessary as a ‘focusing device’ to 
make sure that appropriate research activities are connected to needs and markets, 
there must also be countervailing forces to avoid moral hazard and prevent adverse 
selection.  RCN’s increased efforts to contain conflict of interest show that it is acutely 
aware of this issue.  Nonetheless, as the NANOMAT and FUGE evaluations show, 
under-involving potential users leaves the programme designers with too few signals 
about what is important if the research community is to be built up in areas of 
relevance and if research is to connect with practice.   
The centres programmes appear to have started to induce more strategic research 
management and some restructuring, especially in the universities.  It is reasonable to 
expect that at least the SFIs will also improve industry-academic cooperation and 
industrial innovation.  Here we can see RCN operating as a force for change.   
Evaluations show that user-directed R&D is a useful instrument to increase business 
expenditure on R&D.  It leads to industrial innovation (enough of which is 
economically successful to generate significant private returns), generates important 
knowledge and capability spillovers and leads companies (especially smaller ones) to 
want to do more R&D.  The private and public returns to industrial R&D are both high.  
While economists often like to speculate that state funding of industrial R&D will 
crowd out private investment and induce companies to invest in the wrong things 
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(‘picking winners’), the evidence shows the opposite.  RCN funding ‘crowds in’ private 
investment; the private returns induced are about the same as companies get from 
their own investments in R&D; and the societal returns are higher.  The Skattefunn 
fiscal incentive is a useful way to help small companies begin to do more R&D, 
generating high private returns but limited externalities.  As companies’ R&D 
expenditures rise, RCN’s selective approach becomes more appropriate because it 
increases externalities, it can support agglomeration (including around national 
priorities) and it avoids the problem that at larger volumes companies tend to free ride 
on tax incentives.   
Those ‘technology push’ efforts that have been evaluated have not worked as well as 
expected – either at the level of technology transfer (FORNY) or large programmes 
(FUGE and NANOMAT).  A more integrated approach to knowledge exchange is 
needed, with greater demand-side involvement.   
Participants in RCN’s ‘meeting places’ confirmed the view that RCN’s science 
communications activities are good.  People were happy to be involved in meeting 
place activities but – like those we interviewed in the Main and Division Boards – they 
felt their influence was limited by the framework conditions the ministries imposed.   
Companies seek RCN funding in order to help solve problems related to innovation 
and reduce technological risks.  They were cautious about the quality of the 
assessment process, which could be overly academic and unhappy about the timing of 
call deadlines.  These needed to be frequent – once a year is not enough, given the 
pace needed for decisions in industry.  They saw RCN staff as helpful and a good 
source of advice but were surprised at RCN’s apparent lack of interest in the outcome 
of projects once the relevant forms were filled in.  RCN’s culture of openness was a key 
asset that it should try to preserve.   
Our overall impression is that RCN is very good at reacting to defined needs and 
‘serving its customers’ but less good at being proactive.  This is perhaps not surprising, 
given its governance, so it probably needs other mechanisms for tackling things that 
the customers do not yet know they need, including the ability to do diagnostic and 
prospective studies, fund small-scale, promising developments on its own initiative 
and consider explicitly addressing high-risk and interdisciplinary research.  Its ‘change 
agent’ role could thus be stronger.   
 
Internationalisation 
Norway has for a very long time been internationally orientated in trade, industry and 
science.  The past ten years have seen a dramatic acceleration in the process of 
globalisation of both the economy and the scientific community, both through 
developments in the European Union and in the emergence of previously less 
conspicuous but large and important countries like China, Russia, India and Brazil 
firmly onto the world stage in both industry and science.   
RCN funding schemes play a strong role in supporting internationalisation and are 
widely appreciated but should become better known in the research community.  RCN 
has made a significant effort to encourage and fund Norwegian researchers to take 
part in the Framework Programme and other European collaborations. More needs to 
be done to understand what would be needed to increase interest in participating.  
Norway still does not get as much money back from the Framework Programme as it 
puts in, so there may be scope to increase RCN’s support effort further.  However, 
since Norway’s contribution is proportional to its GDP, it is probably unrealistic to 
expect to repatriate it all.  Participation has wider benefits that make it worthwhile to 
maintain the partnership with the EU.   
Internationalisation is a key goal of Norwegian research and innovation policy and 
foreign participation in RCN projects is growing.  At the current rate that would bring 
it to one third of all projects by 2015, so RCN needs to consider more explicitly what its 
internationalisation goals are.  Mainstreaming internationalisation should be coupled 
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to a clearer sense of what internationalisation contributes and in what subjects and 
geographies collaboration should focus.  More open debate about the role of 
internationalisation is needed across sectors and ministries should be more explicit 
about their internationalisation strategies.  At the moment, there is probably too little 
collaboration outside the EU and North America.   
Inward mobility is good, but Norwegians are still too reluctant to go abroad for part of 
their careers.  It may be that enabling short as well as long stays abroad could combat 
this problem.   
 
Recommendations 
As an agent, RCN can largely not act alone.  Our recommendations apply therefore not 
only to RCN itself but also to other relevant actors, not least the ministries and the 
government.  Our main recommendations are 
• The lack of a high-level research and innovation council that sets policy makes it 
hard to coordinate research and innovation policy at the national level.  We 
understand the difficulties of creating such a council in the Norwegian governance 
system but recommend that as a minimum the government investigate 
constitutionally acceptable ways to increase the strength of research policy 
coordination at a level above the ministries  
• A national strategy and policy for research and innovation is more than the sum of 
what sixteen ministries want.  The Fund for Research and Innovation was an 
important mechanism for providing ‘strategic’ resources to induce change in the 
research and innovation system – acting as a ‘countervailing force’ to the tendency 
of sector requirements to lock in RCN and inhibit necessary change in the research 
and innovation system.  While the government had good reasons to close the 
Fund, it is vital that the funding mechanism replacing it should be able to address 
the long-term research and restructuring needs of the system 
• The quality of Norwegian research is on the average good but in the light of 
increasing knowledge-intensity as a key requirement for competitiveness, it is 
probably not good enough.  Increasing quality should be even more strongly 
emphasised as a goal for RCN 
• RCN should have some strategic resources and freedom to explore and fund new 
opportunities on its own initiative, ahead of collective demand from its principals, 
in order to avoid problems of late entry and catch-up 
• RCN’s responsive approach to basic research means that the existing pattern of 
activity plays a large role in determining the pattern of future activity.  There is no 
provision for high-risk research and some evidence that Norway has moved slowly 
into key generic technologies.  RCN should therefore establish mechanisms that 
promote disruptive change in basic research as well as in more applied areas 
• Raising business expenditure on R&D is an important policy objective, which is 
addressed through a tax incentive, thematic programmes and the bottom-up BIA 
funding arena.  This leaves a gap for smaller-scale, time-limited programme 
initiatives responding to the needs of a sub-sector or cluster at a significantly 
larger scale than BIA consortia.  RCN should review at the micro level the 
opportunities from time to time to involve stakeholders in starting such 
technology programmes and eventually create a larger-scale instrument for doing 
so 
• Bottom-up, researcher-initiated research is an important component of any 
healthy research system – especially in a rich country that needs to operate at or 
near the scientific and technological frontier.  FRIPRO funding should be 
strengthened, especially to tackle more interdisciplinary and higher risk research 
aiming to drive up quality.  This could be complemented by mandating the 
addition of a more explicit fundamental research component to Large 
programmes  
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• RCN and the ministries should review the adequacy of basic and applied research 
funding in ICT, in conjunction with the development of a new ‘generic technology’ 
strategy for ICT 
• RCN makes too little systematic use of evaluation and prospective studies.  
Evaluation should be embedded in the programming cycle and there should be 
more effort devoted to understanding the impacts of RCN activities.  More effort 
and budget should be devoted to potentially disruptive prospective studies, 
including foresight, to counterbalance the inherently conservative (but absolutely 
necessary) tradition of wide stakeholder consultation and involvement at RCN 
• The performance-based funding system for the institutes has already had positive 
effects, based on reallocating quite small sums of money.  It should be fully 
implemented at the present levels of reallocation – there is no evident advantage 
in making more of the core funding contestable at this stage.  To fulfil its strategic 
as well as its funding responsibility to the institutes, RCN should offer them 
periodic evaluations at the level of individual institutes or groups of institutes 
• The new MBO system is intended to improve the steering of RCN by raising it to a 
higher level.  So far, it has had limited effect.  RCN should work with KD and the 
other ministries to raise the level of steering from activities to goals  
• RCN has been very successful in promoting internationalisation. The strategy 
should now be revised to consider how to make the internationalisation effort 
more targeted  
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1. Introduction 
This report synthesises the work done in the second evaluation of the Research 
Council of Norway (RCN), which was undertaken in 2011-12. The background reports 
on which it is based are published on the World Wide Web by KD.   
1.1 Evaluating RCN 
The government established RCN in 1993 by merging Norway’s pre-existing research 
councils.  Parliament decided1 that a foreign evaluator should evaluate it once it had 
had a chance to operate for a few years.  Following an open competition for the 
assignment, a team under our leadership did that evaluation in 2000-012.  The 
evaluation had a wide-ranging mandate but the key question was existential: Was this 
radical merger to create a single organisation funding innovation and basic research a 
good idea, or should RCN be broken up – by assumption into a traditional research 
council and a separate innovation agency?  Our evaluation said that the merger was 
the right thing to do but that it had not been sufficiently well done.  To create an 
effective single council would involve drastic reorganisation and changes not only in 
the internal way of working but also in the context: how RCN was funded and 
governed.  RCN was indeed drastically reorganised in 2003, and that organisation was 
further refined in 2010.  Not all aspects of the context proved as easy to change.   
In the latest White Paper on research3, the government said it was time to evaluate 
RCN again, in order to see whether it was now operating well.  The Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Education and Research (KD) awarded another international team led by 
us that assignment in open competition. The full mandate is in the Appendix to this 
report.  The scope of the evaluation is 2003-2010, though where possible we try to 
take account of more recent events.  One of the points of discussion with the Ministry 
during the competition was: Is it a good idea to use the same evaluator twice?  On the 
one hand, such an evaluator would have the background and history in mind as well as 
a fair understanding of the national research and innovation system (NRIS).  On the 
other hand, there would be a risk of rerunning the old evaluation rather than doing a 
new one.  In fact only two members of the current team were involved in the previous 
evaluation. We have been conscious of that risk and believe we have successfully 
managed it. The earlier work has given us a clear and well-documented baseline –
 which is both useful and rare in this kind of work.   
RCN and the first evaluation have received a lot of attention in the research policy 
world internationally.  We called the first evaluation ‘A Singular Council’ because RCN 
was (and, with the exception of RANNIS in Iceland, still is) the only hybrid research 
council and innovation agency in the world.  Naturally, everyone wanted to know 
whether this form of organisation works.  It was a little disappointing to have to say 
‘we are not really sure because RCN in 2000 was rather like six organisations 
cohabiting in a single house’.  The core question in this new evaluation is not ‘Should it 
exist?’ but ‘Does it work?’  Our answer is ‘Yes, it does’.  How it works in more detail, 
what is going well, what needs improvement and how these things relate to the context 
is the subject of this report.   
 
 
1 “Fleirtalet ser behovet for å få evaluert den nye organisasjonen når systemet har verka ei tid, gjerne av 
kunnige som står utanfor det norske miljøet.” Innst. S. nr 231 (1991-92), s.5 
2 Erik Arnold, Stefan Kuhlman and Barend van der Meulen, A Singular Council Evaluation of the Research 
Council of Norway, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs, 2001 
3 Det Kongelige Kunnskapsdepartement, Klima for forskning, St meld nr 30, 2008-2009 
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1.2 RCN’s goals and tasks 
During the scope of this evaluation, RCN’s statutes4 said  
The Research Council of Norway shall serve as a national strategic and 
executive body for research.  The Research Council is responsible for 
increasing the general knowledge base, and for helping to meet society’s 
research needs by promoting basic and applied research as well as 
innovation. The Research Council shall promote international research 
cooperation.   The Research Council shall serve as an advisory body to 
the government on matters concerning research policy.   
Its tasks were to  
• Support basic research and seek to encourage development within the various 
research fields and disciplines as well as to ensure inter- and multidisciplinarity 
in research  
• Support research that encourages public debate and contributes to the 
development of democracy and the formulation of policy  
• Promote innovation in public and private sectors in all parts of the country  
• Promote coherence and interaction between basic research, applied research and 
innovation  
• Fulfil national responsibilities with regard to dissemination of research and 
work to promote the uptake of research results  
•  Promote international research cooperation  
• Work to ensure the highest possible quality in Norwegian research activities  
• Work to achieve cooperation and cohesiveness between public agencies within 
the research and innovation system  
• Work to achieve constructive distribution of tasks and cooperation between 
research institutions, and take strategic responsibility for the research institute 
sector  
• Ensure the evaluation of Norwegian research activities   
• Provide advice to government authorities as a basis for the formulation of 
research policy  
The Research Council is also required to follow political guidelines set out in White 
Papers on research and other subjects and the government’s annual budget acts. Goals 
and guidelines are also specified annually in letters of allocation from the ministries 
that finance the Council’s activities.   
1.3 Approach and methods 
KD’s terms of reference for the evaluation were extremely wide-ranging but also rather 
open in the way the evaluator should tackle them.  We grouped the evaluation issues 
into two groups.  First, a set of five ‘formative’ questions, namely: How well does RCN  
• Create and provide strategic intelligence on research and innovation to 
stakeholders in the National Research and Innovation System (NRIS), including 
itself? 
• Operate effective organisation and governance structures and processes within a 
national division of labour among government authorities? 
• Implement and add value to national research and innovation priorities and 
policies?  
• Play a developmental role in the NRIS, supporting the needs of the various 
component communities and institutions? 
• Embed Norway in the changing international research and innovation system?  
 
 
4 These are the first two paragraphs of the statutes that came into force in December 2002.  They remain 
unchanged in the current statutes (2011) 
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Second, a set of ‘summative’ questions: how well does RCN achieve the goals set out in 
the new Management By Objectives system used for the steering and reporting 
dialogues with the ministries that fund RCN? 
• Goal 1: Increase quality, capacity and relevance in Norwegian research nationwide 
• Goal 2: Good use of resources and appropriate division of labour, cooperation and 
structure in the research system 
• Goal 3: Research results are used by business, society and administration 
throughout the country 
We operationalised our approach into seven Work Packages (WPs) 
• WP1 Strategic intelligence and advice to government (Technopolis, UK) 
• WP2 Organisation (Technopolis, UK) 
• WP3 Adding value to national priorities (Technopolis, UK) 
• WP4 Developing the NRIS (Technopolis UK and CWTS) 
• WP5 Value-added for beneficiaries (NIFU, SSB, Technopolis SE) 
• WP6 Internationalisation (MIoIR, Technopolis NL) 
• WP7 Interaction with an expert advisory panel  
Figure 1 shows how the work packages interrelate.  There are background reports that 
show their results.  They are listed in the Appendix, together with details of where to 
find them on the Internet.   
Figure 1 How work packages interrelate 
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The methods we used across the evaluation were as follows.  They are described in 
detail in the respective background reports.   
• Document analyses.  (In total RCN supplied us with about 1.5 Gigabytes of data 
and information)  
• Analyses of RCN data, for example composition data in relation to types and 
beneficiaries of project funding, monitoring data about outputs 
• Interviews with people and at key organisations in all the categories of actor 
defined above.  In many cases, the degree of satisfaction of those involved is a 
primary indicator of the usefulness and effectiveness of RCN actions 
• Evidence from existing evaluations and studies, including meta-evaluation of a 
sample of RCN evaluations   
• Bibliometric analysis of publications and citations 
• Econometric and statistical analysis of funding and company performance data 
• Surveys of beneficiaries: researchers, research-performing institutions, companies 
and participants in RCN’s various ‘meeting places’  
At many points we bring in international comparisons in order to provide a frame of 
reference and benchmarks.   
1.4 Guide to the report 
We used the formative questions as a background to structuring this report. In the 
course of answering them, we provide the information needed to answer the 
summative ones.   
To discuss RCN, we need first to think about its context and the challenges it faces in 
the Norwegian research and innovation system.  In Chapter 2, we therefore discuss the 
international and national context.  Chapter 3 discusses RCN’s role and the way the 
research and innovation governance system works in Norway.  Chapter 4 tackles some 
questions about the role of basic research, since there is strong pressure from the 
research community for increased funding of ‘free’ research.   
Chapter 5 evaluates RCN’s role as a research policy advisor to government.  Chapter 6 
evaluates RCN’s organisation and governance while Chapter 7 evaluates the ways in 
which RCN adds value over and above the national priorities and how it works to 
develop the research and innovation system.  Chapter 8 evaluates RCN’s effort in 
internationalisation.   
Chapter 9 provides our major conclusions and recommendations in relation to RCN’s 
role in research and innovation policy.  We do not there repeat the more operationally-
and administratively focused conclusions from the body of the report.  The most 
important recommendations overall are listed in the Summary of the report.   
Appendix A contains our mandate. To avoid repetition, we provide summary answers 
to the individual evaluation questions in Appendix B.  Appendix C lists the background 
reports, which contain evidence and analysis used in this synthesis report.   
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2. International and domestic challenges in research and 
innovation  
In a globalising world, Norwegian research and innovation policy cannot be 
considered without reference to the international context.  Hence, we start this chapter 
with a brief reminder of some of the key international trends.  We go on to discuss 
innovation and renewal in Norwegian industry and then what we can see from 
bibliometric evidence about the performance of Norwegian researchers.   
2.1 The international context 
Norwegian research and innovation policy has to be made and implemented with an 
understanding of the increasingly competitive and global nature of research and the 
economy.  Key trends include 
• The emergence of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries and 
particularly China as a country with a large research and technological 
development capacity that is becoming recognised for meeting high international 
quality standards and having large critical mass 
• The increased political debate and urgency of global challenges such as climate 
change, health issues and sustainable energy resources that ask for policy 
strategies that reach beyond science and innovation policy 
• The globalisation of R&D, which is not a new phenomenon, but is becoming more 
visible particularly in research by large R&D intensive corporations and triggered 
by the world wide mobility of researchers. This also requires better framework 
conditions (eg IP protection) that are applied internationally 
• Particularly in Europe, demographic developments and the decreasing share of 
graduates in science and engineering have made the shortage of research talent 
very urgent. International research collaboration can be used to attract talent from 
partner countries. The best way to achieve this is by having a visible pool of 
excellent research of which the most talented people want to be part  
• The increased policy debates and ambitions in Europe to provide more critical 
mass and international profile to research excellence, in which partnering with 
‘the best’ plays a big role.  The discussion on the European Research Area and the 
position Europe should play in the global arena has also spurred more policy 
activity on this topic 
On the latter point, as part of the Europe 2020 strategy, the European Commission 
adopted the 'Innovation Union' flagship initiative. It sets out a comprehensive 
innovation strategy to enhance Europe's capacity to deliver smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. A new perspective in the Innovation Union is the intention to link 
research and innovation more explicitly, which should manifest itself in new types of 
instruments and research geared to societal and industrial challenges. The Innovation 
Union plan contains over thirty action points, with the aim to5: 
• Make Europe into a world-class science performer  
• Remove obstacles to innovation – like expensive patenting, market fragmentation, 
slow standard-setting and skills shortages – which currently prevent ideas getting 
quickly to market 
• Revolutionize the way public and private sectors work together, notably through 
Innovation Partnerships between the European institutions, national and regional 
authorities and business  
 
 
5 Innovation Union Web Site 
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Horizon 2020 is the funding instrument for implementing the Innovation Union. The 
proposal for Horizon 2020 brings together the innovation related part of the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Plan (CIP), the European Institute of Technology 
(EIT) and the Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development 
under a single heading to remove the separation between research and innovation. 
The programme will run from 2014 to 2020 with the proposed budget currently 
standing at €80 billion.  
EU research activities are increasingly directed at supporting broader EU policies in 
most areas of the Lisbon Treaty. These developments in European research policy 
generate a more thematic based approach that relies on bringing together the best 
placed actors - user communities, innovators and researchers – to tackle societal and 
economic challenges. Thus the bottom-up approach of the recent years of the 
Framework Programmes has formed a junction with more strategic and thematic 
based policies at international scale.  A number of Key Enabling Technologies (KETS) 
are identified as being the technologies that will underpin the shift to a low carbon, 
knowledge-based economy.  
All these developments require the European Member and Associated States to decide 
in which strategic research domains they can realistically play a leading role in Europe. 
The conviction that not every country can be at the forefront of all research and 
technology domains is also behind the concept of smart specialisation that also stems 
from the Innovation Union and is regularly quoted by various European 
Commissioners as the way forward for smart growth in Europe.  
2.2 Research and innovation in the Norwegian economy 
Innovation and technological change are key requirements for economic development 
and growth and therefore for maintaining the very high levels of income and welfare 
that Norway enjoys today.  Wealth means that costs – especially, but not only, labour 
costs – in Norway are high.  As a result, Norway has increasingly to compete on the 
basis of knowledge.  This is recognised in the repeated policy commitments over the 
last ten years to reaching the EU goal of the state spending 1% of gross domestic 
product GDP on R&D and business a further 2%.   
While no indicator is perfect, those that are available suggest that Norway does not do 
all that well at innovation.  Thus, Norway is below the EU average in the European 
Innovation Scoreboard, which is based on a mix of input and output indicators.   
The OECD economic review of Norway in 20076 launched a discussion of the 
‘Norwegian puzzle’, namely that the share of gross domestic product (GDP) Norway 
devotes to research and development (R&D) is comparatively low while income per 
head is high.  There are many reasons why the R&D/GDP indicator is not well suited 
to Norwegian circumstances.  Norwegian GDP is ‘inflated’ relative to most OECD 
economies by oil and gas production.  The structure of Norwegian industry is biased 
away from ‘high tech’ industries and towards large-scale process industries that 
typically do little R&D.  Norway does a lot of advanced technological activity (such as 
sub-sea engineering) that is skill-intensive but does not count as ‘R&D’ in the 
statistics.  However, even if Norwegian R&D-intensity is adjusted for the country’s 
unusual industry structure, companies tend to spend only about an amount on R&D 
that is average for their branch internationally.  This is well below the OECD leaders 
and therefore not consistent with the recognised need to compete on knowledge 
intensity7.  A way to compare R&D spending that avoids the problems associated with 
GDP is to compare it with the size of countries’ population.  On this measure, Norway 
spent about the same as S Korea or Germany and well above the OECD average, but 
also much less than the Nordic neighbours the USA, Israel or Japan (Figure 2).   
 
 
6 OECD, Economic Surveys: Norway, Paris: OECD, 2007 
7 OECD, Reviews of Innovation Policy: Norway, Paris: OECD, 2008 
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Figure 2 Gross Expenditure on R&D per capita and as a share of GDP, 2009 
 
Source: RCN, Indikatorrapporten, 2011 
The latest Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in 2008 shows that the proportion of 
firms undertaking innovation activities in 2006-7 is slightly below the EU average.  
Slightly fewer Norwegian firms introduced new products or processes in the period 
2006-8 than the European average (Norwegian service firms did a little better than 
average but manufacturing firms rather worse).  The proportion of Norwegian firms 
undertaking product or process innovations is gently declining: from 34% in the 2000 
CIS to 33% in 2004 and 30% in the 2008 study.  
Market dynamics – the extent to which new firms are created and old ones die – also 
give cause for concern.  Normally we expect high rates of entry in science-based 
industries as innovators rush to exploit technological and market opportunities.  In 
fact, the rate of entry in these sectors is no higher than in the resource-based 
industries, which are dominated by large firms and therefore have rather stable 
market structures.  Norwegian innovation is more focused on process improvement 
than product innovation and Norwegian innovators are less likely to say that the 
purpose of their innovation was to enter new markets or to increase their market share 
than is the case with their equivalents abroad8.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is not 
only an indicator of the attractiveness of investing an economy but also a source of 
innovation and restructuring.  In Norway, FDI as a percentage of GDP has crept up 
from about one third of one percent in 1999 to a little less than 1% ten years later; in 
the same period, in Europe more widely it has oscillated between about 2% and over 
5%9. 
Petro-states notoriously fail to use the windfall of finding oil or gas as a way to trigger 
wider processes of economic and social development. This is a specific case of the 
more general ‘resource curse’, which also applies to the discovery of other resources in 
addition to oil10.  Policy options to mitigate against the resource curse include 
• Invest in productivity in order to offset negative effects on exchange rates 
 
 
8 Fulvio Castellacci, Tommy H Clausen, Svein Olav Nås and Bart Verspagen, ‘Historical Fingerprints” A 
Taxonomy of Norwegian Innovation’ in Jan Fagerberg, David C Mowery and Bart Verspagen (eds), 
Innovation, Path Dependency and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 
9 OECD 
10 Terry Lynn Karl, ‘The perils of the petro-state: Reflections on the paradox of plenty,’ Journal of 
International Affairs, Fall 1999, 53(1), 31-48; Michael L Ross, The political economy of the resource 
curse,’ World Politics^, 51, 1999, 297-322; Jeffrey Frankel, ‘The natural resource curse: a survey,’ Harvard 
Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP10-005, 2010; Ricardo Hausmann and 
Roberto Rigobon, ‘An alternative interpretation of the ‘resource curse’: Theory and policy implications,’ 
Working Paper 9424, Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002 
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• Use part of the windfall to fund the building of upstream and downstream links 
from the new resource-based industry 
• Fight Dutch disease (ie the consumption of the windfall through higher welfare 
payments) via a tight fiscal policy 
• Keep windfall tax revenues outside the country in foreign-currency funds11 
The experience of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other countries with significant 
resource bases shows the way to benefit from them in terms of development, without 
necessarily falling victim to a resource curse 
• Development through knowledge upgrading and investment strategies in 
resource-based industries 
• Development through leveraging resource bases into upstream and downstream 
industries 
• Knowledge creation via knowledge infrastructures12 
Norway is normally held up as the good example of a country managing to avoid the 
resource curse.  Its strong mechanical engineering and ship building tradition, 
supported by a large and capable industrial research institute sector, provided an 
excellent basis for developing offshore technologies, integrating the oil and gas sector 
with other parts of the economy.  This was strengthened by a canny policy of requiring 
those who obtained concessions to do or pay for R&D in Norway.  While in the late 
1970s the first oil income to the state did prompt increased welfare spending, inflation, 
increased national debt and reductions in the competitiveness of both agriculture and 
manufacturing, its effects on the economy were managed thereafter via existing state 
institutions and controls.  Nonetheless, by the early 1990s, oil and gas R&D were 
tending to ‘crowd out’ R&D activity in other branches13.  Since 1990, globalisation and 
liberalisation of the oil industry and finance combined with increased production has 
made Norway a country with surplus capital.  Despite the creation of the Petroleum 
Fund in 1996, intended to soak up excess state income and place it abroad, Moen 
argued in 2005 that the economy had begun to suffer symptoms typical of the resource 
curse 
• De-industrialisation 
• Reduced competitiveness 
• Low propensity to innovate 
• Low investment in R&D 
• Low growth in sectors based on new technology 
• Increased investment by Norwegian firms abroad, at the same time as Norway 
attracts little Foreign Direct Investment14 
Clearly, active policies for innovation and renewal are needed to meet these challenges 
and the rather modest innovation performance of the Norwegian system.  
Unfortunately, such policies have a bad name in Norway, as a result of some of the 
weaknesses of industrial policy in the 1980s.   
Hauknes and Wicken argue that there have been three ‘strategies’ followed in post-
War Norwegian innovation policy.  Elements of each strategy have been present 
throughout the period but different ones have been dominant at different times.   
• Strategy 1 – big industry (1945-75), when the main aim was to build big 
companies.  It was driven by concern to close the ‘productivity gap’ with the USA 
 
 
11 Michael L Ross, ‘The political economy of the resource curse,’ World Politics, 51, January 1999, 297-322 
12 Keith Smith, “Innovation and growth in resource-based economies,” in CEDA Growth No 58, Committee 
for Economic Development of Australia, Melbourne, 2007 
13 Keith Smith and Olav Wicken, Olje og gass som hovedinnsatsområde – prosessevaluering, Oslo: NTNF, 
1992 
14 Eli Moen, Næringsnøytralitet eller næringsavvikling? Norsk oljeøkonomi, næringsutvikling og 
næringspolitikk i et politisk-institusjonelt perspektiv, Discussion Paper 1/2005, Handelshøyskolen BI 
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in the 1950 and the ‘technology gap’ identified by the OECD in the 1960s through 
the introduction of ‘American methods’, including transfer of best practice (US) 
technologies.  The state was able to exert influence by controlling investments and 
inputs into production (especially imports) and labour cooperated even in 
rationalisation because the welfare state provided a good safety net and there were 
good opportunities for people displaced from one firm to find work elsewhere 
• Strategy 2 – new industries (1980s), focused on new technologies and newer 
industries.  It was felt that national positions in resource-based industries were 
insufficient basis for creating the future growth needed. From the 1960s a growing 
share of research funding from NTNF (the former innovation aency) and 
elsewhere flowed into the national champions engaged in ICT or defence, with the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the state-owned Kongsberg 
Weapons group at the core.  They became central proponents of a science-based 
industrial strategy linked to the creation of a national defence industry that 
resulted in a number of new technology-based firms and the entry of some of the 
older national champions into aspects of ICT. A lot of effort went into fish farming 
and offshore technology. And technology Agreements with oil companies. These 
were major successes.  However, in 1987-8, two of the major national champions 
in ICT experienced crises – Norsk Data went bankrupt and Tandberg pulled out of 
high-volume consumer electronics.  Large industry, especially Norsk Hydro, began 
to pull back from research-based expansion. 
• Strategy 3 – technology diffusion (1990s onwards) pulled back from the optimism 
about new technologies and branches that characterised Strategy 2.  From the 
early 1990s the ‘research driven strategy’ for industrialisation was replaced by a 
‘user-driven strategy’ – reacting to the needs of established industry rather than 
aiming to create new industry.  A strong doctrine of branch neutrality developed 
and policy began to pay more attention to the needs of SMEs than was the case 
earlier.  
The research White Papers over the past decade provide an interesting contrast to the 
branch neutrality doctrine by proposing thematic priorities.  There has also been an 
increased interest in clusters rather than branches as the basis for intervention, 
notably in Innovation Norway.  This works against the logic of branch neutrality while 
probably providing an approach that is more robust than the firm-centric selective 
policies of the past.  
The recently-completed Knowledge Based Norway project analyses the major, value-
producing parts of the Norwegian economy.  It underscores the importance of 
knowledge for generating the successes so far and the increasing importance of 
knowledge – expressed not only as research results but especially as human capital –
 for future success.  It also points out that the major successes have build on pre-
existing endowments and capabilities and argues that the role of industry policy is to 
generate externalities beyond those that would be generated by market mechanisms 
alone by building on strengths and not to try to compensate for weaknesses.  The 
developmental policy of levering oil and gas concessions to build domestic R&D and 
supply capacity in offshore has been a spectacularly successful example of this. The 
transformation of a declining general ship-building industry into a high value, 
specialised provider of ships and equipment for off-shore oil and gas applications is 
another one of the successes used to illustrate the point.  But there are also large 
opportunities in other areas.  The study points out the need to connect emerging 
generic technologies with the needs of existing clusters and argues for a more 
selective, cluster-focused innovation policy15.  The thematic priorities of the recent 
research White Papers pull in a similar direction.   
 
 
15 Torger Reve and Amir Sasson, Et kunnskapsbasert Norge, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2012 
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2.3 Norwegian performance on bibliometric measures 
We chose to compare Norwegian publication performance not only with the world 
average but also with that of a basket of similar or otherwise interesting countries 
(Figure 3).  The quality and productivity of Norwegian research measured in 
bibliometric16 terms is good but has definite potential for improvement.   
Over the past ten years, the proportion of Norwegian publications in journals indexed 
by the Thomson-Reuters Web of Science (WoS) that is produced by authors at two or 
more organisations working together has risen from about 75% to 80%.  Over half the 
total output involves international collaboration and this (as is normally the case) is 
cited significantly more than the national output.  So good researchers collaborate 
internationally.  In less mature research systems (such as the Czech Republic17 and 
China) the quality of internationally co-authored papers goes up over time, which we 
suspect means that it is not only that the best researchers can persuade others to work 
with them but also that the collaboration raises quality.  Often, nationally produced 
papers fall below the world average level of citations even in developed Western 
countries.  In Norway, national papers just about reach the average world citation 
level, indicating that average quality is reasonably satisfactory.   
As in other countries, national scientific output has been growing in Norway (Figure 
3).  Average quality, measured by field-normalised citation scores, is well above the 
world average level (1.0), rather stable and similar to Canada, Sweden and Belgium – 
but some way behind the leading group of benchmark countries, ie Switzerland, 
Denmark and The Netherlands (Figure 4).  Norwegian authors tend to publish in 
journals with above-average impact factors – but less in the very top journals.   
Figure 3 Number of Norwegian and other papers in the Web of Science, 2001-9 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 6: Bibliometric Analysis of the Research 
Output of Norway in an International Context, CWTS 
 
 
16 Bibliometrics – ie devising performance indicators based on the quantity of scientific articles produced 
and the extent to which other authors cite them – is a very useful technique but has a number of well-
known biases.  It focuses only on part of what research produces; the journals indexed are weighted 
towards the English language and developed countries (though researchers know this and therefore try to 
publish in such journals); it is more appropriate to the hard sciences than to social sciences, engineering 
and humanities, where other communication channels than journals are more important.  There are big 
differences between fields in how many papers people write, and while it is possible to field-normalise 
indicators to correct for this, it is inevitably an imperfect process.   
17 Czech Audit; NSFC evaluation, van Leeuwen, CWTS, 2009 
0 
50,000 
100,000 
150,000 
200,000 
2001 - 
2004  
2002 - 
2005  
2003 - 
2006  
2004 - 
2007  
2005 - 
2008  
2006 - 
2009  
AUSTRALIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FINLAND 
ICELAND 
NETHERLANDS 
NEW ZEALAND 
NORWAY 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
  
A Good Council? 29 
Figure 4 Field normalised impact scores of Norwegian and other countries’ 
publications in the WoS, 2001-9 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 6: Bibliometric Analysis of the Research 
Output of Norway in an International Context, CWTS 
In terms of productivity, even when adjusting for differences in the fields of research, 
Danish and Swedish scientists produce more papers than Norwegian, Dutch or 
Finnish ones.  Relative to funding, Danish, Swedish and Dutch papers are cited more 
frequently, while Norway is at a similar level to Finland and Canada, so arguably the 
quality of the research is somewhat low in relation to the amount of money spent on 
doing it18.  Clearly, research quality improvement to the high level needed for 
Norwegian long-term competitiveness is an important challenge for RCN and the 
research-performing system.   
2.4 Conclusions 
International developments – not only in Europe but more widely in the world – mean 
that the Norwegian research and innovation system is under increasing pressure to 
perform well and that it must prioritise international presence and competitiveness.   
Norway’s great economic success since the start of the oil and gas adventure has a 
downside, which is that Norway and Norwegians have become very expensive.  The 
non-oil and gas branches therefore find it harder to compete that would otherwise 
have been the case and Norway needs constant restructuring of industry into 
increasingly knowledge-intensive and innovative branches.  However, the evidence 
suggests this is not happening.  Norway therefore needs significantly to increase its 
research and innovation activities and to promote development of new business 
activities.  Often, this is easiest to do in areas related to existing strong points in the 
economy.   
On the research side, Norwegian performance is good but not outstanding.  Given its 
high cost base and the need to compete in an increasingly large-scale and competitive 
global research system, Norway needs to make significant further efforts to drive up 
research quality.  
 
 
18 Jan Fagerberg et al, Et åpnere forskningssystem, NOU 2011:6 
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3. RCN and governance in the Norwegian research and innovation 
system 
3.1 The role of RCN 
RCN is an internationally unique organisation that combines the functions of a 
research council and an innovation agency. Its origins are in the inability of the 
previous research councils to coordinate the implementation of the nine national 
thematic priorities (hovedinnsatsområder) established by the government in the 
second half of the 1980s.  These were all cross-disciplinary and cross-sector fields of 
research, and each priority area could involve several ministries and research councils. 
The research White Paper of 199319 said that the existing research councils quickly 
fragmented the innovative organisational potential of the main target areas. The 
government had explained in its research White Paper20 of 1988–89 that the research 
funding system had become complex and unworkable.  Responsibilities were unclear 
and the government wanted to see a simplification of the entire structure.  It 
appointed the Grøholt committee to suggest how to do this.  That committee proposed 
creating a single research council.  After a lot of discussion, the research councils were 
merged and RCN began operations in 1993.   
RCN is an agency of KD. In the Norwegian research and innovation governance system 
(Figure 10), all Ministries have responsibility for research in their sectors and all of 
them, except Defence, allocate part of their research budget through RCN. The 
Council’s share of the overall Government expenditure for R&D has fluctuated slightly 
in the last decade around a value of some 27%. With 16 ministries using RCN as a 
channel through which to fund research and innovation, RCN is an extreme example 
of a ‘multi-principal agency’.   
Close to half of RCN’s income is provided by two ministries: the Ministry of Education 
and Research (28% of Ministry funding in 2010) and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (23% in 2010). Other ministries with a relatively important share in RCN’s 
funding are the Ministry of Oil and Energy (~10%) and the Ministries of Fisheries and 
Coast, Agriculture & Food, and Environment, each accounting ~5%. 
Government spending on R&D has seen a large increase in the last decade, rising from 
10,137 MNOK in 2000 to 15,749 in 2010 (real prices, fixed 2000). This rise in 
spending was reflected also in the budget allocations to RCN by the various ministries 
– especially by the Ministry of Education in 2004 and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade from 2006 onwards.  
Figure 5 shows the trends in RCN’s sources of income from 2005 to 2010. The 
Ministries of Agriculture Oil & Energy and Fisheries all increased their shares 
significantly. 
 
 
19  St Melding nr 36 (1992-93) Forskning for fellesskapet 
20  NOU 1988:28, Med viten og vilje 
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Figure 5 Trend in RCN’s sources of income (current prices) 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on RCN data 
RCN’s programme portfolio encompasses 4 programme categories: basic research 
programmes, large-scale programmes, policy-oriented programmes, and user-directed 
innovation programmes. There is also a category of ‘independent projects’, 
predominantly for bottom-up basic research. 
The growth in the budget for competitive research funding was primarily in the Large-
scale programmes focusing on the societal challenges (Figure 6). The User-directed 
Innovation programmes, focusing on industry-oriented research, had a close-to-
parallel growth pattern, slightly more marked in 2009. Funding of Policy-oriented 
programmes dropped with the rise of the Large-scale ones, but gradually returned to 
the level of 2000. In the field of basic research, funding for bottom-up basic research 
increased slightly as of 2004; support through basic research programmeswas fairly 
stable in 2000-2010. 
In 2010, the Large-scale programmes were the largest programme category, 
accounting for ~30% of the budget for research funding, closely followed by the user-
directed innovation programmes (~25%). Policy-oriented programmes and bottom-up 
basic research accounted for ~20% and basic research programmes for ~5%. 
Figure 6 Funding of research through the programmes 
 
Notes: data include only the funding for research  
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
RCN money goes to the university and institutes in about equal measure, but the 
institute share is slowly rising (Figure 7).  Much of the industry funding is for user-
directed R&D projects, which largely subsidise companies buying research from the 
institute sector.  Hence, much of the money that industry receives flows through to the 
institutes, in addition to what they get directly from RCN.   
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Figure 7 RCN funding by beneficiary category 
 
Source: RCN, 2011  
Like most countries, Norway has a ‘binary’ research funding system, where state 
research performers get general core or ‘institutional’ funding and supplement this by 
competing for external project-based funding.  Since RCN provides such external 
funding, its expenditure is heavily biased towards science and technology, where 
significant external funding is needed in order to do much research.  
Figure 8 RCN spend by discipline, 2000-2010  
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
3.2 The Fund for Research and Innovation 
The risks inherent in sector-based steering of research were clearly identified in the 
report of the Grøholt committee.  The documents that set out RCN’s goals and 
responsibilities include the report of the parliamentary committee for KUF (the 
predecessor of KD) identified the need for a ‘countervailing force’ that would balance 
the fragmenting tendency caused by sector interests with centralising tendency that 
reflected the collective interest. Amongst other things, it says 
The government will give RCN framework conditions that enable the 
Council to play an independent strategic role.  In this connection, the 
government will ensure stability in the overall budgets given to RCN as 
it becomes established, and to ensure that the funding structure allows 
RCN to act as an independent strategic research agency.21 
Such strategic resources were eventually provided by the government via the Fund for 
Research and Innovation (FFN – Fondet for forskning og nyskaping ) set up in 1999. 
 
 
21 Innst. S. nr. 192 – 1992–93, p 5 
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The FFN was a construction to ensure stable funding to research and innovation in the 
long-term, but was terminated in 2011. Each year capital was channelled to the FFN, 
and each year KD used the returns for research and innovation activities.  The growth 
of the Fund has effectively enabled KD to expand its coordinating role by evolving 
from a traditional education ministry focus on basic research to a wider, almost 
‘science ministry’ style with much wider responsibility for research across the system 
as a whole.   
A fundamental idea behind the use of the FFN resources was to support longer term 
and broad thematic initiatives and thereby to complement more sector-specific 
activities22. The use of FFN resources changed a bit over the years; the initial thought 
was to channel all resources to RCN for basic research, but then the government 
decided to add to the Fund and to use the resources also for broad, thematic purposes 
and to distribute resources also outside RCN. Substantial amounts of the returns from 
the FFN have been used to fund Centres of Excellence programmes (Sentre for 
framragende forskning, SFF; Sentre for forskningsdrevet innovasjon, SFI) and RCN-
led programmes in nationally prioritised areas such as biotechnology, energy, climate, 
nanotechnology, and seafood. Significant resources have also been used for 
investments in infrastructure and for (now abolished) co-funding of large research 
donations to universities or university colleges. 
Since 2006, the Fund constituted the third largest source of revenues for RCN; it 
accounted for 15% of RCN’s overall income in 2005 and 2006, rose to 20% in 2007 
and then gradually dropped back to 15% in 2009. Figure 9 shows that the FFN has 
played a major role in funding newer kinds of intervention by RCN (various centres 
programmes, infrastructures) as well as basic research.   
Figure 9 How RCN used income from the Research and Innovation Fund (FFN), 
2006-2011, MNOK 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
User-directed R&D 20.5 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 
Basic research programmes 15.0 89.0 86.0 86.0 93.5 12.0 
Policy-oriented programmes 15.0 27.0 20.0 19.0 23.0 61.6 
Large programmes 225.3 271.0 269.2 260.0 260.0 265.0 
FRIPRO 61.3 62.7 61.7 0.7 0.7 40.7 
Other basic research 37.3 11.0 12.2 12.2 1.2 1.2 
Other free-standing projects 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.2 35.2 
Strategic institution support 41.2 18.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
SFF/SFI/FME 130.0 300.0 325.8 391.0 390.4 418.1 
Research infrastructure 0.0 23.0 12.0 12.0 152.0 276.0 
Other 162.5 83.5 80.2 85.6 73.2 74.5 
Source: RCN, 2012 
The FFN was terminated in 2011 due to projected unstable or low returns following 
the economic crisis and low interest rates 2008-2011.  While replacing the Fund with a 
new line in KD’s budget made obvious sense in the context of declining interest yields, 
this runs counter to the original reason for creating the fund: namely, the need for 
long-term and cross- or inter-sector resources in the research and innovation funding 
system.   
 
 
22 St Meld Nr 39, (1998-99) Forskning ved et tidsskille 
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3.3 The governance and policy context 
We cannot evaluate RCN without reference to the overall governance context.  Norway 
lacks an effective national research and innovation council in the Finnish style – a 
style that is increasingly imitated in various ways around the world.  There seem to be 
two reasons for this.  First, such councils provide an effective way to coordinate 
research and innovation policy.  Second, they establish a legitimacy for action in the 
research and innovation system that often brings results only in the long term and is 
therefore uninteresting under the short-term incentives of the political system.  While 
KD has lead responsibility for research coordination across the government and for 
RCN, its ability to coordinate is constrained by the sector principle and the lack of a 
higher-level ‘referee’ such as a research and innovation council.  This in turn regulates 
the effectiveness of RCN as an advice-giver.  
In the past 20 years or so, an increasing number of countries have established 
committees or councils to advise the government on national research and innovation 
strategy.  The Finnish Research and Innovation Council has inspired many of these.  
The growth appears partly to be due to the increasing degree to which research and 
innovation policy issues affect several sectors of society and partly to the spread of the 
‘innovation systems’ perspective, which recognises the systemic nature of innovation 
and therefore the need for a coordinated approach from government.   
There is no wider literature about such councils, so we have had to rely on our own 
earlier work looking at councils internationally23. The councils almost always involve 
both industry and academia as advisors.  Curiously, only the Finnish council involves 
the research institute sector, despite its inherent closeness to innovation processes. 
The councils considered tend not to suffer policy capture.  They engage with a 
sufficiently wide set of stakeholders and provide a neutral forum for discussion, so that 
attempts by special interests to pursue their own objectives quickly become visible.   
From the government perspective, the councils reviewed provide three possible 
choices 
• A joint planning model (Japan), where the government uses the council as a 
virtual ‘horizontal ministry of innovation’, much as engineering companies build 
project teams by bringing together people across different disciplines  
• A coordination model (Finland, Netherlands Innovation Platform, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Chile), where the intention is that the council should 
communicate horizontally across ministry responsibilities so as to align policies in 
support of innovation, without this alignment always being binding 
• An advice model (Canada, Ireland, Netherlands AWT, Switzerland, UK), where 
the government is happy to be advised on research and innovation policy but does 
not want to be restricted by that advice  
The planning and coordination models require significant commitments of ministers’ 
time as well as willingness across political parties to see research and innovation as 
permanently central aspects of government policy.  The councils examined all inhabit 
systems where there is considerable distributed strategic intelligence within the state’s 
part of the innovation system.  This means that a great deal of instrument and even 
policy design takes place in ministries, agencies and at other levels ‘below’ that of the 
advisory council.  It has the advantage of exploiting the superior knowledge of needs 
and implementation found at lower levels of the system and demands good 
communication between the council and organisations working at ‘lower’ levels. 
Making good use of the intelligence distributed across the system appears to depend to 
a fair extent on developing what might be called ‘social networking capital’.  
Desiderata that emerge from the survey of councils include 
 
 
23 Erik Arnold and Gernot Hutschenreiter, Chile’s National Innovation Council for Competitiveness: 
Interim Assessment and Outlook, Paris: OECD, 2009 
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• An innovation policy council should serve as a publicly open arena in which 
stakeholders and decision-makers debate and influence the directions of long-
term research and innovation policy.  This arena role should be complemented by 
actively consulting stakeholders 
• Its composition and status should be such that it is socially and politically 
legitimate and therefore largely robust against changes in government.  It should 
include scientific and technological expertise 
• The council may sometimes need to act as referee and take decisions with which 
not everyone agrees, but an important goal is to create consensus about policy, so 
that it is natural for stakeholders to do things that are consistent with the policy 
• Part of the council’s function is to create and collate the ‘strategic intelligence’ it 
needs in order to analyse deficiencies in the innovation system and propose 
improvements.  This should be part of a wider pattern of distributed strategic 
intelligence  
• The council should produce a long-term strategy for the innovation system that 
does not only tackle systemic and market failures but sets thematic priorities, is 
holistic, suggests an appropriate policy mix and serves to reduce the ‘dynamic 
inconsistency’ between the long time constants of the research and innovation 
system and the shorter term perspectives of the world of politics  
• A key role of the council is coordination: vertically, horizontally and over time.  In 
many countries, coordination also needs to have a regional dimension.  
Coordination serves to reduce inconsistencies and goal conflicts among policies 
and actors, make the division of labour in the support system efficient and reduce 
fragmentation of effort while empowering the actors involved to do their jobs 
effectively  
• The council needs to maintain a high profile with the public and at the level of 
opinion-formers, promoting the importance of research and innovation and 
demonstrating its own impact  
• It should be sufficiently independent of the system that it can act as a change 
agent.  This means it should have no agendas or operational functions other than 
its brief to promote R&D&I and it should not have an interest in acquiring or 
spending significant resources of its own  
• The council should have a clear interface to government, at least at the level of 
ministers, so that someone is responsible for accepting (or rejecting) and 
implementing its advice.  This often means that some ministers should be 
members of the council   
Figure 10 The RD&I Governance system in Norway 
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The governance structure of the Norwegian research system – including the 
government budget procedures – means that coordination is a problem. Which actor, 
or body, plays the role of national coordinator of research and innovation policy? 
Formally, the highest authority in the governance system is the government, which can 
choose to prepare decisions through its research committee (regjeringens 
forskningsutvalg – RFU), comprising a sub-set of ministers chosen by the government.  
In practice it has tended to be chaired by the Education Minister. RFU was re-
established in 2005 as the highest level coordinating and policymaking mechanism for 
research.  It was chaired by the Minister of Education and Science 
(kunnskapsministeren), and comprised the ministers for trade and industry, labour, 
finance, fisheries, agriculture, health, oil, environment, development and a secretary of 
state from the prime minister’s office. All the ministries that spend money on research 
have officials who sit on Departementenes forskningsutvalg (DFU).   
RFU’s task is much more narrow than that of international policy councils like the 
Finnish one, focusing on setting government policy.  The wider set of governance tasks 
is effectively distributed across the government the ministries and agencies in the 
Norwegian system. Committees to advise government on research and/or innovation 
policy in Norway have had a troubled and uncomfortable history, during which few 
have had strong influence.  Since no prime minister has taken overall responsibility, 
there has been (and still is) no referee at the top of the governance hierarchy24.  This 
necessarily influences the way RCN and KD have to do their respective jobs of 
coordination within the national research and innovation system.   
In analytic terms, KD’s coordination of research is ‘weak’ coordination, where the role 
of KD is to collect and share information about the research activities of the various 
sector ministries and bottom-up to prepare the national research budget.  FFN 
provided resources that KD has used to fill gaps and launch new policies.  We 
distinguish this from ‘strong’ coordination, which would involve imposing priorities or 
reallocating resources among ministries.  KD’s leadership of the process of setting 
national priorities in successive White Papers similarly amounts to ‘weak’ 
coordination, where the White Paper proposes directions rather that being strongly 
coupled to mechanisms that impose them25.  
 
 
24 Erik Arnold, Stefan Kuhlman and Barend van der Meulen, A Singular Council Evaluation of the 
Research Council of Norway, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs, 
2001 
25 Jasper Deuten and Patries Boekholt, Prioritering in kennis- en innovatiebeleid, Ervaringen uit Canada, 
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Noorwegen, Den Haag: Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en 
Innovatie, 2009 
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Figure 11 Norwegian Research Governance and Steering Structure 
 
This lack of strong coordination at the top means that the balance of the structure 
shown in Figure 11 effectively steers research policy.  The arrows represent 
communication and negotiation links.  A large part of the power to define policy sits in 
the sector ministries, where it is modulated on two sides.  On the one side there is 
interaction with RCN (and in many cases with other agents – both agencies such as 
regional health authorities, through which the ministries spent a considerable 
proportion of their research and research performers such as the Marine Research 
Institute).  RCN devotes considerable effort to ‘add value’ by defining cross-sectoral 
programmes, which it then tries to ‘sell’ to sector ministries.  On the other side, the 
steering is modulated by the formation of a small but growing number of cross-
ministry national strategies, especially in the so-called 2020 processes, where RCN 
plays a partly agenda-setting role by acting as the secretariat.  (This cross-ministry 
coordination may potentially be reinforced by the appointment of a ‘lead’ ministry for 
each of RCN’s Large programmes and the role of the four ministries in charge of the 
institute ‘competition arenas’.)  The result is a structure where ministries choose à la 
carte among strategies on the one side and programmes on the other, in addition to 
specifying their own specific needs to RCN in the expectation that these will be 
satisfied through ministry-specific action.  The lack of a strong coordinating force at 
the top combined with the lack of strategic resources at the level of RCN means there 
are few countervailing forces to the policies of the ministries.  Over the last decade, in 
the hands of KD the Research and Innovation Fund has been such a countervailing 
force.  
3.4 Autonomy and external funding 
The 2002 Quality Reform of the Higher Education Sector introduced significant 
changes in governance.  It granted the HEIs more autonomy (e.g. for the use and 
internal distribution of their public funding) and tackled quality in teaching and 
research by introducing a performance-based funding model (PBRF), fully 
implemented in 2006. A similar model was also implemented for part of the core 
funding in the research institute sector in 2009. The reform aimed to encourage 
modernisation and greater ability to respond strategically to contextual changes and 
pressures.  This implied a change in the relationship between the higher education 
sector and the government. Government maintained its ability to influence research 
directions, steer the research base to align with policy priorities, and ensure 
performance through more external competitive funding and shifting the balance of 
core funding towards more performance-related funding. More open competition for 
funding based on quality and relevance was expected to lead to a more ‘dynamic’ 
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division of labour in the research system. A key objective was to ensure effectiveness 
and efficiency of the university and institute sectors in fulfilling their roles in the 
education and research system. 
Other interventions such as the 2005 Act on Universities and University Colleges 
increased the their responsibility for strategic management of research and granted 
them the right commercially to exploit intellectual property they developed. The Acts 
also mandated that the universities facilitate research-based innovation through the 
licensing of technology and spinning off new enterprises. The universities responded 
by establishing Technology Transfer Offices, in some cases jointly with university 
colleges and other institutions. (RCN’s FORNY commercialisation programme was for 
a time used to support these start-up operations.)  Norway opted not to have a Danish-
style forced merger between the government laboratories and the universities, 
although there has been some merger activity on a voluntary basis, through mergers 
among the food research institutes and a merger between certain institutes and Oslo 
University College.   
3.5 Conclusions 
RCN was created in order to combat the tendency of the sector principle to fragment 
the Norwegian research and innovation system.  It channels almost a third of the 
state’s spending on R&D from sixteen ministries, of which five provide the largest 
shares.  The intention from the outset was to provide it with ‘strategic’ resources to 
counterbalance that tendency to fragmentation.  In 1999, the government established 
the FFN fund as a mechanism to provide these resources under the management of 
KD and through the KD budget.  The Fund has been a significant actor in expanding 
KD’s role in research policy and coordination and in allowing the implementation of 
new R&D funding instruments and programmes intended to drive important changes 
in the performance of the research and innovation system.   
Norway lacks a Finnish-style, high-level research and innovation council.  This means 
that the research coordination and strategy function is distributed across many actors 
in the government and the state.   
Like other countries, Norway has chosen to make its research performers increasingly 
autonomous and to a great extent to steer them using performance-based core funding 
systems to promote quality and external project-based funding to guarantee quality 
and to steer research in thematic terms.   
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4. The role of basic research 
‘Basic research’ is a key component of a research and innovation system.  The term has 
both cognitive and political meanings, so we start the Chapter by disentangling these.  
We go on to describe a different way of thinking about allocating research funding that 
is not based on a distinction between basic and applied work but between research 
that maintains and develops the broad research capabilities of the research system 
partly through bottom-up funding and partly by using signals about social needs to 
add investment to the parts of the research system for which there is high demand.  
We then establish that the proportion of the research effort that is ‘basic’ in a cognitive 
sense in Norway is about normal for an advanced country.  Finally, we consider 
whether there is space to adjust between funding university research (as a proxy for 
basic research more generally) directly and competitive funding.  
4.1 Basic research in the innovation system 
The ‘research on research and innovation’ community has been proclaiming the death 
of the linear model for some decades now.  The ‘linear model’ is the idea that basic 
research somehow causes applied research and that that somehow then drives 
innovation and wealth creation.  These days, we think in terms of ‘innovation systems’ 
and recognise that the impulse to innovate can start anywhere; thats it very often 
starts with the need to solve a real-life problem; and that innovation may use the 
results of research but that may well be old research. Science and research more 
generally becomes socially useful and play roles in innovation where they are coupled 
to needs and users.  This systemic view underpins the construction of RCN as a single 
organisation  
Research is not just about new ideas. We have begun to recognise the huge importance 
of human capital (trained people, especially those with PhDs or equivalent experience) 
in enabling the conduct of R&D in industry and more widely in society, as well as in 
the scientific research sector.  Indeed, in many smaller countries it is plausible to 
argue that the most important reason for national funding of basic research is to 
generate the people that give the national research and innovation system the 
'absorptive capacity' to exploit global science.   
In Norway as in many countries research policy debate tends to crystallise around two 
‘tribes’ of researchers: the academic, ‘basic research’ faction that is prone to argue that 
there should be no research programmes and that the universities should be given 
money for research and left to get on with it without further controls or questions; and 
the ‘relevance’ faction that focuses on applied research and development in the service 
of society.  While some members of the basic research tribe see a contradiction 
between doing high quality research and doing relevant research, the evidence 
suggests the opposite. In many if not most fields, research-industry links improve 
research performance26.   
There are both cognitive and political definitions of ‘basic research’.  When 
collecting R&D statistics, the OECD uses a cognitive distinction among three 
components  
 
 
26 See for example: Magnus Gulbrandsen and Jens-Christian Smeby, “The external orientation of university 
researchers and implications for academic performance and management,” Science and Public Policy, 
2003; Gustavo Crespi, Pablo D’Este, Roberto Fontana and Aldo Geuna,  The Impact of Academic 
Patenting on University Research and its Transfer, SPRU Electronic working Paper Series No. 178, 
Sussex University: SPRU, 2008; L-M Lebeau, M-C Laframboise,  Lariviére and Y Gingras, ‘The effect of 
university-industry collaboration on  the scientific impact of publications,’ Research Evaluation, 17 (3), 
2008, 227-232; M Perkmann, Z King and S Pavelin, ‘Engaging excellence?  Effects of faculty quality on 
university engagement with industry,’Research Plicy, 40 (2011), 539-552 
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• Fundamental research: work undertaken primarily for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge, without a specific practical application in view 
• Applied research: work undertaken primarily for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge, with a specific practical aim in view 
• Development: the use of the results of fundamental and applied research directed 
to the introduction of useful materials, devices, products, systems and processes, 
or the improvement of existing ones27  
This distinction between fundamental and applied research is quite odd.  It literally 
means that the same piece of research can be applied if the researcher knows why she 
or he is doing it and fundamental if not.  These days the OECD tends to refer to ‘basic’ 
rather than ‘fundamental’ research but the meaning is the same.  Godin, not 
unreasonably, argues that the idea of ‘basic’ research would have been dropped as 
incoherent a long time ago were it not for the fact that most of the developed world is 
committed to collecting statistics about it28.   
Alternative definitions have been attempted.  One recurring idea is that basic research 
produces knowledge that is general.  Applied research is needed in order to build on 
that knowledge in ways that make it ready to apply it to particular situations, such as 
the development of a specific product29.  ‘Basic science’ — curiosity-driven research 
without regard to applicability — usually carries a higher prestige than ‘applied 
science’; and even a certain snobbery of the basic toward the applied scientist can 
sometimes be observed30.  
‘Basic research’ also has a political or governance-related definition as research whose 
subject is chosen by the investigator. ‘Basic research’ in the governance sense is 
important (a) because it connects to the idea of academic freedom and (b) because it 
relates to who steers the allocation of resources and therefore the ability of the 
individual researcher to follow her or his personal research trajectory.   
The right of academics to say things unpalatable to church and government involves a 
battle going back hundreds of years.  In the European university tradition, the 
emergence of ‘Humboldtian’ universities in the early Nineteenth Century marked the 
legitimisation of the role of universities in research as well as in teaching and the 
principle that university teachers’ academic freedom consists not only in saying what 
they want but also in researching what they want. What emerged in the post-War 
years was a ‘social contract’ that gave the scientific community a high degree of control 
in running the ‘basic’ science funding system, bolstered by the ‘linear model’ idea that 
there was an automatic connection between doing basic, researcher-initiated research 
and social and economic welfare.  The essence of that social contract was that “The 
political community agrees to provide resources to the scientific community and to 
allow the scientific community to retain its decision-making mechanisms and in turn 
expects forthcoming but unspecified benefits.”31  From the 1960s and 1970s, there is a 
clear breakdown of the post-War social contract, with society increasingly demanding 
to see useful results from its investment in science.   
 
 
27 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Measurement of Scientific and Technical 
Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development (Frascati Manual), 
DAS/PD/62.47, Paris: OECD, 1962 
28Benoît Godin, ‘Measuring science: is there “Basic Research” without statistics?’ Social Science 
Information, 42 (1), 57-90 
29 Keith Pavitt, ‘What makes basic research economically useful?’ Research Policy, 20, 1991, 109-119; Mario 
di Marchi and Giovanni Napolitano, ‘Some revised definitions of Aplied Research and Experimental 
Development’, Science and Public Plicy, 20 (4), 1993, 281-284 
30 JD Bernal, The Social Function of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, first published 1939 
31 DH Guston, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000 
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4.2 Finding the right mix 
While Sweden is one of the places where the battle between the two tribes is noisiest, it 
is also the place where the need for all the different styles of research was most clearly 
and early recognised, when a new innovation agency (Styrelsen för Teknisk Utveckling 
– STU) was set up in the late 1960s to act as a 'change agent' and combat the 
stagnation in national research identified by the OECD at that point.  STU came to 
argue that Sweden needed the conventional research councils to fund bottom-up and 
foster excellence across a very wide range of disciplines in order to keep the university 
teachers current, make sure the foreigners could not fool the Swedes and to ensure 
that any field that proved promising could quickly be expanded, based on the human 
capital already in place.  This it called 'Programme 2'.  STU saw its own role as 
'Programme 1': funding research activity in the parts of the system that underpinned 
industrial and other societal needs – connecting non-academic actors like the major 
Swedish companies with the academic research community and making sure that 
enough knowledge and people were generated in the areas of contact between the 
scientific and other societal systems.  Note that the idea of 'basic research' was not part 
of the discussion: the research to be done was the research that was needed, 
irrespective of its nature.   
Figure 12  Programme 1 and Programme 2   
 
In practice, richer countries tend to do more R&D than poorer ones. One of the best-
known regularities in economic development is that the proportion of GDP spent on 
R&D tends roughly to rise with rising income32.  There are important divergences from 
this norm: for example, Italy and Norway manage to have a surprisingly high GDP per 
head of population while devoting a comparatively small proportion of GDP to R&D; 
the inverse is true of Sweden.  But since we can observe a rather clear relationship 
between R&D (as a proxy for innovation) and GDP, and since there is plenty of 
economic evidence to show that changes in technology drive a large part of growth in 
productivity and the economy as a whole, policymakers tend to regard this as a driving 
relationship – hence the EU’s continuation of the old ‘Barcelona Goal’ of spending 3% 
of GDP on R&D in the new Europe 2020 strategy.   
Business expenditure on R&D becomes increasingly important as incomes rise but 
needs to be supported by increased education and research activity in the Higher 
Education sector.  As industrial development proceeds, so industry's R&D effort grows 
faster than that of the state.    Figure 13 shows the relative proportions of Business 
Expenditure on R&D (BERD) and Higher Education Expenditure on R&D (HERD) for 
a number of countries over 2006-9.  It suggests that there is a certain minimal level of 
HERD necessary even at low levels of BERD.  You need universities to train people 
 
 
32 Curiously, however, it has not been possible to establish a short term relationship between growth in 
R&D and GDP 
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and do research; otherwise business cannot start doing R&D.  There is an ‘entry ticket’ 
to development, meaning that the state has to make the initial investment in research 
and learning. Second, the slope of the ftrend is shallow: growth in BERD is faster than 
growth in HERD.  So once business starts doing R&D it still needs the universities to 
do teaching and research.  HERD needs to grow in order to support BERD – but not at 
as fast a rate. In European policy, this is reflected in the fact that the 3% goal is made 
up of 1% from the state and 2% from industry.  The interdependence of different parts 
of the innovation system is underlined by Brusoni and Geuna’s work showing that 
high-performing countries such as the USA and Germany publish strongly across all 
types of research: basic, applied, development and engineering33.    
Figure 13 Relative importance of BERD and HERD, 2006-9 
 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
Basic research is also growing in importance as a function of development – advanced 
countries have to do more basic research because their opportunities for imitation 
decline – and because technologies are becoming more ‘scientific’.  However, the most 
innovative and dynamic economies maintain a balance between more fundamental 
research and activities associated with application and development via big mission-
driven programmes where the state plays a large role.   
As long as national technologies remain behind the technological frontier, companies 
can operate in 'catch-up' mode and need to be supported by the state research 
infrastructure maintaining significant applied research capability.  Once the frontier is 
reached, however, the way forward is no longer defined by earlier developers; 
companies and countries need to search more widely for knowledge and this typically 
leads to an increase in the proportion of fundamental research done, in order to 
generate or absorb knowledge from new directions.  This proportion goes up not only 
in the research sector but also among companies.  We can see this effect both in 
national R&D statistics and in the spending pattern of certain R&D funders at national 
level. The balance of basic and more applied research is very different in different 
circumstance.   
Many countries do not collect data that distinguish between different types of R&D.  In 
Figure 14 we present a view of the division among types for the ‘average country’ in the 
basket of developed countries that do provide such data.  (We have excluded the 
former Soviet Bloc countries because their expenditure pattern is dominated by the 
restructuring of their research and innovation systems since 1989.)  The movement 
among categories during the period is slight: basic research nonetheless increases as a 
percentage from 18.6% in 1989 to 20.2% in 2009. Norway is at about the same level as 
the other countries that collect these data.   
 
 
 
33 S Brusoni. and A Geuna, Persistence and Integration: The Knowledge Base of the Pharmaceutical 
industry, in: C. C. Antonelli, D. Foray, G.M.P. Swann and W.E. Steinmueller (Editors), Technical Choice, 
Innovation and Knowledge: Essays in Honour of Paul A. David, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,  2001 
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Figure 14 Absolute and Relative Development of Research by Type over Time and in 
2006-9 for a Basket of Countries 
  
Source: OECD, Main S&T statistics, R-D expenditure by sector of performance and type of R-D 
(in Million 2005 Dollars - Constant prices and PPPs)   
Note: Due to gaps in data series, some data are interpolated.  Data presented on the left are the 
mean of the percentages for each country considered – they are not weighted by the absolute 
amounts of R&D done in the different countries 
It is very hard to find many data about which organisations other than research 
councils fund basic research.  Figure 15 shows that the major US mission-orientated 
research funders spend quite a lot of their money on it while of course the National 
Science Foundation spends almost all its money on basic research.  So it is reasonable 
to expect to see quite a lot of basic research funded in ‘Programme 1’ or in pursuit of 
sector missions, as well as via ‘bottom-up’ or free research programmes.   
Figure 15 Proportion of Basic Research in the main Departments and Agencies 
involved in R&D funding (1986-2009) 
 
Sources: Technopolis, based on National Science Foundation Division of Science Resources 
Statistics, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development  
We cannot disaggregate what the universities do sufficiently to get a comparative 
picture of the way basic research funding splits between core funding and externally 
funded projects, but we can look at the overall balance between core or General 
University Fund research and external project funding in a selection of countries 
(Figure 16).   
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Figure 16 Government Funding of HERD: Institutional Funding vs. Project Funding 
(2008) 
 
Source: OECD, Measuring Innovation: A new Perspective, Paris: OECD, 2010 
Different countries choose different balances between institutional and project-based 
funding of research.  In principle, the project-based component involves competition 
and therefore induces quality as well as providing a way to reallocate resources 
towards excellent research.  The institutional component provides stability: it makes it 
possible to take decisions about things like the number and size of research-
performing entities (for example, it may not be desirable for all research in a field to be 
done in one place), supports the provision of infrastructure and enables exploration 
and capacity-building by providing resources that are sheltered from competition.   
A growing number of countries are using Performance-Based Research Funding 
(PBRF) systems that allocate some or (rarely) all of the institutional resources in the 
medium term, based on performance so that institutional funding also becomes 
competitive.  Historically, the trend has been for countries to move from 100% 
institutional funding to a mix of institutional and project funding and then finally to 
making part of the institutional funding performance-based.  In the 1990s, higher 
education funding was split in many countries between 20-30% project funding and 
the balance of institutional funding, but the share of project funding has risen since 
then34.  There appears to be no ‘ideal’ mix; rather, the objective is to maintain a 
balance between competition, stability and restructuring that ensures quality while 
keeping the research system up to date and relevant.  Project funding is itself normally 
a mix of researcher-initiated (‘bottom-up’) funding and programmed (‘top down’) 
funding.   
Figure 17 breaks Government sector funding of Higher Education R&D (HERD) down 
into General University Funds (GUF) and Direct government funding, i.e. project 
funding – most often competitive. Norway is among the countries with the highest 
proportion of university research funding via the GUF.  In this table we colour coded 
the comparison countries: those with similarly high levels of GUF are coded green; 
those with more competitive funding by the government are highlighted orange. 
 
 
34 Barend van der Meulen, The Austrian Science Fund: Governance and Processes, Enschede: Universiteit 
Twente, 2001 
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Figure 17 Share of GUF versus direct government funding of R&D expenditure in the 
Higher Education Sector, 2009 (in millions of €) 
 Government sector 
funding 
General university 
funds (GUF) 
Direct government 
funding (projects) 
Belgium 1,117 36% 64% 
Denmark 1,653 72% 28% 
Ireland 704 31% 69% 
Germany 7,575 71% 29% 
Spain 3,012 66% 34% 
France 7,972 50% 50% 
Italy 5,204 85% 15% 
Austria 1,669 76% 24% 
Finland 1,033 58% 42% 
Sweden 2,041 57% 43% 
United Kingdom 5,545 48% 52% 
Iceland 55 51% 49% 
Switzerland 2,000 82% 18% 
Russia 548 6% 94% 
Japan 6,877 73% 27% 
Norway 1,380 73% 27% 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on Eurostat  
It is clear from the Table that different stable positions are possible.  We showed in 
Section 2.3 that Denmark and Switzerland are both high performers in terms of 
citations and both – like Norway – allocate most of the university research money 
through the GUF.  But on the other hand, the UK (a high performer not considered in 
this report) has a very different way of distributing the money, with a high proportion 
of competitive projects in addition to a strong performance-based way of allocating the 
research component of the GUF.  A proper analysis of the relationship between 
funding mechanisms and performance is well beyond the scope of this evaluation; 
however we can conclude that there is space for the government and RCN to change 
the way competition and incentives work for basic research in Norway.   
4.3 Conclusions 
‘Basic research’ is a key component of a research and innovation system.  The term has 
both cognitive and political meanings.  Part of the political meaning is the idea that 
research is basic if the researcher herself decides what research to do, so it is strongly 
connected to the idea of academic freedom – hence it is discussed in Norwegian as 
‘free research’.  One of the things that a research funding system has to do is to find a 
way to manage the mix of free (or bottom-up or researcher-initiated) research and 
thematically steered research, despite the fact that these modes usually have different 
governance systems.   
International statistics show that basic research (in the cognitive sense) plays an 
important role in the research mix for many advanced countries.  Norway has about 
the same proportion of basic research in the mix as others.  This basic research needs 
to be done partly in a ‘free’ mode and partly in a thematically programmed mode.  
Especially in Norway, the universities dominate basic research. Norway has chosen to 
fund university research via a mix between core funding and competitive project 
funding where almost three quarters of the money comes through the core funding.  
Some other countries do the same; yet others do not, and there is no simple link 
between this funding pattern and performance. Given the quality issues discussed in 
Section 2.3, it may be useful to change aspects of that mix.  We return to this question 
in Chapter 9.   
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5. Strategic intelligence and advice to government 
We distinguish between strategic intelligence and advice.  In this Chapter, we first 
discuss RCN’s development and use of strategic intelligence and then its role as an 
advisor to government.  Finally we discuss RCN as an advisor to the research 
performers and its strategic responsibility for the research institutes.   
5.1 Strategic intelligence 
The idea of ‘strategic intelligence’ has become important in the way we think about 
research, innovation and the institutions in which these happen in last 25 years or so, 
since the idea of ‘national innovation systems’ took hold. National innovation systems 
are nationally specific not only because of differences in factor endowments, 
geography and culture but also because they co-evolve with national systems of 
governance. In the systems view, governance is not a simple matter of top-down 
‘steering’, in which an all-knowing principal sets agents to work to achieve goals that 
can be set from the top alone, but involves competition, consensus-building, 
networking and negotiating decisions in arenas in which multiple actors are 
involved35. Strategic intelligence – in the sense of the knowledge needed to make 
strategy but also the deliberate use of evaluation, foresight and technology assessment 
in policy formulation and implementation – is a characteristic of research and 
innovation systems that needs to be decentralised, to enable components of the system 
to work well.  It is not enough that one central actor knows everything – knowledge 
must be developed and particularly shared across the system of actors involved.36.  
The system of distributed intelligence therefore needs to: be networked; involve active 
actors or ‘nodes’ in the different organisations involved; be transparent so that as 
many parts of the innovation system as possible can share intelligence; publicly 
supported, so that there are resources available to provide data and analysis; and 
quality-assured through the participation of multiple providers of intelligence and 
regular efforts to keep the knowledge involved up to date. 37 
5.1.1 Information and studies 
Today, in partnership with others, RCN generates a lot of ‘systems health’ indicators.  
These are now complemented by KD’s ‘research barometer’. One of the most 
conspicuous pieces of strategic intelligence is the Indicators Report –
Indikatorrapporten38 published by RCN, NIFU and Statistics Norway, which 
describes and documents the Norwegian research and innovation system.  The report 
produces and presents key indicators for Norwegian R&D&I with the purpose of giving 
an overall view of Norwegian activity in R&D, higher education, science and 
technology.  
RCN undertook a number of research foresights from 2004 onwards, especially in 
connection with the new Large programmes.  The use of foresight studies has since 
 
 
35 Renate Mayntz and Fritz W Scharpf, ‘Der Ansatz der akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus’ in (same 
authors) Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung, Frankfurt: Campus, 1995 
36 Stefan Kuhlmann, Paries Boekholt, Luke Georghiou, Ken Guy, Jen-Alain Héraud, Philippe Laredo, Tarmo 
Lemola, Denis Loveridge, Terttu Luukkonen, Wolfgang Polt, Arie Rip, Luis Sanz-Menendez and Ruud 
Smits, Improving Distributed Intelligence in Complex Innovation Systems, Final report of the Advanced 
Science and Technology Planning Network (ASTPP), TSER Contract No SOE1-CT96-1013, Karlsruhe: 
Fraunhofer-ISI, 1999 
37 Stefan Kuhlmann, Governance and Intelligence in Research and Innovation Systems, address delivered 
upon the acceptance of the office of a Fraunhofer-ISI Professor of Innovation Policy Analysis at Utrecht 
University on 7 October 2002, Universiteit Utrecht, 2002 
38 www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&pagename=indikatorrapporten%2FHovedsidemal& 
cid=1224698172624 
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declined to a low level within RCN.  National strategies corresponding to the Large 
programme areas are now developed by ministries, with varying degrees of support by 
RCN.  RCN and the ministries continue the practice of broad stakeholder consultation 
for the development of new programmes, but there is still little use of foresight 
exercises or other disruptive approaches such as technology assessment in RCN and in 
the policymaking system as a whole.  
5.1.2 The role and value of RCN ‘meeting places’ 
The term ‘Meeting Places’ refers to all opportunities created or exploited by RCN, for 
knowledge sharing with key stakeholder groups, government and research 
institutions. They play roles in both strategic intelligence and in governance.  In its 
2012 report on the meeting places39, RCN reports on an internal survey trying to 
establish the intensity of RCN’s activities from this perspective. In 2011, RCN 
organised or participated in approximately 350 ‘meeting places’ involving meetings 
with stakeholder groups or events, excluding management committees and 
appraisal/competition panels. This implies that there is a fraction less than one 
meeting for every single day of the year. Our analysis of the RCN committees showed 
that in the period 2003-2011, RCN set up a total of 238 committees, involving 1,541 
individuals.  Currently, there are 172, of which the great majority are Programme 
Boards (Figure 18), which play an essential role in defining and managing RCN 
programmes. Except in the Innovation Division, university researchers are the 
category of people most frequently involved in the RCN steering committees.  Some 
44% of members are women.  Industry is the most represented stakeholder group in 
the Innovation Division but is little represented in the Strategic Priorities Division. 
The Institutes sector is also poorly represented. According to interviewees, this is the 
case in order to avoid conflicts of interest, especially in the programme boards. The 
largest group of meeting place members is ‘researchers’. 
Figure 18 Type of committees or boards (2003-2010) (Percentages) 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 2: Organisation, Governance and 
Institutional Boundaries of the RCN, Technopolis; based on the RCN committees database 
RCN continues to be very open in the extent of its consultations with stakeholders.  
Stakeholders regard it as an important arena for counselling and dialogue on research 
and innovation policies.  However, meeting place participants tend to see participation 
as an opportunity to learn and to network rather than as a chance to exert much 
influence on RCN policy or practice.  This is true both at the level of stakeholder 
meetings and in RCN’s Boards.   
 
 
39 Forskningsrådets møteplasser 2011 og 2012 – Rapport fra kartlegging, RCN, 2012 
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5.1.3 Evaluation 
The statutes say that RCN should “ensure the evaluation of Norwegian research 
activities”40. RCN describes its evaluation activities as   
• Scientific field evaluations, for which the RCN science division has a five-year 
plan.  The cover research at universities, instotutes and university hospitals 
• Evaluations of instruments, predominantly programme evaluations  
• Evaluations of institutes. RCN has stopped doing these on the understanding that 
their direction is replaced by the new performance-based funding system  
• Other types of evaluation where RCN acts as purchaser of large-scale policy 
evaluations on behalf of ministries, such as in the area of social reforms 
• Self-evaluations, predominantly undertaken by the Innovation Division and 
focusing on the improvement of additionality in innovation programmes  
Field evaluation is an area where RCN does well – it has inherited and improved the 
former NAVF tradition.  Evaluations are normally followed up and a number of 
research roadmaps for discipline development have thus been developed.  These are 
valuable and play a role in guiding events among the research performers.  Where 
relevant, they can have an effect on future RCN programmes.  However, we can see 
little evidence of work that problematises new fields or that tackles the problems of 
interdisciplinarity.  These are important complementary issues in discipline 
development.   
In the 2001 RCN Evaluation, we estimated that in the years 1995-1999, the level of 
spending for evaluation represented no more than a maximum of 0.33% of the RCN 
research budget. Data for 2003-2010 show that little has changed. RCN’s expenditure 
and activity in evaluation is thus modest – this is an under-used tool.  Evaluation is 
otherwise poorly institutionalised.  The evaluation strategy dates from 1997 and has 
never been implemented.  Evaluation is not embedded in the programme or policy 
cycle, though individual programme strategies have begun to call for evaluation, 
especially in bigger programmes and instruments and there is some evidence that 
these influence practice.  There is a lack of meso-level studies.  There is little apparent 
interest in the impacts of RCN funding (outside the company sector, where 
beneficiaries of user-driven R&D projects have been surveyed about impacts annually 
since the early 1990s). Changes in minimum grant size, the launch of the FUGE 
programme, creating the SAMKUL programme and adding resources to FRIPRO are 
examples of events at least partly triggered by evaluation.   
Dropping the former practice of evaluating the institutes means that there is now no 
institutional perspective on their performance and that their chief source of feedback 
is instructions from their parent ministries and signals from markets and the new 
performance-based research funding system.   
5.2 Advice to government 
RCN plays an important role with others as a co-producer of strategic intelligence and 
policy advice.  The annual budget proposals are argued to be a key source of advice to 
government.  They result from 16 intimate, parallel and increasingly detailed dialogues 
between RCN and the ministries and are becoming longer and more detailed over 
time.  Ministries’ needs of and attitudes to RCN differ widely.  For example, some say 
they want more advice about priorities while others prefer RCN to limit its suggestions 
to the level of instruments.  It is very complex to handle this diversity – RCN therefore 
acts case by case, using dedicated ‘account managers’ (‘DADs’).  
At the level of national policy, RCN is a big and active participant in a debate that 
involves many other actors in addition.  RCN systematically inputs into the research 
White Paper processes.  Many (but by no means all) of the ideas proposed find their 
 
 
40 Statutes of the Research Council of Norway, New version – 1 January 2011 
  
A Good Council? 49 
way into the White Papers and there is then a good correspondence between the 
priorities of the White Papers and those RCN sets in its own strategies.  This RCN 
advice on national policy appears to be influenced by the fragmented nature of its 
dialogue with the ministries.  It sometimes produces proposals orthogonal to the 
contents of those discussions but there is not a clear whole-system vision from which 
RCN generates such advice.  We argue that this results at least in part from overly 
decentralising the production of strategic intelligence within RCN to the divisions.   
However, RCN has succeeded in signing up more and more ministries to a declining 
number of common programmes, so it clearly is able to set or exploit cross-ministry 
agendas and find synergies in R&D funding.  This is an important (if labour-intensive) 
form of policy coordination.  A number of ‘21’ national research strategies have been 
set up by individual ministries, sometimes with only modest support from RCN.  The 
ministries themselves increasingly show signs of coordinating specific strategies, such 
as the new ones for generic technologies where multiple ministries develop a strategy 
together with help from RCN and widespread stakeholder consultation.  In these 
cases, RCN aims to contribute strategic intelligence and secretariat support to the 
process of developing strategy. RCN coordination from ‘below’ to a degree therefore 
complements inter-ministry coordination from ‘above.  In other words, the system is 
itself evolving to cope with the coordination deficit at the highest level by moving the 
locus of strategy formation that underlines large programmes from RCN to the 
ministry level.  
At the government level, the sector principle is very valuable. While KD has 
responsibility for coordinating research policy, in practice it has limited authority.  A 
consequence is that there is only in a limited sense a national strategy – that is the 
strategy that KD can negotiate with the other ministries during the White Paper and 
budget processes.  There is no higher-level mechanism for creating a view that goes 
beyond the individual ministry views or the sum of ministry views when they choose to 
develop national strategies together, eg in bio- and nano-technology.  This is 
increasingly problematic as the locus of research policymaking in Europe shifts 
towards Brussels.  Among the consequences is difficulty in prioritising.  Thus, RCN 
became involved in a very large proportion of the early EARA-NETs and is currently 
taking part in all the Joint Programming Initiatives of the Framework Programme.   
5.3 Advice to the research performers and strategic responsibility for the 
research institutes 
The closest thing RCN produces to direct ‘advice’ to research performers is the results 
of its field evaluations. Government policy has been to make the research performing 
organisations more autonomous. RCN and others have identified needs for structural 
change in the research system, notably to tackle fragmentation, lack of mobility and 
the need for greater internationalisation. Hence, the ‘advice;’ that RCN can give them 
has to be given at least in part through providing incentives.  The three Centres 
programmes (SFF, SFI and FME) provide clear signals about building critical mass, 
training researchers and better international exposure.  Other measures such as the 
research infrastructure plans, developed in 2006 and since revised, similarly promote 
de-fragmentation and a better division of labour in the research system.  More 
generally, RCN influences research performers through its thematic and non-thematic 
programmes and by operating the performance-based funding system for the 
institutes, which has already affected their rate of publication and in a number of cases 
caused them to increase their attention to research management.   
RCN has always had ‘strategic responsibility’ for the research institutes – a 
responsibility it has been difficult to fulfil, given its lack of authority over them and 
lack of control over budget. In line with the government’s policy to make research-
performing institutions more autonomous, RCN helped develop a new performance-
based research funding (PBRF) system for reallocating parts of the core funding 
among the institutes.  It also revised its programme for providing ‘strategic’ funding to 
institutes, to help them develop capacity. Not all the ministries have been prepared to 
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transfer core funding into the PBRF-based part of their funding arena and only one 
area has so far implemented the new strategic programme.  There has been a little 
restructuring in the institute sector to adjust to the new regime, but there is probably 
scope for more.   
Internationally, the use of a PBRF in the institute sector is unusual but not unique.  In 
western countries, it is similarly unusual for all the institutes to have a single owner, 
but parts of the system are often grouped under umbrella ‘owners’ (like the Fraunhofer 
Society) in order to give common management to common categories of institute. 
Evaluation and funding tend to be done at the same level, so that evaluations have 
consequences.  And where there is a need to steer the portfolio of institutes, it is done 
by active management rather than using indirect incentives such as PBRFs.  
International practice would not suggest that all the institutes should have a common 
owner (as was the case in the old Soviet academy system) but it does imply that active 
ownership or stewardship can be useful across groups of institutes, involving more of a 
‘visible hand’ than the ‘invisible hand’ of markets or PBRFs.   
5.4 Conclusions 
RCN has a substantial list of achievements to its credit.  In many cases these cannot 
solely be attributed to RCN because they are co-produced in partnership with others. 
The ones we mention here are nonetheless ones where RCN has at least played an 
important role – and our list is not exhaustive.  
• RCN produces or co-produces a very large volume of strategic intelligence at the 
level of indicators and surveys.  These range from the Indicators Report to detailed 
monitoring of the research institutes.  They are of general interest for making and 
implementing policy 
• Strategic intelligence and policy are developed in the context of large-scale 
stakeholder consultation.  This is difficult to benchmark but is certainly towards 
the most consultative end of the spectrum of policy development internationally  
• Field evaluations are regularly conducted and provide information that is valuable 
to participants and their organisations as much as it is to RCN itself.  These have 
consequences for participants’ strategies and for RCN programmes 
• Evaluation is to a growing extent informing RCN programming beyond 
disciplinary research (to which the field evaluations are primarily relevant) 
• RCN plays a significant role in helping sixteen ministries plan a large and growing 
part of their research expenditure.  The budget is a key process for doing this.  
While there are two parts to this discussion – one on the next year and one on the 
following year – a longer-term element might also be beneficial 
• RCN is an active and well-informed partner for ministries responsible for writing 
White Papers.  The main interaction is with KD for the research White Paper, but 
there are also others 
• RCN supports the coordination of sectoral research needs by developing and 
implementing research programmes of interest to multiple ministries.  In this way, 
a declining number of programmes is satisfying the needs of a growing number of 
ministries (in the sense that the mean number of ministries per programme is 
increasing) 
• Ministries are, singly and in groups, preparing thematic national strategies on 
research.  RCN is increasingly providing coordination by supporting these with 
strategic intelligence and by providing or hosting secretariats 
• These two coordination mechanisms appear to be evolutionary adaptations to the 
lack of an overall ‘referee’ in the policy system 
• RCN is playing a significant role in the development and deployment of 
programmes that tackle structural deficits in the research system, including the 
Centres programmes (SFF, SFI and FEM), research infrastructure and the 
regional research funds.  These systemic interventions tend to lie outside the 
interests of individual sector ministries and have been tackled using money from 
the Research and Innovation Fund.  This underscores the importance of RCN as a 
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change agent and the need for ‘strategic’ resources to be available to 
counterbalance the tendency of sector-driven funding to cause lock-in 
• RCN has made a major contribution towards strengthening the institute sector by 
designing and implementing the new performance-based funding system, even if 
that system has by no means been fully rolled out at this stage 
Issues and problems raised in this chapter include the following.   
• RCN made use of foresight for a short period but seems since largely to have 
dropped it.  Foresight is a useful component of strategic intelligence because it 
helps you move away from consensus to explore disruptive possibilities and 
counteract the tendency of research agendas and programmes to lock in to existing 
ideas and trajectories 
• Equally, we were not able to identify much strategic intelligence about 
interdisciplinarity or new and disruptive directions in research 
• Evaluation is not properly embedded in the programming cycle at RCN.  While we 
are wary of the idea that everything has always to be evaluated, formally deciding 
whether to evaluate before, during or after a programme and in relevant cases 
doing such evaluations ought to improve the quality and efficiency of intervention 
• Nor does evaluation adequately tackle impacts.  As a result, RCN lacks evidence 
for accountability and to demonstrate the value of what it does  
• The European and global context means it is increasingly important to have a clear 
national strategy in relation to quality, thematic focus, internationalisation, etc.  
Without this a small country easily becomes irrelevant in the international 
research system and resources are wasted on sub-critical and fragmented efforts.  
Given the lack of a ‘referee’ in the system, such a strategy is hard to make truly 
national in Norway 
• Advice giving to government appears overly embedded in RCN’s interactions with 
the ministries.  RCN needs capacity to develop strategy and advice that is not 
captive to the ministry agendas and that therefore has greater potential to induce 
disruptive change 
• The availability of strategic resources in the form of the Research and Innovation 
Fund has been key to RCN’s ability from time to time to act as a change agent 
• The reform of the research institute system is unfinished business.  Neither 
component of the new funding system is fully implemented.  The incentives for 
restructuring the system remain rather weak and the interest of a number of 
ministries in addressing institute policy seems limited.  The end of institute 
evaluation means there is no rounded view of the individual institutes as 
organisations.  International experience with performance-based funding systems 
suggests that strongly formula-based steering leads to perverse behaviour and 
lock-ins.  We therefore would prefer to see a mix of measurement and judgement 
by one or more competent owners of clusters of institutes rather than treating the 
institute system as a quasi-market.  But whichever view one takes, the institute 
system currently hangs between an evaluation-based system that had no ‘teeth’ 
and a performance-based system that is only partly implemented.  This is clearly 
not satisfactory  
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6. RCN organisation and governance 
The central question for this chapter is ‘Does RCN function well as an organisation?’  
That is a multidimensional query.  Organisations have to have structures and 
processes that are the right ones for their context and it is in the nature of a state 
agency that it is in part externally governed, so we need to treat organisation and 
governance together.  Functionally, we can view the organisation of RCN as extending 
upwards into the way it is governed by the ministries; and we can also view ministry 
organisation as extending down into the agency.   
We start by discussing RCN’s internal organisational structure, how it has changed 
during the period covered by the evaluation and the three-level internal steering 
structure of RCN, with a Main Board, four Division Boards and many Programme 
Boards.  Second, we look at the key process in RCN – funding.  Third, we look at the 
way ministries steer RCN – in effect the extension of the organisation up to the policy 
level.  The new Management by Objective (MBO) system is intended to be an 
important part of that steering.  Fourth, we look at the boundaries of the organisation: 
Are the dividing lines between RCN and Innovation Norway, on the one hand, and 
SIVA, on the other, in the right places?  Finally, we bring together some conclusions.   
6.1 RCN’s internal organisation and steering 
RCN’s character as a multi-principal agency with a broad set of system-wide 
responsibilities imposes a heavy organisational and administrative load.  This is made 
heavier by the growing complexity of science and technology, the increasing 
importance of interdisciplinarity and cross-sectoral problems and the large number of 
stakeholder groups to which it must relate.   
Until 2003, RCN’s organisational structure consisted of six ‘research’ divisions, 
organised primarily according to disciplinary and sector boundaries (Figure 19) that 
reflected boundaries among the organisations merged to form RCN in 1993. All the 
divisions except Industry and Energy (IE), funded basic and applied research, while 
the Science and Technology division (NT) funded basic research activities that 
underpinned the disciplines covered by the other divisions. 
RCN was radically reorganised on 1 September 2003, with the aim of breaking down 
internal barriers that hung on from the pre-RCN organisation, making it easier to run 
programmes that spanned applied and fundamental research and supporting change 
in the programme portfolio so that RCN could be a change agent in the research and 
innovation system. Three overarching ‘specialist’ divisions were set up.  
• The Division for Science, focused on funding long-term and basic research 
• The Division for Innovation, focusing on industry-oriented research and having a 
greater emphasis on user needs 
• The Division for Strategic Priorities, which was to provide the opportunity to 
exploit synergies between basic research and industrial research through 
crosscutting initiatives (the Large-scale Programmes).  
The reorganisation also resulted in a sharper focus on international cooperation and 
participation in EU research, and the Director’s staff was made responsible for the 
coordination of international affairs.  
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Figure 19 Developments in the RCN organisational structure  
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 2: Organisation, Governance and 
Institutional Boundaries of the RCN, Technopolis  
RCN undertook a significant restructuring in 2010, creating a mix of two priority-
focused divisions and two divisions respectively reflecting RCN’s functions as a 
research council and an innovation agency.  
The most pertinent change involved the split of the Division for Strategic Priorities 
(SATS) into two divisions centred on the two main dimensions of national and 
international research priorities in relation to Welfare: the Division for Energy, 
Resources and Environment (ERM) and the Division for Society and Health (SAH). 
Both divisions were to cover the entire range of research in their specific fields (from 
basic research to innovation) and the Division for Society and Health was additionally 
assigned responsibility for RCN’s bi-lateral international cooperation agreements 
(previously under the Director’s staff International Unit).  
The Division for Innovation took on the responsibility for funding research tackling 
the national priorities in terms of Technologies, ie ICT, biotechnology and 
nanotechnology and the new materials. It was given more responsibility for 
strengthening the knowledge-based economy and research-based innovation and was 
also put in charge of RCN’s contribution to regional research and innovation. 
The Science division focuses on basic research (predominantly bottom-up) and was 
assigned overall responsibility for a well-functioning research system, with strategic 
responsibility for the universities, university colleges and all the independent research 
institutes. 
In our view, the reorganisation of RCN in 2010 was useful.  It addressed the need for 
thematic and disciplinary expertise at the Division Board level and allowed RCN the 
possibility to strengthen its position in relation to the generation of national research 
and innovation strategies that is increasingly taking place at the level of the Ministries.  
It strengthened line management by reducing functional overlaps among divisions and 
made the structure of RCN more transparent.  Weaknesses of the new organisation 
structure are complexity (which to a small degree explains an increase in the number 
of staff employed) and the disappearance of an ‘arena’ specifically for new and 
strategic initiatives by locking the successors of the Strategic Priorities Division into 
specific themes.   
The reorganisation was well conducted.  While the impulse came from the Director 
General, staff and key external stakeholders were individually and collectively 
consulted and a broad consensus was reached that the reorganisation was desirable.  
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Key individuals were redeployed in a manner that appears to have caused little or no 
friction.  Internal and external stakeholders are happy with the result.   
Most large organisations are forced to choose some form of ‘bureaucratic’ organisation 
structure, with hierarchy (‘line management’) and delegation.  Typically, similarities of 
process and the nature of the knowledge and technology needed to perform them tend 
to dictate how the boundaries are established between departments.  Common 
functions and oversight may be provided by staff who sit outside the ‘line’ 
departments.  Bureaucratic organisations tend to be good at doing a small number of 
things at large scale; they lend themselves to de-skilled rather than knowledge work; 
and they are often inflexible.  They can benefit from using modern, small-scale 
organisational devices such as teams to accomplish particular tasks but these have to 
be organised within or across the bigger bureaucratic structure.  The normal way to 
modify to bureaucracy in order to tackle its weaknesses is ‘matrix’ organisation and 
that is what RCN has adopted.   
While the new structure represents an improvement on the previous one, it remains 
complex – and a deal of that complexity is externally imposed through limited 
coordination of research policy at the level of the 16 ministries.  Coordination costs are 
therefore internalised at RCN.  Half the staff (228 people) are involved in internal 
coordination groups.  While each ministry is assigned to a division and an individual 
‘account manager’, in total 60 people play a role in the ministry groups.  There are also 
coordination groups for each of the nine national priorities, a Budget Forum of nine 
people, an Annual report Forum of 11 and 23 ‘portfolio groups’, each dealing with a 
thematic priority or structural objective stated in RCN’s strategy.  In addition, there 
are functional coordination groups for funding processes (the R&D Committee), 
analysis, IT, communications and the Impartiality and Appeals panel (HAK) among 
others.   
The budget process illustrates the complexity of coordination in RCN. The process 
involves two major phases: a preparatory phase where the underlying principles are 
defined and resulting in a proposal at the level of strategic priorities, and a finalisation 
phase during which the detailed budget proposal is developed.  The entire process 
takes approximately 3/4 year and involves juggling national Strategic Priorities from 
the government’s White Papers, internal portfolio groups, the interests of the sixteen 
ministries and the internal organisational structure. It is summarised in Figure 20, 
based upon the RCN internal Guidelines and input from RCN management.41  
The diagram illustrates the important role of the cross-divisional Budget Forum, 
chaired by the Director’s staff. The Budget Forum co-ordinates the input from the 
cross-working groups and senior experts in the Divisions, acts as facilitator for the 
discussions in the Directors’ Meeting, and takes into consideration the feedback 
received from the Executive Board and the Division Boards for the development of the 
different versions of the budget proposal, in all phases of the process. There is 
opportunity for dialogues between the different Board levels; the Executive Board is 
responsible for quality assurance and the internal approval of the budget proposals.  
In the preparatory phase, the different dimensions in the priorities that guide the 
budget proposal are defined and agreed upon in different steps: first the main 
priorities, then the other priorities, and finally the application of these priorities for 
the proposals to the different Ministries. 
In the first step, the administration puts forward a first internal draft of the budget 
proposal  - Version 1, covering only the ‘main priorities’. These priorities are designed 
to follow up objectives set out in the White Papers and the Research Council’s strategy 
and action plan.  
 
 
41 Rådviseren – styrende dokumenter, B-2-01 v2 Budsjettforslag, RCN, 2010 
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This version builds upon the input from the ministry groups, the Directors’ meeting 
and the cross-divisional Strategic Priorities (FM) groups, which in turn have received 
input on the existing RCN portfolio from the cross-divisional portfolio (PG) groups. 
The Executive Board takes a preliminary decision in relation to the main priorities for 
the annual budget. The draft is then forwarded to the Division Boards for comments 
and alternative proposals.  
Version 2 of the internal draft reports and discusses the Division Boards’ input and 
includes also a draft budget for the other priorities so that the Executive Board has a 
view on the proposed overall budget framework. The Executive Board discusses and 
approves the final framework for all priorities, without establishing the sub-division of 
the budgets among the Ministries.  
The next step consists in a merging of the internal draft Version 2 with the budget 
needs for specific programmes and instruments, setting it in the context of the   overall 
Government funding framework (per Ministry) and taking into account the alignment 
with the other key research dimensions. 
Figure 20 Process for drafting annual budget proposals 
 
Source: RCN guidelines 
The proposal at the level of ‘Strategic Priorities’ entails for each single Ministry a 
proposal for contribution to the main and other priorities’ budgets, taking into account 
the state budget and the ministry shares of the previous year. The Division with key 
responsibility for a ministry drafts the section of the proposal related to that ministry. 
This proposal should account for the RCN’s main priorities, but the analysis should be 
at a sufficiently detailed level for the Ministries to use it in their preparatory work for 
the state budget.   On approval of this proposal by the Executive Board, the Budget 
Forum co-ordinates the drafting of the final budget proposal, which includes all 
programmes and activities, detailed at the level of each Ministry.  
In its broad lines, it is difficult to find principles of organisation likely to reduce the 
level of complexity at RCN.  In the detail, some issues appear to be overly 
decentralised.  In particular, evaluation, analysis, statistics and the parts of IT 
associated with maintaining databases of projects and experts need to have strong and 
responsible leaders, in addition to the networks currently working across RCN.  The 
lack of a strong, central strategic analysis group means that the centrifugal forces 
caused by RCN’s multi-principal governance are not strongly opposed by a powerful, 
internal centripetal force that produces an independent national view.  An analysis 
group recently set up in the Director’s staff is intended to take on this role.  
International practice would argue for placing at least part of the analysis function at 
the centre and for caution in designing over-complex matrices.   
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RCN’s administrative costs are paid partly by KD via a dedicated administration 
budget and partly by the other ministries, which earmark a small percentage of the 
money they spend through RCN to cover ‘management’ costs.  Overall, the proportion 
of the budget spent on administration and management declined from 8% in 2000-2 
to 7% in 2003-10.  In the last few years there has been a reduction in the use of 
external contractors, who previously played a more significant role in programme 
management.  This increasing efficiency has been accompanied by a rationalisation in 
the number of programmes or schemes offered (from 229 to 178) and an increase of 
about 10% in average project size.  There has been substantial investment in IT 
systems and standardisation of proposal and assessment procedures (admittedly 
across a large number – 22) of funding instruments.   
RCN data indicate that the increase in personnel, combined with the efficiency 
enhancing measures, more than absorbed the increase in workload (Figure 21). Since 
2004, there has been a slight reduction in average workload per employee in terms of 
budget for which each employee ‘accounted’ (real prices) and of proposals, and from 
2009 onwards there was a drop in number of ‘live’  projects per employee.  
Figure 21  Research budget per FTE, 2004-2010 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total FTE 330 345 350 378 377 394 411 
Total budget – in MNOK* 4061 3897 3914 4483 4362 4958 4843 
Total nr projects 4130 4505 4654 5128 5198 4692 4754 
Total nr proposals** 6135 6511 6661 7136 7207 n.a**. n.a.** 
Budget/FTE 12.3 11.3 11.2 11.9 11.6 12.6 11.8 
Projects/FTE 12.5 13.1 13.3 13.6 13.8 11.9 11.6 
Proposals/FTE 26.5 24.4 21.7 20.1 18.3 n.a. n.a. 
Notes: * Real prices – Fixed 2004;  **data on proposals are to be considered proxies at a year-
to-year level; data on 2009 and 2010 could not be included due to problems in the data  
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 2: Organisation, Governance and 
Institutional Boundaries of the RCN, Technopolis; based on RCN data  
The RCN staff is highly qualified (15% have a PhD), ageing (half are over 50) and 
disinclined to leave (staff turnover was only 4% in 2010).  Overall numbers have risen 
from 330 in 2004 to 411 in 2010 and 455 today.  The proportion of people at Special 
Advisor or Director level rose from 27% in 2004 to 37% in 2010.  The proportion of 
women rose gently from 60.5% to 62.9% in the same period.   
Timesheets have only recently been introduced and the reliability of the data collected 
so far is uncertain.  In the aggregate, however, these data suggest that RCN personnel 
spend 25% of their time on programme management, the same on creating and 
sharing strategic intelligence, 15% on national ‘meeting places’ and 10% on 
internationalisation.  This suggests that the ‘core’ funding function is efficiently done 
but also that other transaction costs in RCN are high.  
The reduction in the number of programmes has been accompanied by a fall in the 
number of Programme Boards and scientific committees from 80 in 2004 to 45 in 
2010 – and a faster decline in the number of members from about 700 to some 300 – 
half of them from the Norwegian research sector, 16% from abroad (mostly 
researchers), 16% from industry and the rest largely form the public service.   The 
research community therefore has about two thirds of the places in RCN’s committees.  
Industry is little represented outside the Innovation Division.  The proportion of 
foreign experts has doubled since 2006.   
Three levels of boards (or committees) govern RCN, mirroring the administrative 
hierarchical structure (Figure 22). Members of these boards comprise members of the 
stakeholder communities.  For a small number of specific programme boards this may 
include Ministry representatives but ministry representation in RCN boards is 
declining as a matter of policy. 
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Figure 22 The three-level hierarchy in the governance structure 
 
At Division (DS) and Executive Board (HS) level, relevant stakeholder groups appear 
well represented.  Many of the DS and HS Board members interviewed were frustrated 
that the three-level steering hierarchy and the limits of their authority posed by the 
requirements of the funding ministries led to a lot of ‘rubber stamping’ of decisions.  It 
was inconceivable to operate RCN without the HS and Programme Board (PS) levels; 
the DS were needed partly for span-of-control reasons and partly to give legitimacy to 
division operations.  There seems to be universal admiration in the Boards for the 
quality and effectiveness of RCN administration, which was often able to use advice on 
implementation from the Boards.  However, while the PS have real influence over 
programme design and composition, the higher levels were largely not empowered to 
take strategic decisions; members felt it was close to impossible to trigger significant 
changes in direction from within the Boards.  Some Board members argued that 
greater influence than this would be unreasonable, in the context of public service and 
an organisation whose main remit is to implement policy.   
The DS and HS Boards play a large role in the development of RCN strategy.  
However, this primarily involves overseeing the aggregation of the results of detailed 
initiatives taken at the level of the people in RCN who handle relations with the 
funding ministries.  The Boards do not have a separate or independent source of 
analysis that would form the basis for proposing alternative strategies.  In effect, their 
ability to set strategy is limited not only by the complex principal-agent governance 
system within which RCN lives but also by information asymmetry.   
In our view all three levels (Executive, Division and Programme Boards) of RCN’s 
three-level steering hierarchy are necessary.  The new arrangement should increase 
the strategic value of the two upper levels – especially if better supported by 
independent analysis. 
6.2 The funding process 
RCN has significantly improved the way it processes applications in recent years – a 
fact reflected both in the researcher survey and in interviews with stakeholders.  
Procedures are documented and for the most part transparent. Each funding 
instrument has a defined process.  The European Research Council (ERC) heavily 
influences the process for ‘bottom-up’ and thematically specified scientific proposals.  
Proposals to programmes are assessed via international scientific peer review as well 
as by the relevant Programme Board, which makes final decisions.  Innovation 
projects are additionally assessed by the administration for likely socio-economic 
impacts before the Programme Board takes a final decision.  Centres and research 
infrastructure proposals are administered in the part of RCN that has relevant domain 
expertise, peer reviewed and then prioritised by panels put together specially for that 
purpose, under the authority of the Executive Board of RCN.  Applicants get feedback, 
comprising referees’ comments and the scores allocated in the course of appraisal and 
have the opportunity to appeal decisions.  Processing times are rapid.  RCN has some 
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difficulty in handling interdisciplinary proposals – a feature common to all research 
funders.  Current practice may obscure the extent of interdisciplinarity in proposals, 
making it hard to see whether these are assessed adequately.  But more broadly, RCN 
assessment procedures are consistent with good international practice among research 
councils and innovation agencies such as those in the other Nordic countries and 
Austria.   
Success rates vary widely across RCN’s different instrument and programmes.  
Unsurprisingly, some specialised areas such as space research have high success rates.  
User-driven R&D projects also enjoy a high success rate.  However, FRIPRO has a very 
low overall success rate and this is a matter of great concern to the research 
community since it is the national programme for competitive researcher-initiated 
project funding.  Analysis of the overall scores allocated to FRIPRO proposals in 2011 
shows that 30% were fundable (in the sense of having an overall score of 6 or 7 on the 
7-point scale used), and that half of these proposals were actually funded.  Overall 
success rates were lowest in the social sciences (12%) and highest in humanities 
(20%). However, the proportion of fundable proposals actually receiving funding was 
lowest in mathematics, natural science and technology (40%).  RCN’s aim of allocating 
money to broad discipline groupings in proportion to the amount of university 
research effort done in each supports existing capacity but can drive differences in the 
proportion of excellent proposals funded.   
The universities and research institutes are the organisations that submit the highest 
proportions of fundable proposals.  There is quite a long ‘tail’ of medium- and low-
quality proposals.  The proportion of low quality proposals is greatest among the 
universities and university hospitals, suggesting that these organisations do less 
quality control of outgoing proposals than the institutes.   
Analysis of publications by RCN-funded researchers compared with those by 
researchers whose applications were rejected shows that at the overall level those 
funded are more highly cited than those whose applications were rejected – and the 
more highly cited authors tended to have had more applications to RCN accepted.  
There is a minority of individual fields where rejected applicants’ average citation 
performance is better than those whose proposals succeeded.  The differences were 
quite big in agriculture and food science, educational sciences and literature (a field 
where bibliometrics is not a very good indicator).  RCN beneficiaries were much more 
visible than those who had been rejected in the top journals in their respective fields 
(Figure 23).  Thus, the bibliometric evidence confirms our analysis that the quality of 
RCN’s funding processes is good.   
Figure 23 Visibility of RCN-funded and other Norwegian researchers in top journals, 
2001-2007 
 
Note: Ratios of Actual to Expected papers in the top x% most highly cited journals in the 
respective field 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 6: Bibliometric Analysis of the Research 
Output of Norway in an International Context, CWTS 
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6.3 Ministry steering and the new management by objectives system 
In theory, the relationship between principals and agents involves significant risks to 
the principal, owing to the information asymmetry between them: in the detail, the 
agent tends to know more about what is being done than the principal and therefore 
has various opportunities to cheat. The delegation styles used between ministries and 
research councils have evolved over time.  ‘Blind delegation’, where the decisions 
about how to use the money are simply left to the council worked in many places until 
the 1970s, when the ‘social contract’ with science started to change and the state 
became much more interested in understanding the results of research and ensuring 
they were economically and socially useful.  From that point on, ministries have 
increasingly tried to govern science using incentives and performance contracts, the 
latter in line with current thinking on the so-called ‘New Public Management’42.   
However, effective governance appears to require a degree of decentralisation and use 
of local as well as central strategic intelligence.  Effective governance styles rely 
increasingly on a degree of empowerment – giving the agent sufficient freedom to 
innovate and to invest in a class of solutions rather than individual potential 
solutions43.  This allows agents to learn and add value to the instructions of the 
principal through programming.  Correspondingly, if the agent is not empowered it is 
difficult for it to innovate and quickly to shift resources to support emerging ideas and 
risky research or to maintain sufficient diversity in the system to respond to emerging 
problems44.  Research funding principals’ market power as monopsonists creates 
strong incentives for agents to conform with their wishes, further tending to lock in the 
steering relationship.  Using RCN in the year 2000 as a case in point, van der Meulen 
argues that having multiple principals causes further lock-in, as the principals strive to 
make sure their money is spent on ‘their’ research needs45. Empowerment relies in 
turn on trust and a level of shared values and social ties46.  The risk of bad behaviour 
by the agent is expected to reduce where these contextual factors are in place.   
Given the large number of RCN’s principals, we concentrated on understanding 
steering by the five largest funders of RCN 
• Ministry of Education and Research (KD) 
• Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD) 
• Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) 
• Ministry of Health and Care Services (HOD) 
• Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (FKD)  
Our interviews and review of documents suggest that the steering processes between 
RCN and individual ministries are cordial and based on trust – more so than was the 
case 10 years ago – and some ministries have increased the proportion of their 
research expenditure that they channel through RCN as a result. All the ministry 
people we interviewed are happy with the dialogue with RCN. They all find RCN to be 
expedient and competent and think that RCN understands their needs. They are also 
happy with RCN reporting, though reporting needs differ considerably among 
ministries.  NHD and HOD require intensive monitoring and frequent data deliveries, 
while KD, OED and in particular FKD are less focused on data inputs. 
 
 
42 Dietmar Braun, ‘Lasting tensions in research policy-making – a delegation problem’, Science and Public 
Policy, 30 (5), 2003, 309-322 
43  Elizabeth Shove, ‘Principals, agents and research programmes’, Science and Public Policy 30 (5), 2003, 
371-381  
44 Benedetto Lepori, ‘Coordination modes in pubic funding systems’, Research Policy, 40 (3), 2011, 355-367 
45 Barend van der Meulen, ‘New roles and strategies of a research council: intermediation of the principal-
agent relationship’, Science and Public Policy, 30 (5), 2003,323-336 
46 Lepori, Op Cit 
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The dialogue appears to be more two-way than before. Allocation letters have overall 
developed positively and become more instrumental and distinct. The number of 
guidelines has generally not increased and the ministries say they listen more than 
before to RCN when drafting allocation letters. While detail tends to lock RCN in, the 
ministries do not uniquely cause it – RCN also has an interest in detailed instructions 
that commit ministries to working through it.  Unlike in some foreign systems, the 
‘unit of analysis’ in the steering dialogue tends to be programmes or other activities 
rather than higher-level objectives.  Thus, while the new MBO system represents an 
ambition to steer at a higher level, the real negotiations remain activity-based.  RCN 
has developed a practice of ‘selling’ multi-ministry programmes as a way to coordinate 
at this level so the ministries are increasingly buying into joint programmes.   
Steering at the activity level involves a risk of detailed interference by ministries at the 
level of selecting individual projects or steering the details of individual programmes.  
However, we saw no evidence that this is the case – rather, ministries tend to maintain 
a greater distance from programme committees than before.  Where ministries need to 
be more involved at the project level, they are likely to do this through their captive 
research institutes.  By implication, they see RCN as the appropriate arena for 
competitive funding.   
The general idea that each ministry should take responsibility for research in its sector 
is almost universally agreed in Norway.  That is a view that we share.  Indeed, while 
the Norwegian principle is perhaps more explicit than that abroad, most countries 
organise their research funding and governance around this idea.  The alternative of 
centralising responsibility for research in a science ministry or something similar is 
unusual.  While there is no clear proof, the argument that it is better to have 16 
ministries supporting the idea of research than to have one fighting the other 15 to 
maximise the national research budget is attractive.   
Our discussions with both RCN and the ministries made it clear that despite a useful 
discussion47 in 2004, there is not a uniform understanding of the ‘sector principle’ in 
research. We can think in terms of two kinds of sector principle for research.  One is a 
‘narrow’ principle that each ministry should pay for and secure or procure the 
knowledge it needs to run its daily business of regulation and making policy.  The 
other is a ‘wide’ principle that gives each ministry in addition the responsibility to 
make sure Norway has research capacity (in terms of a lively community of applied 
and pure researchers) working in and for its sector.  Without this, there is no 
guarantee that the narrow sector principle can be followed in future.  Ministries varied 
in the extent to which they see the wide principle as applying to them but in general, 
sector ministries tended to feel that KD’s responsibility for basic research implied that 
they themselves did not need to play a role in funding the growth of fundamental 
knowledge or research communities relevant to their own sector.  (This contrasts, for 
example, with US practice.)   
RCN’s relationship with KD has an importance that goes beyond ownership.  KD, the 
Fund and the budget line that has replaced it represent the major opportunity to tackle 
systemic failures such as the need for restructuring, capacity building and research 
that falls into the ‘grey zone’ between ministries.  The nature of that relationship must 
also in part depend upon an understanding about the degree to which sector 
ministries have responsibility for basic research of relevance to their own sector and 
therefore how ‘wide’ the sector principle is held to be.   
A new Management by Objectives (Mål- og resultatstyrning – here abbreviated to 
MBO) system for RCN was implemented in the steering and reporting process 
between the funding ministries and RCN in 2010-11. It represents an attempt to 
integrate ideas from the New Public Management into that relation, supporting the 
 
 
47 Departementenes sektorsansvar for forskning, Slutrapport fra et arbeid utført av Utdannings- of 
Forskningsdeartementet, Oslo: UFD, 2004 
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ministries in the exercise of their sector responsibility with respect to research while at 
the same time enabling coordination and a streamlined process of instruction and 
reporting.  It also provides an opportunity to review the degree of specificity in 
ministry instructions and the dialogue with RCN about particular activities and 
therefore the room RCN has to manoeuvre in trying to optimise its activities at the 
national level while still making sure that sector needs are met.   
The MBO system involves three high-level goals, broken down into a total of 13 sub-
goals.  The group that designed the system suggested over 70 quantitative indicators 
that could be used in conjunction with it.  (The ‘research barometer’ proposed by the 
Fagerberg Committee seems to a degree to be a reaction to this.  The barometer aims 
to diagnose the state of health of the research and innovation system in Norway, which 
is what RCN should aim to optimise.)  In its reporting, RCN has carefully broken down 
its activities and budgets, allocating each to a unique sub-goal.  This allows it to report 
and use some output indicators at the overall level but also to describe how money 
from individual ministries has been used and to some degree to connect that to sub-
sets of outputs.   
In 2011, most of the ministries adopted the system.  It is largely overlaid on previous 
practice, with letters of allocation providing an indication of which MBO sub-goals 
ministries want RCN to pursue on their behalf in addition to a traditional set of tasks 
and guidelines.  Ministries vary in the extent to which they specify what performance 
indicators RCN should use; in any case, they do not tend to set target values.  Goals are 
therefore high level and not quantified.  NHD has partially overlaid the system on its 
own one and asks for reporting following its own budget lines.  Ministries take on sub-
sets of the 13 goals according to their own needs.   
Our discussions with the 11 ministries willing to be interviewed suggested that while 
two felt the new system improved the steering and reporting process, the remainder 
felt it added length but little value to the process.  In the absence of specific targets or 
significant variations from plan, RCN itself judges in its 2011 Annual Report that its 
performance against all 13 goals is “satisfactory”.  The complexity of RCN’s steering 
relationships with 16 ministries makes it a unique case, but it is noteworthy that 
foreign systems tend to be simpler, more aggregated in their reporting and use a small 
number of indicators.  Some countries emphasise assessments of impacts more than 
RCN and other Nordic agencies do.  Simplification would significantly improve the 
readability of RCN’s reporting.   
6.4 RCN’s organisational boundaries 
SIVA, Innovation Norway and RCN are the three main players in the national 
research, development and innovation industry and business support system. The 
three agencies have different roles, responsibilities, and tasks, but are required to 
cooperate in areas of common interest where there are risks of overlap. 
In particular, the three agencies work together in local and regional environments, and 
through the programmes ARENA48, which supports regional business clusters, and the 
Norwegian Centres of Expertise (NCE).  There is also routine cooperation, especially 
between RCN and Innovation Norway, at the working level  For example, proposals for 
innovation projects are sometimes shared in order to find the best fit with the 
combined set of funding instruments offered by the two organisations.   
In short, the contrasting roles of the agencies could be described as follows 
• SIVA’s investments are geared towards physical and virtual centre and incubator 
investments aiding innovation, while RCN’s focus is on creating commercial and 
social value via research grants. Innovation Norway works largely through loans 
 
 
48 www.arenaprogrammet.no 
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and is geared towards creating socioeconomic benefits from entrepreneurship, 
business development and innovation but without having a research funding role 
• In contrast to SIVA, Innovation Norway and RCN both base their support in 
individual enterprises and projects, which are in turn encouraged to create 
networks. SIVA, on the other hand does not support individual undertakings, 
focusing instead on the development of physical and organisational infrastructure.  
RCN’s links with Innovation Norway are mainly through the its Innovation Division. 
There are regular activities around the inter-agency cooperation, and as such, goodwill 
towards a coordinated national research and innovation system.  Recent evaluation 
studies of SIVA and Innovation Norway have looked at the relationship between the 
two agencies and RCN49 but not identified significant problems.   
Our interviews with Innovation Norway  SIVA, industry, industry associations and 
research-performing institutions suggest general satisfaction with the division of 
labour.  There is little sense that beneficiaries are confused about which agency to go 
to for which kind of support.  Nor is it reasonable to expect that all potential 
beneficiaries will maintain a clear understanding of the agencies and the support 
opportunities they provide.  It is at the stage of search that transparency matters, so 
that beneficiaries can find what they are looking for.  In this respect, our view is that 
the Innovation Norway web site is unhelpful, owing the organisation’s desire to bring 
companies into a personal dialogue before informing them of the opportunities on 
offer.   
Several interviewees pointed out that the regional mission of Innovation Norway 
means there is the biggest gap in innovation (as opposed to research) support for 
industry in the capital region, which has the highest concentration of innovative firms.  
That seems unfortunate to us, but it is a matter of policy and formally beyond the 
scope of this evaluation.   
Our assessment of RCN’s institutional boundaries with SIVA and Innovation Norway 
suggests that RCN boundaries with SIVA are overall clear and well understood.  Small 
areas of overlap exist with Innovation Norway and there the two organisations 
cooperate. This does not seem to cause problems for beneficiaries. Collaboration 
between the two agencies is long established and is increasing.  It could be improved 
in relation to information sharing and there may be potential to make better common 
use of the organisations’ international networks.   
6.5 Conclusions 
• Multi-principal agencies are particularly susceptible to governance lock-ins.  The 
need to provide RCN with a degree of strategic freedom beyond that provided by 
its principals was recognised already in 1999 and led to the creation of the Fund 
for Research and Innovation. It has been replaced by budget-line funding from 
KD.  The intention appears to be to continue to use this money as a strategic 
resource  
• The 2010 reorganisation was useful and well executed.  The organisational 
philosophy at RCN today appears to be to drive the organisation as far as possible 
through the ‘line’.  The structure is a line organisation with a staff that is operated 
as a functional matrix. There are inevitably substantial coordination costs because 
there is no unique logical place to put things that affect multiple divisions.  There 
is a high degree of internal and external satisfaction with the organisation and in 
the absence of evidence that it is broken there seems to be no point in proposing 
that it should be fixed rather than monitored and if necessary tinkered with over 
time.  In this respect the change in the statutes that allows the Director General to 
 
 
49 The NCE and Arena programmes have also been evaluated, however these studies have not included 
agency management aspects, but focused on the progression of the actual projects 
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decide the organisation structure is a great improvement on the original statutes 
that effectively forbade change   
• RCN administration is increasingly transparent, respected and efficient but the 
costs are driven up by the complexity of RCN’s context 
• The three-level steering system works reasonably well and the 2010 reorganisation 
makes it possible better to use expertise at the level of the Division Boards in 
developing RCN’s strategy and practice.  A two-level system would create an 
unmanageable span of control.  The existing structure should be retained  
• Funding processes at RCN conform to good international practice and favour good 
researchers over bad ones.  Closer attention is needed to interdisciplinary and 
high-risk proposals  
• The steering relationships between ministries and RCN are close and trust-based 
but continue to involve a lot of detail.  The unit of analysis is activities rather than 
goals and this constantly risks lock-in 
• The lack of clarity about how ‘wide’ the sector principle for research is tends to 
mean that ‘basic research’ is seen as the responsibility of KD.  This may lead to a 
deficit where – as with the Large programmes – there is an intention to increase 
and focus national research capacity  
• The new MBO system clearly offers an opportunity for a process of improvement 
in the quality, clarity and specificity of steering and reporting while enabling 
better coordination among ministries and giving RCN opportunities to serve their 
needs using common programmes and other instruments as far as possible.  So 
far, the new MBO system has changed the form but little affected the content of 
the steering relationships.  The ministries need greater incentives to adopt it.  At 
the moment it is probably more useful to RCN and to KD than to the other 
ministries.  The ministries should now collectively review their experience 
together with RCN and move towards a steering RCN through more general high-
level goals, set more specific performance expectations and implement a shorter 
and more transparent reporting system.    
• The organisational boundaries between RCN and respectively SIVA and 
Innovation Norway are not problematic.  Where relevant, the organisations 
cooperate in a friendly way.  There may be opportunities better to use data and 
international networks in common but we found no grounds to ‘improve’ 
something that already works rather well 
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7. Implementing and adding value to national priorities and 
developing the national research and innovation system 
In this chapter we refer back briefly to RCN’s role in developing national and ministry 
strategies for research.  This was already discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.  
In the second section, we focus on RCN’s research spending.  We first discuss the 
overall pattern, most of which is funding of competitive research.  Second we look 
within that category of competitive research at the policy mix – what kind of research 
is funded.  Third we look at RCN’s systemic interventions, where one of the purposes 
of funding is to generate organisational changes and changes in the way research is 
done.  Fourth, we look at the beneficiaries: Who got the money?  Fifth, we look at the 
way RCN has shifted its programming towards national priorities.  We then examine 
funding for internationalisation and the surprisingly poor representation of women as 
leaders of RCN-funded projects.   
In the third section, we look at those effects on the research and innovation system 
that are visible in the changing pattern of funding by field and discipline, the effects 
reported by the various stakeholders we have surveyed and interviewed and available 
evidence from RCN’s evaluations.   
7.1 Research strategy 
RCN translates, complements and provides input to the national strategies by means 
of its own strategy papers. Discipline evaluations constitute an important source of 
strategic intelligence, feeding into RCN’s input to the national strategies as well as its 
own actions and programmes.  
RCN’s programmes have become increasingly cross-sector and are ore often funded by 
multiple ministries (especially the large-scale programmes). 
There was an increase in funding of RCN’s activities in 2004-2010, spread over the 
various ministries, but it was particularly marked for the Ministry of Education (in 
2004) and for the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Oil & 
Energy (from 2006 onwards). The Ministries of Agriculture, Local Government & 
Regional Development, Foreign Affairs, and Fisheries increased the share of their 
R&D funding budget that was allocated to the RCN. 
The national strategy of most importance for the period under assessment (2004-
2010) is in the White Paper Commitment to Research 2004-2005. This established a 
range of thematic and technological priority areas (energy and environment, food, 
oceans and health; ICT, biotechnology and materials and nanotechnology), as well as 
crosscutting systemic priorities for basic research, research-based innovation and 
internationalisation. 
7.2 How RCN used the budget  
In this section we focus on the research budget. The information presented is based on 
analysis of the database provided to us by RCN (in January 20, 2012). We have 
subsequently ‘cleaned’ some of the data.  Financial figures are generally turned into 
real prices, most often fixed-2000, in order to identify trends in funding behaviour.50 
RCN’s database is essentially a finance-management database. RCN has made a 
considerable effort to structure its activities and define indicators that would facilitate 
the analysis of its funding activities from a policy perspective – especially from 2006 
onwards. The Council divides its research budget into management costs, research 
 
 
50 Details on the modalities for these calculations are provided in a separate background report  
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programmes, infrastructural and institutional measures, independent projects and 
networking measures.   
For this study, we re-structured RCN’s funding activities from an intervention logic 
perspective, ie the rationale of the activity in relation to R&D policy, wherever 
possible.  First, we grouped the budget lines into three major funding categories: 
management costs, competitive funding, and non-competitive funding. The latter 
includes core funding to the research institutes and the semi-competitive funding for 
strategic institutional projects that is channelled through RCN (the SIP, SUP, SHP, 
and ISP).  For each of these funding categories we defined ‘intervention 
categories’, focusing in particular on competitive funding, within which we defined 2 
intervention categories  
• Research, Development and Innovation, encompassing research performed in the 
programmes and independent projects – including the measures for international 
cooperation  
• Systemic initiatives, including the Centres programme, measures fostering 
network development or funding infrastructures and scientific equipment, 
regional innovation, commercialisation of R&D results etc 
The intervention categories are sub-divided into policy mix categories, reflecting 
the focus of the funding. For this categorisation we took into account the combination 
of proposal types and types (or content) of programmes or measures.  
The policy mix for Research, Development and Innovation consists of  
• Innovation-oriented research, including both bottom-up innovation (BIA) and 
programme-steered innovation – the latter in all other user-directed innovation 
programmes and in the Large-scale & policy-oriented programmes. Included in 
this category are the User-directed innovation projects (IPN), the ‘Competence-
development with user-involvement’ projects (KPN), and the Industry PhDs 
• Basic research, grouping bottom-up basic research (FRIPRO – which includes 
Storforsk, and YFF) and programme-steered basic research (in the other basic 
research programmes), listed in the RCN database as ‘basic research’. As RCN 
does not define proposal types for basic research, we could not identify basic 
research funded in the Large-scale & policy-oriented programmes. 
• Mission-oriented research, encompassing basic or applied research (all ‘non-
innovation oriented’ research) in the Large-scale programmes and policy-oriented 
programmes. It also includes some research projects that were listed as 
independent projects but had a programme name (projects from 2000-2003) 
• International cooperation in research, grouping the projects focusing on research 
as well as ‘network development’, which are listed separately in RCN’s 
categorisation, as well as the international cooperation projects/measures funded 
in specific programmes – wherever identifiable. We distinguished participation in 
EU programmes/initiatives or Nordic initiatives based on programme or project 
descriptions (in the titles).  This was done manually 
In the category of Systemic interventions, the policy mix included 
• The Centres programmes, including the Centres of Excellence and the Competence 
Centres  
• Support for Competence development, which includes support for infrastructures 
& equipment, network development, institutional measures (not further 
specified), dissemination (ie scientific publications), research competence 
(projects listed as independent with no further explanation), and (competitive) 
institutional funding. The latter includes support for strategic projects in institutes 
that were more competitive in nature  
• Support for Innovation capacity building, such as the schemes fostering the 
commercialisation of research results (FORNY), industry mobilisation (MOBI 
programme & similar) or regional innovation (VS-2010 & VRI)  
  
66 A Good Council? 
• Support for internationalisation, including international dissemination activities 
(conferences, publications, etc) related to EU programmes/initiatives, Nordic 
initiatives or other cooperation initiatives, as above 
According to the RCN database, the Council involved ~3000 stakeholder organisations 
in its activities during 2000-2010.51 
In line with common practice, we made a major distinction from a ‘sectoral’ 
perspective, ie identifying the key actors in the RD&I system: universities, university 
colleges, the industry sector, research institutes and ‘institutes with research’. 
University hospitals are ranked under the main category ‘university’; industry 
associations are listed under the main category ‘industry’. 
‘Institutes with research’ include research institutions that do not have research as 
their key activity and/or are not officially recognised as ‘research institutes’. These are 
government labs (whether owned by ministries or autonomous), museums, or 
institutions such as the Statistical Office.  
We also grouped another set of stakeholders under ‘other research’. This includes 
especially individual researchers for which the database did not give us clear ‘sectoral’ 
indications; other organisations included in this category are research foundations, 
inter-institutional centres, and (disciplinary) research associations. 
We called a final category ‘Public Sector/Society’. This category contains citizens’ 
organisations, public administration (at national, regional or local level), public 
agencies, and public services, including museums, libraries and (non-university) 
hospitals. 
7.2.1 Funding overall 
In 2000-fixed real prices, RCN’s budget rose from 2,843 MNOK in 2004 to 4,470 
MNOK in 2010 (Figure 24). The budget growth went almost entirely into competitive 
measures, in line with the government’s intention to make the research performing 
institutions more autonomous and to steer using incentives.   
Figure 24 The main components of the research budget 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Within total competitive funding, RCN spent more money over time on both R&D 
projects and on systemic interventions intended to induce structural changes (Figure 
25). In 2010, the budget for RD&I funding was 3,935 MNOK; funding for the systemic 
initiatives was 1315.7 MNOK (current prices).  The share of the money spent on 
 
 
51 This number is an over-estimate: it is based on the total of organisation IDs in the database. Numerous 
organisations had more than one organisation ID and there were a large number of individual researchers 
for which no organisation ID number was provided. This number includes only organisations that were 
‘project leaders’ and researchers benefitting of individual grants. 
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systemic initiatives rose to some 30% in 2004 and remained at that level for the rest of 
the decade.   
Figure 25 Intervention categories for competitive funding 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
At the overall level, competition-based support for the innovation system has risen 
faster than that for the research system (Figure 26) – driven by the rising contribution 
to the budget from innovation-orientated ministries, especially NHD, OED and LMD.   
Figure 26 Focus of support to the RD&I system – competitive funding 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
7.2.2 The policy mix in competitive funding 
Within the category of competitive finding, innovation-oriented research showed the 
strongest growth, in particular since 2006, followed by mission-oriented research 
(Figure 27). Basic research (in the relevant programmes or as ‘free’ projects) 
stagnated, receiving a stable level of funding throughout the decade (real prices).  (A 
limitation of this analysis is that we cannot look into the Large programmes and see 
how much of the research done there is in effect fundamental.)   
In 2010, innovation-oriented research accounted for ~40% of the funding for R&D, 
compared to ~25% in 2004. The strong growth in innovation-oriented research meant 
that mission-oriented research and basic research jointly counted for ~55% in 2010, 
compared with  ~70% in 2004.  International cooperation accounted for some 5% in 
2010.  
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Intervention categories for competitive funding  
In M NOK, real prices 2000-fixed 
Research, 
Development 
& Innovation 
Systemic 
Initiatives 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Focus of support to the RD&I system - Competitive funding    
In M NOK, real prices 2000-fixed, R&D & Systemic initiatives 
Support to 
the Research 
system 
Support to 
the 
Innovation 
system 
  
68 A Good Council? 
Figure 27 Policy mix for the competitive funding of RD&I 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Our approach is unable to distinguish basic from other kinds of research within the 
Large programmes.  The RCN database is partly coded to permit such analysis but it 
has not proved possible fully to clean the data.  Figure 28 is not therefore fully 
consistent with the rest of our analysis but probably provides the best view possible of 
this issue.   
Figure 28 RCN view of basic research content in Large programmes 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on RCN data  
The Policy Mix adopted in the research divisions quite obviously reflects their 
mandates (Figure 29). The Science Division focuses on basic research and invests 
~35% of its budget in systemic interventions for research, the Innovation Division 
focuses on innovation-oriented research (increasingly bottom-up), and the Strategic 
Priorities covers (basic and applied) mission-oriented research. 
Figure 29 The policy mix of competitive funding in RCN’s three divisions 
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Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
It is particularly noticeable that the Strategic Priorities Division shifted its spending 
somewhat from mission-orientated work towards innovation, under the influence of 
the evolution in the strategies of some of the programmes (Figure 30).   
Figure 30 Policy-mix for competitive funding in the Division for Strategic Priorities 
(2004-2010) 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
7.2.3 Systemic intervention 
Throughout the decade, RCN spent a fairly stable share of ~20%/25% of its 
competitive funding budget on the delivery of support to the RD&I system, beyond the 
direct funding of research. 
In the beginning of the 2000s, one fifth of this budget (~20%) went to support the 
innovation system (‘innovation-capacity building’), while the remaining 80% went to 
the research system (‘competence development’). This balance changed with the 
launch of the two Competence Centres schemes (SFI and FME). As a result, funding of 
support for research competence development accounted for ~40% of the systemic 
initiatives funding in 2010, compared with 80% in 2000. 
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The Centres programmes currently constitute the core of the systemic initiatives 
policy mix, accounting for 40% to 45% of the funding for systemic initiatives (Figure 
31).  
Figure 31 Policy-mix for the systemic initiatives 
 
 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Support for infrastructures and scientific equipment is a constant theme in the field of 
competence development, while the focus of institutional support changed from 
support for individual, small strategic projects to support for the creation of (inter-
institutional) research groups and centres (Figure 32). The Centres of Excellence 
account for ~35% of the budget for systemic initiatives focusing on the research 
system.   
In the field of innovation capacity building, a historical major focus is raising the 
awareness of industry about research-based innovation. Regional innovation is 
another major - and returning - focus of the initiatives. The Competence Centres are 
the major instrument, accounting for ~60% of the funding related to the innovation 
system. 
Figure 32 Trend in systemic initiatives for the research and innovation system 
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Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Figure 33 shows that the major focus of the systemic initiatives has been on changing 
the behaviour of the universities but with the institutes becoming increasingly drawn 
in through the decade.  
Figure 33 Stakeholder involvement in the Systemic initiatives 
 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
From mid-decade, RCN has increasingly focused on fostering collaborations within 
and between the different ‘sectors’ in the RD&I system. In 2010, collaborative research 
accounted for 56% of the competitive research funding for ‘national’ initiatives, i.e. 
excluding research abroad. Most of this funding was focused on innovation (Figure 34) 
but collaborative mission-orientated and basic work also grew.  
Figure 34 Funding of collaborative research 
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Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
There is growing collaboration within Norway, especially between organisations in the 
regions and in Oslo (Figure 35).   
Figure 35 Inter-regional research collaborations – project ‘owners’ versus partners, 
2010 
Partners 
Region project ‘owner’ – 
base (nr. of interregional 
collaborative projects) 
Hoved
staden  
Midt-
Norge  
Vestlandet  Oslofjorden  Nord-
Norge  
Innlandet  Agder  
 
Hovedstaden  429    41% 27% 12% 12% 8% 4% 
Midt-Norge  276  65%   39% 18% 14% 11% 7% 
Vestlandet  197  54% 30%   6% 13% 2% 4% 
Oslofjorden  75  67% 33% 23%   1% 11% 1% 
Nord-Norge  69  61% 38% 25% 1%   1% 0% 
Innlandet  34  50% 56% 6% 12% 12%   0% 
Agder  25  36% 36% 36% 16% 8% 8%   
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Starting in 2008, a new core funding system for research institutes was put in place, 
comprising a performance-based reallocation of a small part of the core funding and a 
new system for the strategic projects.  Neither has been fully implemented.  
The data show a considerable rise in core funding for the research institutes from 
2008 onwards, partly compensating for the drop in funding for the strategic projects 
in these institutions (Figure 36). The funding of other institutional strategic projects, 
instead, remained at a fairly stable level overall. However, at a more detailed level, 
there was a change in focus, with increased funding for strategic projects in university 
colleges (SHP) and for the funding of ISP, ie projects funding the development of 
strategic international inter-institutional collaboration. 
Figure 36 Institutional funding channelled through RCN 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Another important structural influence is RCN shifting resources away from individual 
grants and towards projects that involves more than one person with the intention of 
reducing fragmentation in the research community.  The exception is that YFF 
(excellent young researcher) grants have grown against the trend of general decline in 
grant funding, underlining RCN’s increasing focus on excellence.   
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Figure 37 Instruments for competitive funding 
 
 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
7.2.4 Who got the money? 
In terms of the stakeholder groups benefiting from the projects (Figure 38), a lot of the 
growth went to the universities and the research institutes and there was a recovery in 
industrial involvement from the trough in the early-mid 2000s.  Growing industry 
involvement further benefits the institutes because a lot of the funding to industry is 
user-directed R&D – where companies get R&D subsidies to which they add their own 
money and then spend at research institutes. University colleges and the public sector 
rarely led such projects.   
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Figure 38 Stakeholder involvement in competitive-funded measures 
 
 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
The breakdown of the industry stakeholders involved at the level of the major industry 
sectors shows an increasing involvement in the second half of the decade of 
manufacturing companies (as leaders of research projects).  Since 2004, the service 
sectors accounted for ~45% of RCN funding for industry; since 2007, the 
manufacturing sectors had a share of ~40%.  The Primary sectors slightly increased 
their involvement in 2008 and a positive trend is equally visible for the ‘other’ sectors, 
which includes the energy sector. The Mining & Quarrying sector (including services 
for the petroleum industry), instead, reduced its involvement from 2007. 
Figure 39 shows that industry is the major beneficiary of innovation-orientated 
research funding but that the institutes’ share has been growing.  Remembering that 
most of the money that goes to industry is then spent at the institutes, this confirms 
the major role the Norwegian institute sector plays in innovation-orientated R&D.  
The institutes are also central in mission-orientated work, but here the relative 
importance of the universities has increased.  Unsurprisingly, the universities 
dominate the basic research activity.   
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Figure 39 Stakeholder involvement in innovation-orientated, mission and basic 
research 
 
 
  
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
The mix of research funded under competition moved towards technology during the 
decade (Figure 40).  There are also clear shifts in the funding mode of different fields 
• For research in Agriculture & Fisheries, there is a clear shift notable from mission-
oriented (basic/applied) research to innovation-oriented research, and an end to 
funding basic research 
• In the field of Maths & Natural sciences, we see fairly stable mix of basic & 
mission-oriented, with a start of innovation-oriented programme-based research 
in the more recent years 
• Research in Humanities is close-to-uniquely basic research funded  
• Research in Social sciences is strongly mission-oriented funded; there was some 
basic research funded in the field (but in decline) as well as some innovation-
oriented research (also in decline) 
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• For research in Medical sciences there was a shift from basic bottom-up research 
to mission-oriented research; we also note the beginning of some innovation-
oriented research funded 
• Research in Technology is strongly innovation-oriented and increasingly bottom-
up. There is close-to-no basic or mission-orientated research funded in the field  
Figure 40 Disciplinary focus of competitive research 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Figure 41 shows the disciplinary focus and level of interdisciplinary research in the 
different types of programme.  Maths and natural sciences dominate the basic 
research programmes and – together with medical sciences – are a major part of the 
bottom-up basic research effort.  Technology dominates the Large and User-directed 
programmes, while social sciences provide the biggest element in policy-orientated 
research programmes.  
Major trends within fields are: 
• In the Agriculture & Fisheries area, an increase in share of funding for agricultural 
sciences, aquaculture & interdisciplinary agriculture/fishery sciences, 
accompanied by a decrease in plants, fish health sciences, and fishery technologies 
• In the field of Humanities, an increase in research in history, archaeology, 
architecture & design, and a rise in share for interdisciplinary research within 
humanities but decrease in interdisciplinary between humanities and other 
sciences 
• In Math & Natural Sciences, an increase for interdisciplinary, both within maths 
& natural sc. area and between the area disciplines and others; there was less 
funding for research in basic biosciences and chemistry 
• In Medical sciences, more funding for research in medical molecular biology and 
health sciences, less for medical biochemistry 
• In Social sciences, an increase in funding for interdisciplinary research between 
disciplines in the area and with other sciences, economics, pedagogical sciences, 
social geography, international politics, clinical psychology and development 
psychology. Sociology and media sciences/journalism received less funding 
• In Technology, more funding for machine technology for energy/environmental 
technology, rock and petroleum sciences, ICT, interdisciplinary within and with 
other disciplines, marine technology, nanotechnology, chemical process 
technology; less funding for research in biotechnology 
• Throughout the decade, RCN dedicated a fairly stable share of ~20%/25% of its 
competitive funding budget for the delivery of support to the RD&I system, 
beyond the direct funding of research. 
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Figure 41 Disciplinary focus & level of interdisciplinary research in the programmes 
 
Notes: In M NOK, real prices 2000-fixed 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Interdisciplinary work is most important in the basic research and policy-orientated 
programmes.  It is surprisingly small in bottom-up basic research and in the large-
scale programmes, suggesting that some of the work done there may be rather 
traditional.  The low level of interdisciplinary research in the Large-Scale programmes 
– on average 5% of the funding, with a slight growth in the last years up to 7% – is 
especially surprising given their problem-solving orientation. 
In the specific Large-scale programmes, research was indicated as being 
interdisciplinary only in some programmes (Figure 42): 
• In the RENERGI programme, interdisciplinary research was conducted in the 
areas of Technology, Maths & natural sciences, and Social sciences, accounting in 
total for ~15% of the funding 
• In the PETROMAKS programme, the disciplinary research was in the area of 
Social sciences, accounting for ~5% of the funding 
• In the NORKLIMA programme, in the Maths & Natural Sciences area, accounting 
for 8% of the funding 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % in average
Basic research progr.
Agric. & Fisheries 6 5 4 2 0 1%
Humanities 20 16 12 25 39 39 28 11 7 17 26 12%
Maths & Natural SC. 88 75 88 104 95 72 51 117 109 101 86 50%
Medical Sc. 13 0 1 0 6 9 11 21 16 4%
Social Sc. 49 44 32 38 40 56 35 32 27 27 28 21%
Technology 40 25 27 28 39 37 27 17 5 0 1 12%
Total 210 166 164 199 215 203 147 186 158 166 156
of which Interdisciplinary 45.2 20.0 19.0 27.5 37.5 39.9 29.2 27.1 38.3 43.1 45.2
22% 12% 12% 14% 17% 20% 20% 15% 24% 26% 29% 19%
Bottom-up basic research
Agric. & Fisheries 1 1 1 3 2 1 0.5 0%
Humanities 44 52 59 55 62 57 57 51 48 52 51 15%
Maths & Natural SC. 88 89 98 101 103 124 148 166 165 153 170 35%
Medical Sc. 98 107 104 102 124 130 113 114 113 106 108 30%
Unspecified 2 0%
Social Sc. 47 59 61 59 64 60 50 57 58 59 65 16%
Technology 16 15 16 15 19 17 11 11 9 12 19 4%
Total 294 323 339 335 375 389 381 398 393 382 413
of which Interdisciplinary 7.0 13.7 23.4 30.5 30.0 30.0 25.3 29.9 35.4 39.1 51.3
2% 4% 7% 9% 8% 8% 7% 8% 9% 10% 12% 8%
Large-scale programmes
Agric. & Fisheries 51 55 72 74 75 79 98 89 81 110 107 21%
Maths & Natural SC. 0 0 1 5 7 6 5 8 12 16 23 2%
Medical Sc. 29 30 34 58 77 73 71 82 105 141 127 20%
Social Sc. 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 18 48 61 50 4%
Technology 2 10 16 15 131 206 301 387 362 381 377 52%
Total 82 95 122 152 291 370 479 584 609 709 684
of which Interdisciplinary 1.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 11.9 17.0 25.1 29.4 38.6 52.9 46.9
2% 5% 4% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 12%
Policy-oriented programme
Agric. & Fisheries 86 97 117 122 121 113 13 12 10 10 6 12%
Humanities 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 2%
Maths & Natural SC. 49 62 82 115 92 73 60 71 85 97 93 15%
Medical Sc. 64 70 71 87 86 97 93 118 142 171 177 21%
Social Sc. 251 229 216 247 230 193 152 172 189 187 173 39%
Technology 75 96 101 97 82 69 6 5 3 3 3 10%
Total 532 563 597 679 623 558 339 394 445 485 471
of which Interdisciplinary 49.7 65.6 79.4 118.4 124.0 116.9 89.6 114.1 111.7 120.1 144.5
9% 12% 13% 17% 20% 21% 26% 29% 25% 25% 31% 20%
User-directed innov. Progr.
Agric. & Fisheries 0 1 1 97 104 112 132 128 9%
Humanities 1 0 0%
Maths & Natural SC. 5 4 0 0 2 4 7 13 13 1%
Medical Sc. 6 12 12 14 7 10 13 16 15 2%
Social Sc. 14 16 33 50 51 35 46 31 16 16 11 5%
Technology 591 527 477 464 303 293 368 458 531 674 507 83%
Total 616 558 522 528 355 329 521 607 679 851 674
of which Interdisciplinary 9.4 20.4 43.3 60.9 53.4 41.1 40.4 31.3 30.2 45.2 46.3
2% 4% 8% 12% 15% 13% 8% 5% 4% 5% 7% 7%
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Figure 42 Funding of mono- versus inter-disciplinary research projects in the specific 
Large-scale programmes 
 
 
Notes: Funding for research only, excl. international cooperation 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
7.2.5 Reprogramming towards national priorities 
Within the overall pattern of growth in the money awarded under competition, it is 
striking that those for bottom-up basic research (essentially FRIPRO and YFF) remain 
flat.  The growth is in the programmed mission-oriented and innovation research 
funding.  
Figure 43 Bottom-up versus programme-based competitive research 
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Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
Through the decade, there is a clear pattern of substitution where the Large 
programmes’ share of industry-orientated projects rises and the share of the 
traditional user-directed innovation programmes falls.  The decline of the user-
directed innovation programmes was further accelerated from mid-decade when BIA 
was set up as a ‘branch-neutral’ competition arena for user-directed projects and 
competence development with user participation projects.  The pattern is of focusing 
resources towards the Large programmes and therefore the national priorities while to 
a considerable extent ‘de-programming’ the rest of the innovation effort.   
In the Science Division, there is a similar pattern of substitution where the share of the 
basic research programmes goes down and the resources ‘de-programmed’ are moved 
into the bottom-up FRIPRO activity.   
There was a sudden shift of focus in 2005 from policy-orientated programmes to Large 
programmes.  In 2001-5 policy-orientated programmes took about one third of RCN’s 
R&D investment; after that, their share fell to 17-18%.  Large programmes showed a 
steady growth in share from 6% of research expenditure in 2001 to 31% in 2006 and 
have since remained at about that level.  To some extent this involves a redefinition of 
policy-orientated work into the Large programmes – but it clearly shows RCN’s 
increasing focus on the national priorities.   
Figure 45 shows for the second half of the decade how RCN’s spending on the national 
priorities split across different types of funding programmes.  Biotechnology and 
health involve a considerable amount of work funded through typical basic research 
instruments.  Health and Welfare are both tackled through policy-orientated 
programmes while most of the remaining activity focuses on the large programmes. 
Only in food is the largest part of the funding spent on user-directed innovation 
programmes.   
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
50% 
Progr.-b. 
mission-or. 
research 
Progr.-based 
innovation 
Bottom-up basic 
research 
Bottom-up 
innovation 
Progr.-based 
basic res. 
Trend in bottom-up vs steered competitive research - R&D  
In shares of the competitive research funding budget, excl. Int'l coop  
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
  
80 A Good Council? 
 
Figure 44 Focus on the national priorities in RCN programmes (current MNOK and 
%) 
  Basic 
research 
User-
directed 
innov progr 
Large-scale 
programmes 
Policy-
oriented 
programmes 
Total 
2006 41% 17% 33% 9% 367 
2007 37% 18% 38% 7% 426 
2008 30% 18% 49% 3% 430 
Biotech 
2009 26% 25% 44% 5% 589 
2006 3% 18% 73% 5% 656 
2007 11% 23% 62% 4% 865 
2008 10% 27% 60% 4% 974 
Energy & 
environment 
2009 7% 29% 61% 3% 1054 
2006 3% 19% 54% 24% 345 
2007 13% 25% 41% 21% 409 
2008 10% 30% 39% 21% 464 
Oceans 
2009 6% 30% 43% 20% 482 
2006 38% 14% 14% 34% 430 
2007 33% 15% 17% 35% 529 
2008 28% 14% 23% 34% 694 
Health 
2009 25% 21% 21% 33% 785 
2006 30% 36% 29% 6% 331 
2007 17% 34% 45% 4% 365 
2008 12% 35% 51% 2% 422 
ICT 
2009 11% 39% 49% 1% 479 
2006 1% 47% 39% 13% 346 
2007 2% 53% 40% 5% 374 
2008 2% 56% 39% 3% 419 
Food 
2009 1% 54% 43% 2% 441 
2006 13% 15% 72% 0% 148 
2007 15% 18% 67% 0% 169 
2008 14% 19% 67% 0% 206 
New mat., 
nanotech 
2009 14% 25% 61% 0% 191 
2006 18% 1% 0% 81% 163 
2007 17% 1% 0% 82% 212 
2008 17% 1% 1% 80% 226 
Welfare & social 
challenges 
2009 17% 2% 4% 77% 214 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on RCN data  
7.2.6 Internationalisation 
A new Project Development instrument was launched at the beginning of the 
2000s, open to all research actors, which provided support for setting up project 
teams and proposals – in particular proposals for EU Framework Programmes - or for 
the establishment of strategic collaboration networks (‘Network Development’). 
Figure 45 illustrates the importance of this instrument for the fostering of 
participation in EU programmes in 2003 and in the case of the project proposals, the 
renewed importance from 2007 onwards.52   
 
 
52 In this context, individual grants refer to the co-funding of grants in ESF programmes and the Marie 
Curie programme. 
  
A Good Council? 81 
Figure 45 Instruments for the funding of participation in EU programmes/initiatives 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 10: Internationalisation, MIoIR; based 
on the RCN database, Technopolis analysis  
The major change related to the support for participation in EU programmes, 
however, was the increase in co-funding of research projects. In 2004, this was 
predominantly linked to the launch of the SAM-EU scheme, exclusively for the benefit 
of the research institutes.53 This scheme was intended creae a ‘level playing field’ for 
the Norwegian research institutes so as to allow them to participate more in the 
Framework Programme.  It topped up the EU funding in order to compensate for the 
higher operating costs of Norwegian institutes compared with their EU competitors in 
the FP6 Integrated Projects (IP) and Specific Targeted Research Projects (STREP). 
This scheme was limited to FP6 and was therefore winding down from 2008 onwards. 
In 2004 we also see co-funding for participation in EUROCORES, a collaborative 
research programme of the European Science Foundation.  Co-funding for 
participation in more industry-oriented programmes started in 2009 with the 
participation in the EU JTIs and the EUROSTARS programme. The latter is a joint 
programme between EUREKA member states and the European Union, launched in 
2008. It offers support for transnational bottom-up research by R&D performing 
SMEs. 
International collaboration has focused on basic and mission-orientated research –
 not on innovation (Figure 46) and is focused in mathematics and natural sciences, 
medicine and social sciences.   
 
 
53 RCN funded 25% of the project costs (provided that RCN funding together with Commission funding did 
not exceed 75% of the overall R&D costs), compensating for the fact that Norwegian research institutes, by 
law private entities, were entitled to Commission funding for only 50% of their project costs. 
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Figure 46 Involvement of foreign partners in ‘mainstream’ collaborative research 
programmes  
  
Foreign share – 
2008  
Foreign share – 
2009  
Foreign share – 
2010  
Other independent projects 5% 6% 10% 
User-directed innovation programme 8% 9% 12% 
Free projects support 38% 47% 55% 
Basic research programmes 2% 5% 14% 
Policy-oriented programmes 29% 29% 42% 
Centres of Excellence (SFF/SFI/FME) 0% 0% 2% 
Large-scale programmes 8% 12% 14% 
Overall 10% 12% 17% 
Note: Percentages in terms of share of total number of participations by partners in that given 
year; 100% = all partners excluding coordinators 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 10: Internationalisation, MIoIR; based 
on the RCN database, Technopolis analysis  
7.2.7 Gender 
While women got about 40% of the individual grants, they led only 20% of the 
projects.  The major driver for gender inequality here seems to be the disciplinary mix.  
Women are much less likely to be leaders in mathematics, natural science or 
technology projects – and these tend to be the biggest fields (Figure 47).   
Figure 47 Gender equality in project leadership 
  
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 5: Implementing and Adding Value to 
the National Priorities and Developing the NRIS, Technopolis; based on the RCN database  
7.3 Other effects on the research and innovation system 
RCN funding has had several effects on the way the research and innovation system 
operates.   
7.3.1 The university system 
The universities are slowly engaging in more innovation-related research projects 
from RCN than before – especially (KMB) projects that link research capacity building 
to a user.  International cooperation is increasing (even if it remains at a rather low 
level).  Survey responses and interviews confirm that increased project sizes and 
RCN’s centres programmes enable the creation of bigger research groups and more 
cooperation within the universities, so these are having the intended ‘defragmenting’ 
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effect.  The policy-orientated and basic research projects in which the universities 
engage are often interdisciplinary.   
Increases in RCN funding means that the university hospitals are increasingly 
involved, bringing research council style quality control to funding in that area.  While 
university researchers generally said that RCN funding helped increase their scientific 
outputs, they were almost universally critical of what they saw as the low level of ‘free 
research’ funding and the over-use of programming.  RCN funding did not help them 
do more interdisciplinary, risky, long-term or disruptive research than they would 
have done without it, so it seems that from their perspective RCN funds business as 
usual rather than adding value.   
7.3.2 Research institutes 
The research institutes’ behaviour has clearly been affected by the introduction of the 
performance-based research funding system. Research is being managed so as to 
obtain rewards from that system, with special attention to increasing scientific 
publication rates.  And there is a distinct increase in such publications by the institutes 
since the new system was advertised.  The growth in innovation funding through RCN 
has been of substantial benefit to the institutes, especially in technology but more 
recently also in mathematics, natural sciences, agriculture and fisheries.  It has further 
intensified the institutes’ cooperation with industry. ‘Top-up’ funding from RCN 
enabled the sector to participate in the Framework Programme much more than 
before.  While RCN offered the chance to do more interdisciplinary work, it did not 
allow the institutes to take on more scientific and technological risk.  It did, however, 
let them tackle more fundamental and long-term research questions than was possible 
with industrial funding.    
7.3.3 Business 
Business was almost exclusively engaged in user-directed R&D projects (where 
industry defines the problems, which are usually solved through the help of a research 
institute) and as partners in the (KMB) capacity development with user participation 
projects, where the leadership comes more from the research side and business 
participates as a potential user.  Companies mainly sought RCN funding in order to 
reduce technological risks and solve technological problems, so the projects tended 
not to lead directly to innovations but were needed so that the companies could use 
the results in their own innovation projects.  Unlike in the Framework Programme, 
where powerful coalitions of companies can sometimes reduce commercial risks 
through cooperation, the RCN projects did not address commercial risks much.  This 
can be either because the firms lack market power or because they focus on 
incremental innovation within established markets (which is what the CIS data 
suggest is what Norwegian innovators tend to do).  In industry, then, RCN funding 
appears to focus on supporting incremental innovation.   
Small technology-based firms often benefited from improved links with the higher 
education or institute sector.  Big companies used schemes like the Industry PhD 
programme as ways to identify and recruit good people.  Several companies pointed to 
a need for pilot and demonstration projects, in addition to RCN’s traditional focus on 
earlier stages of R&D.  Comparison of industry R&D expenditures by branch with 
those of RCN suggests that there are funding gaps in ICT and mining and quarrying.   
7.3.4 Effects of funding programmes 
Evaluations provide some evidence about the impacts of RCN programmes.  
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The FRIPRO evaluation54 confirms our university survey findings that RCN funding 
helps researchers develop their careers but also that ‘free’ research funding largely lets 
them do more of the same rather than enabling significant change, risk-taking or 
interdisciplinarity.   
The SFF centres of excellence increased agglomeration and research ambition levels in 
the research community, affected the division of labour among Norwegian research-
performing organisations and increased researchers’ international collaboration. They 
clearly affected university strategy: they were sufficiently large that universities had to 
fit them into their current activities and to make plans for how and whether to 
continue the centres at the end of their funding period.  In this sense, they have had a 
positive influence on universities’ research management capabilities55.   
The SFI mid-term evaluation56 (2010) was intended to feed back to RCN about the 
progress of the centres and their continuing fundability, rather than to assess impacts.  
It nonetheless concluded that the SFI programme “demonstrably has benefited 
supported industries and organisations in the public sector by providing ideas for 
enhancement of processes and development of improved and new products”.  The 
evaluators are people with considerable international experience with similar 
‘competence centre’ schemes, so their general approval of the SFI centres and their 
continued funding implies that they expect the normal benefits of competence centres 
to result.   
RCN asked a Nordic panel to evaluate the large programmes at mid term (2009)57.  
These had been conceived in dialogue with the Executive Board after the 2001 
evaluation.  The panel observed that the large programmes were agglomerations of 
earlier, smaller efforts and that their funding was a “patchwork” from many sources, 
though the Fund for Research and Innovation was generally a leading, early 
contributor, with ministry funding of the programmes growing over time.   A 
consequence of the multi-principal nature of the programmes was that only 
incremental changes could be made during their life.  Industry does not greatly 
differentiate between user-directed projects in the big programmes and those done in 
other arenas, so it seemed to be hard to get additional value from the large programme 
idea at the industrial level.  On the other hand, there was development and capacity 
building in the knowledge infrastructure.  The evaluation had little to say about wider 
impacts.   
Four of the programmes have since been evaluated: FUGE (2011), NANOMAT (21011), 
PETROMAKS and RENERGI (2012).  These evaluations illustrate the importance of 
links to users and applications even in designing programmes that are intended to 
have a ‘technology push’ element, developing key technologies ahead of commercial 
demand.   
FUGE58 started out as a basic research programme and was transformed into a Large 
one mid way.  It originally set up a large number of ‘technology platforms’ in the 
academic community to enable functional genomics research, some of which were 
clearly sub-critical and became out of date, with those that had been located using 
regional allocation criteria faring worst.  The strategy was first to build academic 
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capacity and then to link to innovation.  The evaluation confirms that FUGE did 
increase research capacity and output, though (perhaps not surprisingly) not enough 
to catch up with Sweden or Denmark in scientific output or productivity.  It increased 
the degree of specialisation and division of labour within the research community.  
While it succeeded in spending 10% of the budget on user-directed R&D, academic-
industry links remained poor – in no small part because of the relative weakness of 
relevant industry in Norway.  There are few industrial effects.  The evaluation 
concludes that FUGE’s limitations result from academic dominance of the programme 
design.   
NANOMAT59, like FUGE, involved significant infrastructural investment to enable 
Norway to ‘catch up’.  It was redefined from being a basic research programme into a 
Large one in 2004.  It led to a rapid increase in scientific publication and a strategic 
concentration of effort within the knowledge infrastructure.  It established PhD 
education in the field and increased the amount of international collaboration.  
Relevant industry is mostly weak and small.  While the evaluators say that NANOMAT 
involved about 100 industry collaborations they also point out that it has produced few 
commercialisable results, arguing that this results from a lack of suitable funding 
instruments.  They also point out that industry was not adequately involved in 
programme design or the choice of themes and hence that there was little academic-
industrial linkage.   
PETROMAKS and RENERGI were evaluated together60.  Both built research capacity 
in areas of national priority within the knowledge infrastructure and industry.  They 
served as ways to focus research attention, effort and capacity on areas of industrial 
need and developed researchers’ international and end-user linkages.  The economic 
payback from Petromaks is very high, in the form of increased yields from oil and gas 
reservoirs.  Some of this benefit has already been realised but the majority is yet to 
come.  Renergi makes a significant contribution to addressing a global challenge.  Both 
increase the amount of ‘early stage’ R&D in industry, which is likely to increase the 
innovation rate.  (Inherently, of course, early stage research in industry should have 
high spillovers.)  User participation in Renergi is lower than in Petromaks.  The 
evaluators argue that this is because the economic returns to industrial R&D are lower 
in renewable energy than in oil and gas.  The user community is also likely to be less 
well defined.  It is a pity that the evaluation was unable to tackle industrial and 
economic impacts more clearly – we would expect these to be very large, especially in 
the case of Petromaks.   
The latest surveys monitoring the effects of user-directed R&D in industry61 show that 
there is a good overall return on investment from user-directed R&D projects –
 measured as monetary benefits to the participating companies – but that returns are 
extremely skewed, with a handful of projects accounting for the great majority of 
them.  Over the five years studied, 10 of the 110 projects able to quantify benefits 
accounted for 90% of the returns. The study shows there is high input additionality.  
That is, the funding tends to ‘trigger’ the company to invest in the project.  There is 
also considerable ‘behavioural additionality’, where companies learn the benefits of 
doing more R&D, collaborating with others, linking to the knowledge infrastructure 
and so on.  The study therefore clearly shows that there are not only short term private 
returns to user-directed R&D (which are useful to society in the sense that they trigger 
increased employment, more payment of tax and so on) but more important that there 
are significant externalities that benefit Norwegian industry and society.  
 
 
59 DAMVAD and Econ Pöyry, Evaluering av NANOMAT: Forskningsrådets Store program innen 
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60 Universitetet i Nordland and Ramböll, Evaluering av Petromaks og Renergi, (forthcoming 2012) 
61 Arild Hervik, Lasse Bræin and Bjørn G Bergem, Resultatmåling av brukerstyrt forskning 2010, Molde: 
Møreforsking and Høgskolen i Molde, 2012 
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The Skattefunn scheme offers companies the chance to offset R&D costs against 
corporation tax and was introduced in 2002.  RCN’s role is to decide whether projects 
meet the criterion of being ‘R&D’. Skattefunn is intended primarily to get companies 
to start doing R&D.  Once they have learnt the benefits, schemes like RCN’s BIA and 
the large programmes are available that intensify their contact with the knowledge 
infrastructure, generate larger than normal externalities and encourage R&D relevant 
to national priorities.   
The Skattefunn evaluation62 (2008) found that the ‘input additionality’ of Skattefunn 
is very high. There is international evidence that incentives for small companies 
involve greater input additionality than those for large ones63.  Or, to put it another 
way, that larger firms more easily free ride on tax incentives than small ones.  The 
Skattefunn evaluation found that the companies doing the least R&D experienced the 
greatest behavioural additionality, so the idea that using a tax incentive will ‘teach’ 
small firms the value of doing R&D seems to be right.  
The evaluation shows that use of RCN funding and Skattefunn are complementary – 
companies that get one tend to go on to get the other. But Skattefunn causes little 
change in companies’ relationships with institutes or other companies, so it brings 
fewer externalities than RCN funding. If we recall that the input additionality of tax 
incentives also goes down as the volume of the tax incentive goes up, then the division 
of labour between Skattefunn and the RCN programmes seems reasonable.  Moving 
resources from RCN programmes to a Skattefunn scheme with a higher ceiling would 
decrease the input additionality of the fiscal incentive and sacrifice the externalities 
associated with RCN funding.   
Another very interesting finding of the Skattefunn evaluation is that it makes little 
difference to the private returns to innovation whether the investment is made 
privately, with Skattefunn money or with the support of RCN.  The best returns are to 
private money followed by Skattefunn and then RCN – but the differences are small.  
On the other hand the social returns probably rank in the opposite order.   
It is perhaps also useful to recall that while the statistical calculations involved here 
look precise, they are far from being so.  We can see this in the wide ranges of 
estimates given not only in the Skattefunn evaluation but also in the international 
literature on the subject.  The skewed economic effects of innovation described in the 
user-directed R&D evaluation may provide one explanation among others of why 
different studies (and approaches within studies) produce such widely differing 
estimates.   
The component of this evaluation of RCN that deals with the added value of RCN 
funding in the company sector64 adds two crucial pieces of evidence to our 
understanding of the effects of RCN funding in industry. It shows that RCN does not 
‘crowd out’ private investment; and that we can expect the same high rates of private 
return from all kinds of R&D.  Societal returns to RCN-subsidised R&D have not been 
analysed but there are no reasons to believe that RCN-funded R&D have lower societal 
returns than non-RCN-funded R&D when private returns are quite similar.  On the 
contrary, the Skattefunn evaluation suggests that social returns are higher in the RCN 
case than with other funding.   
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The FORNY evaluation (2009)65 explores the effectiveness of this programme in the 
latest phase but also looks back to its origins, in the 1990s. Since 1996, FORNY has 
supported some 300 start-ups, which by 2009 collectively employed about 700 
people. Like the user-directed R&D evaluation, it finds that the successfulness of 
innovation is highly skewed, with employment concentrated in a small number of 
larger firms.  Most FORNY-supported firms have survived, but often as ‘one-man-
bands’ with turnover of 1 MNOK or less and often no formal employment (ie the 
entrepreneur is still working on it in her or his spare time).  The focus on Technology 
Transfer Offices in the second phase of FORNY needed to be reconsidered as this was 
not an especially effective channel for knowledge transfer.  The knowledge 
infrastructure should engage in a much broader range of cooperative knowledge 
transfer activities in order to play its role in spreading as well as producing knowledge.  
This conclusion is consistent with what we see in the literature about technology 
transfer from public research organisations and our recent survey of such 
organisations66.   
7.4 Conclusions 
RCN’s contributions to the development of national and ministry strategies were 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Our analysis shows that RCN has successfully worked with the ministries to shift 
funding towards the national priorities and made use of instruments that reshape and 
modernise the research system.   
• RCN’s funding pattern has been strongly orientated to change and development in 
the national research and innovation system.   
• It has followed through the reforms giving research-performing institutions more 
autonomy by increasing the use of competitive incentives.   
• It has addressed systemic failures such as the fragmentation of research via 
centres programmes, increasing funding for collaboration and raising the average 
project size by reducing the use of individual grants in favour of largerprojects 
where more than one person benefits 
− Increasingly focusing on funding bigger research projects, stimulating 
collaborative research and the strengthening of industry-institute strategic 
partnerships for research as well as the constitution of research groups in the 
research institutions 
− Awarding individual grants close-to-exclusively on the basis of excellence (the 
YFF and postdoc grants)  
− Fostering international cooperation in the Norwegian institutions through a 
variety of instruments and schemes, including the co-funding of FP6 projects 
inthe research institutes and the funding of project development instruments 
for the preparation of FP6 proposals, as well as the increasing focus on 
‘inward’ international mobility of individual researchers and a mainstreaming 
of international cooperation within RCN’s national programmes 
− Increasing funding for the development and modernisation of research 
infrastructures and scientific equipment 
− Funding bottom-up initiatives that constitute the starting point for a re-
structuring of the RD&I system, ie creation of inter-institutional research 
groups, research schools, the centres of excellence and the competence centres 
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− The attention dedicated to future recruitment, incorporating in several 
instruments or schemes the obligation to incorporate in the project the launch 
of specific educational or training programmes 
• It has focused funding on the national priorities, especially via the Large 
programmes, and reduced the use of programming in other areas.  
• More resources have gone to innovation and to the research performers doing 
industry-related work, notably industry and the research institutes 
• There is an increasing division of roles among the Large-scale and policy-oriented 
programmes, the former focusing predominantly on the more technological and 
industry-oriented priority areas/challenges, the latter working with societal  areas 
such as health, education, welfare and other social challenges 
• Most important, a similar division of labour is emerging between the user-directed 
innovation and basic research programmes – the only exception is research in 
biotechnologies where the basic research programmes continue to play an 
important role  
• The university sector was still the main beneficiary of competitive project funding 
in 2010 (~30%, similar to the level at the beginning of the 2000s) but in particular 
since 2006, a more wide-spread and – from a policy perspective, more balanced - 
funding distribution is visible for the three major research-performing sectors: the 
research institutes and industry sector both accounted for ~25% of the research-
funding budget in the most recent years.  
• The expansion of funding for the industry sector and the thematic priorities 
covered implied an increased breadth of industry sector coverage. The Service 
sector was the industry sector most involved, accounting for close to 50% of the 
research funding for industry actors; manufacturing companies were more directly 
involved especially as of the second half of the decade, accounting for a share of  
~40% in 2010.  We note especially a stronger involvement of high-tech service 
providers; in the manufacturing sectors, instead, there is a more limited growth in 
involvement of high-tech manufacturing companies  
• The research institutes benefited more from the systemic initiatives launched by 
RCN than was previously the case.  Both the institutes and the industry sector 
significantly increased their involvement in international cooperation. For the 
former this was facilitated by a specific supporting scheme launched by RCN; for 
the latter, the increase was due to Norway’s participation in the EU JTI and 
Eurostars programmes  
• Basic research levels (at least in terms of ‘free’ projects and the basic research 
programmes) stagnated in real terms through the decade and fell as a share of 
RCN’s overall activity.  However, there is additional basic research in the Large 
programmes 
Effects on the research and innovation system 
• RCN funding has helped ‘de-fragment’ university research, promoting bigger 
groups and a clearer division of labour in the university sector. However, it tends 
to fund research similar to what the universities would in any case have done, 
suggesting that RCN should aim to increase its efforts in interdisciplinary, risky, 
long-term and disruptive research 
• RCN funding, combined with the new performance-based core funding system 
increases scientific output from the institutes, strengthens their links to users and 
enables better international linkage through the Framework programme.  
However, there are opportunities to fund more technologically risky research  
• Business benefits financially and technologically from participation in RCN 
programmes.  However, activities tend to be incremental so there are 
opportunities to fund more radical and disruptive changes that could address new 
markets 
• Some of the Large programmes’ economic and social effects have been limited by 
the weakness of domestic industry and its limited participation in programme 
design.  Others with better user linkage seem likely to have significant economic 
effects  
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• More broadly, the Large programme and FORNY evaluations suggest caution 
about ‘technology push’ activities.  These are important – and may be essential to 
achieve restructuring – but need good linkage to demand  
• RCN’s innovation funding and Skattefunn are not alternatives but complements.  
Both provide good economic returns to the firms.  Skattefunn helps companies get 
started with R&D, focusing on internal benefits.  RCN projects have greater 
externalities, as they tackle bigger and more common problems.  RCN funding 
‘crowds in’ private money to R&D rather than crowding it out, where it produces 
similar private returns to private or Skattefunn money but greater societal returns 
or externalities – including strengthening of the national thematic priority areas 
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8. Internationalisation 
RCN’s internationalisation strategy was launched in 2010. It is not however the first 
recognition of the importance of internationalisation of research for Norway nor the 
first statement of policy in this area. Initiatives to link Norwegian research to other 
countries have been in existence for many years, the North America Foundation (non-
governmental) has existed since 191967, and internationalisation has been a 
continuous aim of research policy in Norway for many decades. The current 
internationalisation approach however places new emphasis upon internationalisation 
and encourages the systematic use of international links – mainstreaming them 
through virtually the whole portfolio of Research Council funding instruments. 
8.1 Strategy 
RCN’s Internationalisation Strategy of RCN aims to capitalize upon and realize the 
benefits for Norway of greater international cooperation in research. The Strategy has 
five main objectives and five main action points to help realize Norway’s Visions for 
2020 as outlined in the Strategy document. Those objectives are to 
• Help to address global challenges to society 
• Enhance the quality and capacity of Norwegian research 
• Secure Norway access to international knowledge production 
• Boost the competitiveness of Norwegian trade and industry 
• Promote Norway as a leading research and innovation nation in selected research 
areas 
The main action points for the Internationalisation Strategy are 
• All of the Research Council’s activities, -programmes, open competitive arenas, 
special initiatives, institution-oriented measures and other forms of support- must 
include clearly-defined objectives and plans for international cooperation; 
• The Research Council will encourage Norwegian participation in joint 
programmes across national boundaries when this is crucial to addressing 
common challenges or strengthening Norwegian research and knowledge-based 
industry 
• The Research Council will develop financial instruments to support the 
establishment of long-term cooperation between Norwegian institutions and 
corresponding institutions in other countries. 
• The Research Council will refine and strengthen stimulation measures to 
encourage Norwegian researchers, companies and research institutions to 
participate more actively in international collaborative and competitive arenas. 
• The Research Council will focus greater attention on international cooperation 
and researcher mobility in its internal grant application review processes 
An essential feature, or principle of the Strategy is mainstreaming. This means that 
the Research Council now requires virtually all its funding instruments and 
programmes to have targets for international engagement, and that the Council’s 
funding instruments will seek, wherever possible, to facilitate international 
engagement with researchers and organisations, including companies, outside 
Norway, and reimburse their costs, subject to certain limits.  The combination of a 
common strategy and mainstreaming means that RCN combines a top-down and 
bottom-up approach to internationalisation.   
The research community is already highly internationalised in the sense that science is 
a global endeavour.  There has been growing attention to EU cooperation and 
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especially the Framework Programme during the past decade.  RCN’s information and 
grants supporting proposal-writing and ‘topping up’ FP money are highly appreciated 
by the research community.  Nordic cooperation has had declining visibility – partly 
because a lot of it happens ‘under the radar’; partly because – despite the growing 
influence and visibility of NordForsk – there is not much money available for it; and 
partly because at least parts of the research community view it as rather bureaucratic.   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes the bilateral agreements, once a choice of 
priority countries has been made by the government.  Currently the Council has 
agreements with US, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Russia and Chile. There is great consideration given to the question of whether these 
were the right countries and if the agreement is set at too high a level. 
Norwegian researchers by and large assess the RCN support for internationalisation as 
positive. The majority of respondents confirmed that RCN 
• Support for international mobility helps the career development of individual 
researchers (difference between the group agreeing to the group not agreeing 
28.5%),  
• Provides adequate support for international mobility (diff 18.7%),  
• Schemes are useful in terms of attracting foreign talent to Norway (diff 18.1%), 
• Provides adequate support for international research collaboration (diff. 16.9%) 
• Internationalisation policies support research excellence in Norway (diff 16.1%) 
• Provides adequate support for access to, and coordination of, international 
research infrastructures (diff 6.9%) 
However, a slight majority of researchers is negative as regards  
• The accessibility of information on how various RCN schemes may be used for 
internationalisation purposes (diff: -2.4%),  
• The adequacy of the concrete schemes that are developed to support their needs  
• The adequacy of support for collaboration with partners outside the EU (diff: - 
8.0)  
Across the board, more senior researchers and leaders of research organisations are 
more positive than researchers.  
The Strategy has indicated that the Council is obligated to develop financial 
instruments to support long term cooperation.  These have yet to be developed.  The 
FP support system in RCN seems to be well organised and connected to the other core 
programmes in RCN.  The amount of resource devoted to this function is smaller than 
in some other countries, such as Austria and The Netherlands. The Council already has 
a range of measures that can be used to promote internationalisation and we have 
received a large range of responses and information about their operation. The 
schemes which we have examined and on which we have evidence are  
• Project Establishment Support 
• Top-up funding for Marie-Curie grants 
• Funding of Starting Grant Applications 
• Grant Schemes for Collaboration with US Africa Asia South and Central America 
Survey responses and interviews suggest that these mechanisms were operating with 
some success; they were professionally administered and well supported by the 
Council. However, there were some limitations in that researchers believed that such 
measures were not well enough promoted by the Council. In particular measures to 
promote links with countries outside Europe were very little known (63% of all 
respondents did not know them), and very little used and not rated as being overly 
useful. This should be of some concern.  
There was a general consensus amongst our interviewees that overall Norway is 
successful in recruiting overseas PhD students, post-docs and researchers through the 
Council funded schemes.  However, when it comes to attracting Norwegian 
researchers to participate in exchange schemes with countries outside Norway a 
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somewhat different picture emerges – Norwegians are not very outwardly mobile, and 
many explained this as a result of the higher wages and welfare experienced at home 
than abroad.  
The Strategy of the Council also foresees that its grant money will flow overseas to 
non-Norwegian research actors.  However, there seems to be no common principle for 
how much of the budget could or should do so.   
8.2 Findings 
The Norwegian research system is highly internationalised and internationalisation is 
a key goal for Norwegian science policy. Through various strategic means, the RCN has 
strongly increased the meaning of internationalisation in its funding and support 
activities. The share of international actors that are funded has sharply risen, offering 
broader cooperation opportunities for Norwegian researchers and firms. 
All research and policy actors involved clearly see the net benefits of international 
activities. Internationalisation increases the impact of Norway’s science, raises the 
likelihood of excellence, gives access to knowledge and supports innovation activities. 
While the current RCN strategy can potentially reap the maximum benefit out of 
internationalisation for the Norwegian system, it needs careful implementation and 
entails two risks: (1) certain internationalisation activities may become sub-critical 
especially within small programmes or initiatives and (2) there is a consequent strong 
requirement for transparency and coordination of all these mainstreamed 
international activities, without which, efforts will become fragmented and suffer from 
duplication or gaps. 
Opening programmes up to international participation introduces a new dimension to 
decide Norway’s priorities for research. Because no country has unlimited resources 
with which to fund research, choices must be made about which countries to work 
with and why Norway’s own programmes should work with them. This is more 
important because Norway is a small country and has limited scientific coverage. 
Norway’s interests must drive this process and choices will need to be made. Our view 
is that in this new framework for research policy prioritization of partners, research 
topics and resources need far greater attention. The current position is an “emergent 
strategy”, where there is uncertainty at all levels on the question of how open and at 
what levels Norway should be. Criteria for the added value of international 
cooperation are not fully developed.  
The existing spread of countries and country links that Norway possesses is a strong 
platform to be exploited further. Norwegian scientists are often working on topics of 
interest to other funding bodies outside Norway. However, there appears to be some 
gap in offering collaboration opportunities with countries outside Europe and North 
America. 
In relation to the FP and Norwegian involvement, our view is that the Council has a 
strong and effective process for aligning its priorities with that of the FP. However, a 
consequence of this is that other opportunities including bilateral links have as yet 
insufficient emphasis when choices are made about the topics for internationalisation 
and which countries should become partners.  
The study found that RNC funding schemes play a strong role in supporting 
internationalisation and are widely accepted in the system. Figure 48 illustrates the 
rapid take-up of RCN incentives for EU participation in the early-mid 2000s.  The 
support the RCN offers to internationalise is valued, especially when it comes to EU 
preparation and mobility. However, supporting schemes are not known broadly 
enough and a majority The visibility of internationalisation support schemes should be 
increased through awareness and information campaigns, with a focus on early stage 
career researchers. Doing so would also enable the RCN to be more responsive to 
specific needs of researchers. 
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Figure 48 Involvement of stakeholders in international cooperation activities 
 
 
Source: RCN Evaluation, 2012 – Background report No 10: Internationalisation, MIoIR; based 
on the RCN database, Technopolis analysis  
Measured by the acknowledgements in published articles to EU funding, the influence 
of the EU as funding source is less pronounced in Norway than in benchmark 
countries (Sweden, Denmark). The success rates of Norwegian researchers are slightly 
lower than with most benchmarking countries, while Norwegian SME do 
comparatively better.  
Compared to other supporting systems, the RCN support, through NCPs, is 
functioning well, even if slightly less staffed. However, there is no strong emphasis in 
the advice to advise strategic leaders in organisations and the EU support in NCPs 
does get less prominence than in other comparator countries. 
There is a high awareness of the benefit of inward mobility, but less propensity to see 
the advantages of outward mobility. The attractiveness of Norway as a place to work 
supports one part of the internationalisation policy: it brings non-Norwegian 
researchers of high calibre to Norway to study, mainly to build their scientific careers. 
But not enough Norwegian researchers are moving abroad to develop their careers and 
not enough high calibre researchers remain within the Norwegian system. There is 
insufficient movement out of and back into the Norwegian research system of 
scientists of the high calibre needed to maintain and strengthen Norway’s scientific 
strength.  
In general there is not enough understanding in the system as to the nature, scale and 
scope of internationalisation and thus on the impact and gaps of international 
activities and the necessary modifications in support and financing.  
Giving complete discretion to grant awarding committees and programme boards to 
set the limits to internationalisation involves some risks of missing synergies between 
programmes, and reaping the full benefit for the RCN remit more broadly. However, 
driving internationalisation top down with indicators based on the count of foreign 
personnel or count of outside countries involved, or through a set budget, is not a 
better option. 
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While, in many respects, the cooperation between the RCN and ministries is working 
fine, not all ministries follow a transparent and strategic approach when it comes to 
prioritising partner countries and supporting activities. This causes inconsistencies 
and is a potential for inefficiencies across the system.  
There is a lack of a broader, cross-system debate about the merit and form of 
internationalisation. The dual role of the Council as (1) advising the system (other 
ministries etc.) and 2) being a strategic player with budget decisions and priority 
setting cannot be without tension. A systematic, informed cross-system debate on 
internationalisation is missing 
8.3 Recommendations 
• The strong focus on internationalisation in the RCN strategy should be maintained 
given the preferences of the actors, the overall political goals of Norwegian policy 
and the overall positive net benefit of international research and innovation 
activities. The policy of opening up of programmes should be continued. 
• The Council should examine quickly what administrative burdens will arise from 
greater internationalisation. At the current rate of growth of foreign partners in 
RCN funded schemes, one third of all of the Council’s project participation will be 
with foreign partners by 2015. This is likely to have major impacts upon 
administration of schemes and cost implications. 
• Making internationalisation a central feature of the science system through 
mainstreaming is nonetheless essential and should be continued. However, 
mainstreaming should be coupled to a clear set of principles to determine what 
internationalisation contributes to the various goals and programmes of the RCN 
and which forms and levels of internationalisation are sensible and realistic, given 
organisational and budget constraints. Also, it needs transparency and 
coordination in order to avoid duplicated efforts and sub-critical, costly activity.  
• The Council should formulate a clearer process for determining where 
internationalisation is in the national interest so that all actors in the research 
system understand the scale and scope with which internationalisation should be 
pursued in the various programme areas, and to what limit. There is a strong need 
for the development of internationalisation priorities – e.g. collaborating with 
China needs to be focused on key themes and areas where Norway can benefit 
(rather than just collaborating to keep an eye on a competitor) – similarly, 
collaborating at such a broad and general level with the EU programmes (just to 
gain a ‘seat at the table’) is an inefficient strategy. 
• Some additional attempt should be made to broaden the opportunities to 
collaborate with actors outside the EU and North America should be explored and 
systematically implemented. In addition, the EU/Nordic/3rd country balance 
needs an in depth investigation and study – it should form the focus of either/both 
of the two bodies suggested below. 
• Greater resource should be allocated to promoting the bilateral links with other 
countries on the basis of strategic processes to select topics and partners for 
optimal cooperation – rather than broadening without strategic focus.  
• The Council should play a greater role in defining the scientific benefits for 
Norway that emerges out of bilateral links and then support to create those 
bilateral links with selected countries. 
• The visibility of internationalisation support schemes should be increased through 
awareness and information campaigns, with a focus on early stage career 
researchers. Doing so would also enable the RCN to be more responsive to specific 
needs of researchers. 
• A very detailed analysis as to the nature and quality of participants in EU 
programmes vs. other national and international funding schemes should be 
undertaken in order to understand if the lower success rate of Norway is due to a 
bias in participation, given the generous funding conditions of Norway, or lower 
quality of Norwegian researchers.  
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• The NCP system should focus more on advising strategic leaders and should – in 
case Norway decides to put more emphasis on EU research – play a stronger role 
in linking to the discourse at EU level. 
• The Council’s offering of opportunities abroad for its researchers should broaden 
in scope. Currently there is too much emphasis placed on long term stays in other 
countries. Researchers wishing to have research stays at foreign institutions 
should be able to stay abroad for shorter periods as well as for longer periods. 
• There is a need for RCN to develop a more robust and routine process for the 
identification of strengths and weaknesses of the position of Norwegian S&T – 
either in house or from specific commissioned studies. This should be supported 
by a routine bottleneck analysis to understand how support should be modified. 
Equally, greater monitoring and more frequent and tailored evaluations of the 
implementation of internationalisation and its impact, particularly on country 
coverage, quality and the contribution to Norway’s national interest should be 
undertaken.  
• The RCN should introduce an internal high level, multi-domain advisory body, 
which could represent both top-down considerations and bottom-up (researcher 
driven) demands. This would also enable to better integrate and consider industry 
needs within the science portfolio. It would also lead to an enhanced ability and 
role in influencing ministries when it comes to internationalisation.  
• In order to a systematic and informed cross system discourse and to enable the 
RCN to better listen to respond to the needs of the Norwegian research 
community, a Forum on internationalisation should be established with key 
ministries, the RCN, representatives of large research organisations and 
researchers should be established. This should allow for an open and transparent 
debate about what the policies are and also be the locus of reporting about 
monitoring and evaluation of internationalisation activities. 
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9. Policy conclusions and recommendations 
The preceding chapters handle a lot of operational and organisational questions about 
RCN operations and draw conclusions.  Rather than repeat them, we focus in this 
Chapter on conclusions and recommendations that affect policy.   
9.1 Challenges 
Since 2000, Europe has been telling itself that it needs to become better at research 
and innovation, building bigger and more powerful entities within a ‘European 
Research Area’ (ERA) that can compete with the world.  For the past decade, it has 
been pouring billions of Euros into R&D to support this vision, which involves 
increasing specialisation and building areas of knowledge strength to support it.  With 
about 1% of Europe’s population, Norway has to work hard to find a place in this 
landscape and in the global picture that is appearing as a result of rapid development 
in China, Brazil, Russia, India and elsewhere.  With very few resources, Norway will 
have to play a clever game to succeed in global competition.   
The Norwegian research and innovation system faces significant challenges over and 
above the ‘grand challenges’ of climate change, ageing and so on that preoccupy many 
research and innovation policymakers internationally.  These challenges arise from the 
Norwegian oil and gas fairytale, which has had a wonderful effect on living standards 
and welfare.  But this in turn makes Norway and Norwegians very expensive so that – 
even more than other rich, developed countries – Norway must increasingly compete 
by using knowledge to add value to its natural endowments. erformance in both 
research and innovation must improve.  At the same time, the oil wealth means that 
there is no sense of crisis or urgency, which is unfortunate because the needed 
performance improvements cannot be achieved instantaneously when some crisis 
does arise.   
On the innovation side, the overall rate of innovation is modest and declining and 
there are signs that industrial renewal is happening at too slow a pace.  Despite some 
high points – and it is not hard to identify individual successful innovations and 
companies in Norway – the business sector’s research and innovation effort is simply 
too small. Too much of it is about incremental changes in existing markets.  In a 
globalising world where Norway increasingly experiences both cost- and knowledge-
based competition, this is not good enough.  If we believe the evidence presented here, 
industry’s participation in RCN-funded projects has too much a similar character of 
‘business as usual’.    
On the research side, our bibliometric evidence shows that Norway’s performance is 
solid but – again with exceptions – not leading enough to meet the needs of what has 
become pretty much the most expensive country in the world.  Here, too, the evidence 
is that RCN-funded research lets the universities and institutes do ‘more of the same’ –
 both sectors miss the chance to do more interdisciplinary, risky, potentially disruptive 
work.  What RCN funding does do is to focus more resources on the national priority 
themes, helping to gather strength in areas where generally Norway has advantages on 
which to build.   
Of course, it is easy to undervalue the day-to-day, incremental work through which 
most of science and industry advances – what Schumpeter called68 “the accustomed 
circular flow of economic life”.  But Schumpeter also pointed out – rightly – that 
significant progress is driven by a “gale of creative destruction” where the old gives 
way to the new.  That is why, as we said at the start of this report, RCN needs to find a 
way both to be an ‘aggregation machine’ that smoothly administers the day-to-day and 
 
 
68 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Routledge, 1942 
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a ‘change agency’ that disrupts the system and encourages innovation in research and 
industry.  In our view, RCN has succeeded admirably in the first role but done less well 
in the second.  And just as RCN’s successes that we discussed earlier are ‘coproduced’ 
with others, so is this weakness.  In particular it is coproduced with the governance 
system it inhabits.  The change agent role has tended to focus on structural change.  
However, the clear signals that RCN predominantly funds ‘business as usual’ in both 
research and innovation suggest that it has been less proactive in supporting change in 
science and the innovation system.   
9.2 Getting the balance right 
It would be simplistic to think that these systemic challenges can be met by following a 
simple policy mantra.  Most of the policy choices involve finding an appropriate 
balance between alternatives, such as the need to be orderly and disruptive at the same 
time.   
RCN itself is a very special construction that spans the research and innovation system 
in the hope of integrating and combining its elements in ways that are had to achieve 
in separate organisations.  It has demonstrated that it is possible to balance the needs 
of a wide range of sectors into a coherent policy and a set of programmes and to a fair 
extent to mix up the funding of different types of research in order to tackle specific 
needs.  The coordination costs are perhaps higher than we would like, but RCN 
provides a clear demonstration that where needed a single organisation can provide an 
holistic approach to research and innovation policy.  The Large programmes are the 
major success here, even if some of the individual programme designs have 
weaknesses.   
All research and innovation funding systems face a problem of ‘dynamic inconsistency’ 
between the short-term needs and incentives of the political system on the one hand 
and the long time constants that are relevant in research and the coupling between 
knowledge generation and use.  Two mechanisms are available for tackling this.  One 
is to isolate a part of the state budget from the normal short-term budgeting process 
and to devote it to longer-term needs, as Norway did with the FFN Fund for Research 
and Innovation or as Chile has done by imposing a special tax (the FIC) on the profits 
of the copper mines.  Finance ministries dislike such mechanisms, for good reasons.  
In particular, they limit government’s budgetary freedom and tend to exempt the 
funds from the level of question and scrutiny to which other parts of the state budget 
are subject.  In reality, both the FFN and the FIC pass through the annual state budget 
process. However, legitimising long-term action in an otherwise short-term 
environment is nonetheless important.   
The second mechanism involves creating a high-level research and innovation council 
(like the Research and Innovation Council in Finland) that involves and commits 
government to longer-term action.  This has the additional advantage of explicitly 
being able to coordinate aspects of national research and innovation policy.  Chile, 
interestingly, created a national council for innovation for competitiveness (CNIC) 
originally to advise on how to use the FIC tax money.  Subsequently, the CNIC (which 
involves key government ministers) took on the wider role of research and innovation 
strategy.  When it works well (and of course it does not always do so), such a council 
can effectively make the longer-term policy commitments needed to resolve the 
dynamic inconsistency problem, making a special fund unnecessary.  In Norway, the 
absence of a high-level council means there is a greater need for a mechanism that has 
the function of the Fund than would otherwise be the case.   
A second advantage of a council is that it can provide strong coordination of 
ministries.  The Norwegian system has made several evolutionary adaptations in the 
past decade to the lack of a council.  The FFN Fund is one such.  A second is the 
integration of FFN into KD’s responsibilities.  As the Fund has grown so KD has 
become more of a ‘research ministry’ in the sense of handling far more than basic 
research.  It has deployed Fund money to launch and sustain several key systemic 
interventions, including the centres programmes, infrastructure investment and the 
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Large programmes.  A third is RCN’s practice of reducing the number of programmes 
it runs and signing up more ministries to each programme.  A fourth is the growing 
practice of multiple ministries getting together to design common research strategies, 
as has been the case with climate change, biotechnology, nanotechnology and shortly 
ICT.  These are all useful adaptations – but they appear inherently costly compared 
with the alternative of key people getting together round the council table and making 
decisions.  Further, especially given the strength of the sector principle in Norway, the 
lack of a strong council imposes significant internal coordination costs on RCN.   
We strongly agree with sector principle – not least because it embeds research and 
innovation across the ministry system and means that all ministries become advocates 
for research, rather than one or two ministries effectively having to battle the rest for 
research and innovation money.  Nonetheless, the sector principle is also a powerful 
force for lock-in at RCN.  This is not a matter of bossy ministries limiting RCN’s 
freedom to act but a result of RCN’s parallel dialogues with sixteen ministries where 
the ministries say what they want and RCN does its best to serve its ministry 
customers.  As long as RCN does not have more freedom than the sector ministries 
will grant it, or some sort of ‘strategic’ budget, RCN will be locked in to ministry 
requirements.  This was known when RCN was created.69 
A success of the past decade has been the creative use of budget by KD together with 
RCN that has effectively generated some strategic ‘space’ to launch important new 
initiatives.  This has involved dramatic growth in budget through the mechanism of 
the Fund – effectively growing from nothing to 1.2 BNOK over a decade – something 
that is hard to envisage without the context either of a device like the Fund or the 
influence of an authoritative and powerful research and innovation council.  Despite 
these successes, however, the evidence suggests that the disruptive element of RCN’s 
activities is still too small – there is too much business as usual and not enough risk 
taking – either in RCN’s advice function or in its funding.  (To use a scientific analogy, 
the research community normally expects that if research is sufficiently ambitious to 
be interesting it will from time to time fail.  It may seem like an odd evaluation 
conclusion, but perhaps RCN should fail more often!)   
One way to improve the balance between RCN’s aggregation machine and change 
agent roles would be to raise the level of abstraction in the way it is steered by the 
ministries.  The new MBO system aims to do this and while it seems so far to have 
added little value to the steering of RCN it does provide an arena in which the 
ministries and RCN collectively could work on finding a better balance between sector 
and national needs.   
We mentioned in Chapter 2 the idea of thinking about research funding in two 
‘programmes’.  Programme 2 creates and sustains research capacity across most if not 
all disciplines, supports the development of human capital and is often rather focused 
on basic research.  This is the focus of research councils in most countries.  
Programme 1 builds additional capacity in areas of national importance such as 
providing the knowledge and people to run the hospitals or to run competitive 
companies in sectors of actual or potential national strength.  This tends to be more 
the work of innovation agencies.  In a dynamic research and innovation system, we 
would expect both Programmes to be in constant change.    
We can think of much of the work of RCN’s Science Division as focusing on 
Programme 2.  The Large programmes and national priorities clearly tackle 
Programme 1.  Is the approach sufficiently dynamic?  The large programmes are 
agglomerations of previously smaller programmes and are now moving into a second 
generation.  During their lifetimes, they are said to be hard to change in more than an 
incremental way in so far as they address the needs of multiple ministries.  There 
seems to be sufficient risk of lock-in here that it should at least be monitored.   
 
 
69 Innst. S. nr. 192 – 1992–93, p 5 
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RCN and the ministries have together managed to increase the share of RCN’s budget 
that goes to the national priorities and RCN has been ‘deprogramming’ other 
resources in the Science and Innovation divisions.  On the Science side, there is 
bottom-up funding through FRIPRO and a mechanism (the SFF centres) that permits 
evolution.  New fields and ideas that move to scale can get centre money, which the 
evaluations show gives them the power to affect their organisations’ strategies, so 
there is an RCN-supported route to evolutionary change (notwithstanding the 
criticism that there is in practice too little risk taking).  Deprogramming in the 
Innovation Division, however, is removing the potential for agglomerating and 
strengthening clusters of firms and opportunities because it leads to funding 
innovation at the project level but not at the programme level.  Unlike, say, Finnish or 
Swedish programming practice – which is to identify (sometimes proactively, 
sometimes reactively) clusters of opportunity and to tackle them through ‘technology 
programmes’ – RCN is choosing no longer to provide an evolutionary mechanism 
between the bottom-up project level and the priority level. In this sense, while 
Programme 2 is potentially dynamic, Programme 1 is inherently static.  In the context 
of Norway’s need to promote industrial innovation and renewal, that seems to us to be 
a weakness.  Indeed, given the tendency towards incremental innovation and ‘business 
as usual’ R&D aimed at existing markets in the Norwegian innovation system, we 
would expect to see an agency like RCN being much more proactive in developing mid-
sized programmes and the externalities that they bring over and above the value of 
participation to the individual companies. This aspect of change agency needs 
strengthening.   
The Norwegian research community complains very vocally that the amount of ‘free’ 
research money for basic research at RCN is low.  Our analysis suggests that free 
projects plus basic research programme money have been fairly constant in real terms 
over recent years.  There was growth in basic research in the earlier years of the Large 
programmes but their overall content has shifted towards innovation.  In the 
meantime, the cost of the universities has almost doubled in current terms over a 
decade, driven by rising student numbers.  This automatically increases demand 
pressure for FRIPRO as the number of eligible university teachers rises while the 
universities choose not to manage the allocation of internal research resources or the 
quality of the proposals the academics submit to RCN.   
Basic research is an important component of a research and innovation system.  In 
many advanced countries including Norway, the OECD statistics show that it is 20% or 
so of the total R&D effort.  From an economic perspective (which is of course not the 
only relevant one), basic research tends to support the development of the rest of the 
research and innovation system through developing human capital as well as 
knowledge.  Thus the USA has about the same proportion of basic research in the total 
mix as Norway but this supports much more business activity.  Business expenditure 
on R&D in the USA is almost 2% of GDP, compared with less than half that in Norway.  
To put it another way: Norway has more basic research than is economically 
necessary, given the low R&D performance by business.  However, this can be justified 
if the state is investing in basic research ahead of the growth in industrial R&D – and 
that is precisely the pattern we normally expect to see in the course of industrial 
development.   
Given the high proportion of research money in Norwegian university funding, an 
unusually high proportion of Norwegian basic research is done in the universities –
 which are also the main users of FRIPRO.  Our argument that Norway needs to 
improve the quality of its research also implies that it would make no sense to reduce 
funding for basic research.  One option would be to reallocate money from the General 
University Fund to fund more basic research via RCN, in order to improve quality.  
Another would be to encourage the universities to manage the allocation of research 
time and other resources in a more stringent manner.  What can be done at the RCN 
level is to augment the FRIPRO resources in a way that is more demanding of quality 
and change than FRIPRO is today.  That would imply measures such as a special high-
risk research instrument and increased funding to complement ERC grants.   
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9.3 Recommendations 
• The lack of a high-level research and innovation council that sets policy makes it 
hard to coordinate research and innovation policy at the national level.  We 
understand the difficulties of creating such a council in the Norwegian governance 
system but recommend that as a minimum the government investigate 
constitutionally acceptable ways to increase the strength of research policy 
coordination at a level above the ministries  
• A national strategy and policy for research and innovation is more than the sum of 
what sixteen ministries want.  The Fund for Research and Innovation was an 
important mechanism for providing ‘strategic’ resources to induce change in the 
research and innovation system – acting as a ‘countervailing force’ to the tendency 
of sector requirements to lock in RCN and inhibit necessary change in the research 
and innovation system.  While the government had good reasons to close the 
Fund, it is vital that the funding mechanism replacing it should be able to address 
the long-term research and structuring needs of the system 
• The quality of Norwegian research is on the average good but in the light of 
increasing knowledge-intensity as a key requirement for competitiveness, it is 
probably not good enough.  Increasing quality should be even more strongly 
emphasised as a goal for RCN 
• RCN should have some strategic resources and freedom to explore and fund new 
opportunities on its own initiative, ahead of collective demand from its principals, 
in order to avoid problems of late entry and catch-up 
• RCN’s responsive approach to basic research means that the existing pattern of 
activity plays a large role in determining the pattern of future activity.  There is no 
provision for high-risk research and some evidence that Norway has moved slowly 
into key generic technologies.  RCN should therefore establish mechanisms that 
promote disruptive change in basic research as well as in more applied areas 
• Raising business expenditure on R&D is an important policy objective, which is 
addressed through a tax incentive, thematic programmes and the bottom-up BIA 
funding arena.  This leaves a gap for smaller-scale, time-limited programme 
initiatives responding to the needs of a sub-sector or cluster at a significantly 
larger scale than BIA consortia.  RCN should review at the micro level the 
opportunities from time to time to involve stakeholders in starting such 
technology programmes and eventually create a larger-scale instrument for doing 
so 
• Bottom-up, researcher-initiated research is an important component of any 
healthy research system – especially in a rich country that needs to operate at or 
near the scientific and technological frontier. FRIPRO funding should be 
strengthened, especially to tackle more interdisciplinary and higher risk research 
aiming to drive up quality. This could be complemented by mandating the 
addition of a more explicit fundamental research component to Large 
programmes  
The Summary of this report contains these recommendations, together with a small 
number of other important but more operational recommendations arising from 
earlier Chapters of this report.   
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Appendix A Terms of reference 
A.1   Introduction 
The Research Council of Norway is an essential tool for the development and 
implementation of Norwegian research and innovation policy. Its terms of reference 
cover all academic fields, from basic to applied research, and it has at its disposal a 
range of instruments. The Council receives allocations from 16 different ministries, 
and in 2010 it provided funding totalling almost NOK 7 billion for research and 
innovation purposes.  
The Research Council was established in 1993, and since then has been evaluated 
once, in 2001. As a consequence of the evaluation the Council was reorganised in 
2003, and its six thematic areas were replaced by three divisions. A further 
reorganisation was implemented in autumn 2010. 
Developments in recent years in the national and international research system have 
increased the need for up-to-date knowledge on the Research Council’s activities and 
working methods. This was discussed in the white paper Climate for Research (Report 
No. 30 (2008–2009) to the Storting, cf. Recommendation S. No. 37 (2008–2009)), 
which states that the Research Council will be evaluated during the parliamentary 
term 2009–2013: 
The Government will therefore ensure that an evaluation of the 
Research Council is undertaken during the present parliamentary 
period. The evaluation should provide an overall assessment of the 
Council on the basis of the overarching objectives that have been 
established for the Council’s activity. The evaluation should be based on 
the Council’s three roles in the research system, which should be 
examined in the context of recent developmental trends, including the 
development of more independent research institutions with clearly 
defined strategic responsibilities, and the internationalisation of 
research. The distribution of responsibility between the Research 
Council and the other research and innovation policy agencies should be 
emphasised. Terms of reference for the evaluation will be drawn up. 
The evaluation should consider both the progress made from 2003 up to and including 
2010, and the potential for improvement in the light of significant developmental 
trends. It will also be important to capture the main cooperation processes and the 
potential for learning and development in the research system. One of the main 
premises for the evaluation is that the Norwegian model, with a single council for all 
the different research fields, should be retained. Among the main reasons for the 
single-council model is the sector principle70 in Norwegian research, which creates a 
need for coordination mechanisms; the increasing emphasis on a cross-disciplinary 
approach; and the closer links between basic and applied research. However, the 
model must be evaluated in relation to how well it fulfils its function in the Norwegian 
research and innovation system, and possible options for further development and 
adjustments to the Council’s activities should be indicated. Experience from other 
countries may be used where appropriate to illustrate various development options for 
the Research Council in the time to come. 
Section 2 below provides a short description of the Research Council with an emphasis 
on its organisation and main tasks. Section 3 deals with the main focus for the 
 
 
70 According to this principle each ministry has a specific responsibility to ensure that research is conducted in its 
sector. 
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evaluation, and describes a number of central issues related to the Council’s function 
in the research and innovation system. Section 4 describes the main themes for the 
evaluation: the Council’s advisory and financing functions. Section 5 presents an 
overview of documents relevant to the evaluation and other planned and ongoing 
evaluations addressing the Research Council’s functions. Sections 6, 7 and 8 set out 
the reporting, progress and delivery requirements and list the points to be included in 
the tender. 
A.2   About the Research Council of Norway  
The Research Council of Norway is a public administrative body under the Ministry of 
Education and Research that has been granted special powers of authority, cf. section 
8 of the Council statutes of 20 December 2002.71 The Executive Board, which is the 
Council’s highest authority, is appointed by the King for four years at a time. The 
statutes are established by Royal Decree.  
The Research Council of Norway serves as a national strategic and executive body that 
is responsible for increasing the general knowledge base and for helping to meet 
society’s research needs by promoting basic and applied research and innovation. The 
Research Council also promotes international research cooperation and advises the 
government authorities on matters of research policy (section 1 of the Statutes).  
Under section 4.2 of the Statutes, the Executive Board is responsible for the overall 
activities of the Council. It follows up the research policy guidelines drawn up by the 
government and the Storting and in its advisory capacity to the government it provides 
input to future research policy. The Board has the primary responsibility for drawing 
up the Research Council’s strategy and for ensuring that it operates as an integrated 
body. This involves among other things ensuring close internal cooperation within the 
Council, delegating tasks and ensuring that the organisation remains optimal. The 
Board submits annual budget proposals to all the relevant ministries, and distributes 
the funds allocated to the Council. 
In 2003 the Research Council was organised in three divisions, for science, strategic 
priorities and innovation respectively. In autumn 2010 the Council was reorganised; 
the division for strategic priorities was closed down and two new divisions were set up. 
The divisions are administered by division research boards appointed by the Executive 
Board. In order to ensure close cooperation between the divisions, the chairs of the 
division research boards are also members of the Executive Board. Each division 
provides funds for research activities by means of various instruments, the most 
important of which are the programmes, each headed by a programme board. Over 
800 representatives of research institutions, the private sector, the government 
administration and other social sectors participate in the various management boards, 
which are thus important meeting places as well as advisory bodies and allocators of 
research grants. 
The day-to-day management of the Research Council is the responsibility of the 
Director General. In addition to the research divisions, the Research Council consists 
of the Director General’s staff and the Division for Administrative Affairs, which 
supports the research divisions and coordinates and develops the Council’s activities.  
Section 2 of the Statutes sets out the Research Council’s main tasks. These are to: 
• Support basic research and seek to encourage development within the various 
research fields and disciplines as well as to ensure inter- and multidisciplinarity in 
research;  
• Support research that encourages public debate and contributes to the 
development of democracy and the formulation of policy;  
 
 
71 In a Royal Decree of 17 December 2010 new statutes were established for the Council, which included a new 
divisional structure. The present evaluation should be based on the statutes for the evaluation period 2003–2010. 
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• Promote innovation in public and private sectors in all parts of the country;  
• Promote coherence and interaction between basic research, applied research and 
innovation;  
• Fulfil national responsibilities with regard to dissemination of research and work 
to promote the uptake of research results;  
•  Promote international research cooperation;  
• Work to ensure the highest possible quality in Norwegian research activities;  
• Work to achieve cooperation and cohesiveness between public agencies within the 
research and innovation system;  
• Work to achieve constructive distribution of tasks and cooperation between 
research institutions, and take strategic responsibility for the research institute 
sector;  
• Ensure the evaluation of Norwegian research activities;  
• Provide advice to government authorities as a basis for the formulation of research 
policy. 
The Research Council also follows political guidelines set out in white papers on 
research and other subjects and the annual budget propositions. Goals and guidelines 
are also specified annually in the steering documents from the ministries that finance 
the Council’s activities. 
A joint system for management by objectives has been developed under the leadership 
of the Ministry of Education and Research in cooperation with the Council itself and 
the ministries concerned. A set of common objectives was established based on the 
Council’s statutes and the priorities set by the ministries in their research allocations, 
and in 2010 these objectives were adopted by most of the ministries and set out in 
their steering documents. Parallel with this process, the parameters used by the 
Council in its reports to the ministries were reviewed and adjusted. These objectives 
and the reporting parameters are to be further developed.  
A.3   A single research council in a diverse research system 
The purpose of the evaluation is to examine the Research Council’s role in the 
Norwegian research and innovation system and to consider whether the goals 
established for its activities are being achieved effectively while maintaining a high 
standard of quality. The evaluation will be used as a basis for further learning, and 
attention should be paid to the relations between the Research Council and other 
institutions. This means that a focus must be trained on decision-making processes in 
the Council, patterns of participation, objectives and instruments. The changes made 
since the previous evaluation must also be evaluated.  
The evaluator must adopt an ex-post perspective on the period from 2003 up to and 
including 2010. He must also take an ex-ante perspective and suggest further 
possibilities for development that will improve the Research Council’s ability to 
perform its tasks. 
The evaluator is expected to use other relevant evaluations and descriptions of the 
current status of research as a basis for his work, cf. section 5. 
It is important that the evaluation can be used as a basis for strategic decisions on how 
the Research Council should be further developed in a way that will strengthen the 
Norwegian research and innovation system in the years to come.  
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Main focus – the Research Council’s functions in a diverse research system:  
 
 
The above figure shows the systematic perspective for the evaluation. It should 
concentrate on the relations between the Research Council and the sectors that 
conduct research, the other research and innovation policy agencies and the 
ministries, and on the Council’s activities in the context of the internationalisation of 
Norwegian research.  
An overall review of the status of Norwegian research has been started by a 
government-appointed committee of experts (the Fagerberg Committee). According to 
its terms of reference the Committee will examine the relationship between the goals, 
resources and results of publicly funded research and advise on whether the public 
funding system needs to be altered, with particular emphasis on the relevant funding 
mechanisms. The aim is to raise the quality of research and improve the use of 
resources. The Committee’s recommendations will be submitted to the Ministry of 
Education and Research in May 2011, and its report will be circulated for comments 
before further processing in Ministry.   
A.3.1   The Research Council of Norway as the subject of the evaluation 
The subject of the evaluation is the Research Council. The focus must be on the 
Council’s functions and on its organisation and competence in relation to the 
performance of its tasks. The evaluation should have two main themes. The first 
should be an evaluation of the Council in terms of its advisory function and how this 
function should be further developed. The second theme should be a detailed review of 
the Council’s function as a funding mechanism, with an emphasis on its use of 
instruments and its ability to make use of its room for manoeuvre. The Council’s 
advisory function and its ability to develop and manage instruments for promoting 
research that is highly relevant to our society requires it to have a good understanding 
of society’s future needs. The Council also needs to develop sound insight into the 
ways in which research interacts with other social, cultural, economic, political and 
environmental processes. The evaluation should therefore consider to what extent the 
Council has managed to adapt its research and innovation policy advice and 
instruments to this larger context. The issues relevant to these two main themes will 
be set out in more detail in Chapter 4 below. 
The Research Council also functions as a meeting place for user groups and for 
disseminating information. This function is intended to support the other two 
functions mentioned above, and must therefore also be evaluated. Points to focus on 
are how the Research Council has defined and fulfilled this function during the 
relevant period, and whether it needs to be further developed and modernised in order 
to provide optimal support for the advisory and funding tasks. 
The quality of the Research Council’s organisation and competence is a decisive factor 
for the quality of the services it provides, and the advisory, funding and meeting-place 
functions should be examined in this light. It is especially important to determine 
whether the Council’s internal organisation and competence-building measures are 
appropriate for addressing the new research policy challenges. The Research Council’s 
Research sectors Research and innovation policy agencies  
Ministry of Education and 
Research and sector ministries Internationalisation 
Research Council of Norway 
Funcsions: advising, funding a 
meeting place 
Instruments: organisation and 
competence 
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model of organisation, which is based on a three-level hierarchy of boards that is also 
reflected in its administration, has not previously been externally evaluated. The 
cooperation and interfaces between the three board levels and between the boards and 
the administration, and the horizontal coordination between the divisions, should be 
reviewed. The evaluator should also conduct a process evaluation of the internal 
reorganisation carried out in autumn 2010. 
A.3.2   The Research Council’s general function in the research system 
As the figure shows, the relations between the Research Council and the various 
research sectors – the university and university college sector, the institute sector, the 
business sector and the regional health authorities – will be key elements of the 
evaluation. The Norwegian research system is developing in the direction of greater 
autonomy for research institutions, more strategic management and increasing 
competition for national and international funding. The impact of these trends on the 
Research Council’s activity should be examined.  
Another important element is the Research Council’s cooperation with the other 
research and innovation policy agencies, which represent the system of government 
policy instruments intended to channel funds to research and innovation activities. 
The cooperation and interface between the Council and this system have a strong 
influence on all the Council’s tasks and functions. The evaluation of the Council and 
those of the other research and innovation policy agencies (Innovation Norway and 
the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA)) will together provide a 
broad knowledge base for decisions on adjustments to these organisations.  
The ministries have the overall responsibility for financing research in their own 
sectors. This principle is intended to encourage the ministries to invest in research, to 
ensure that research is conducted within its sector, and to promote socially relevant 
research. This ensures that research and knowledge are developed as an integral part 
of policy and social development. The Ministry of Education and Research is 
responsible both for coordinating research policy and for research in its own sector. As 
the figure shows, the evaluation should include an examination of the Research 
Council’s relations with the ministries providing funds and of the importance of the 
sector principle for the Council’s activity. Similarly, the steps taken by the Council to 
achieve research policy goals during the evaluation period (cf. the white papers 
Commitment to Research, Report No. 20 (2004–2005) to the Storting, and Climate 
for Research, Report No. 30 (2008-2009) to the Storting) are important reference 
points.  
Another perspective for the evaluation as a whole is that of internationalisation. This is 
a major trend in the research sector and the responsibility for promoting international 
research cooperation is laid down in the Research Council’s statutes. In recent years 
the Council has been allocating an increasing proportion of its budget to 
internationally oriented activities and projects.  The scope, complexity and speed of 
change in the international research arena have increased the need for up-to-date 
information on the steps taken by the Council to address the issue. 
The evaluation should pay great attention to the efforts to increase Norwegian 
participation in EU research framework programmes and initiatives related to the 
emergence of the European Research Area. The question of whether the Research 
Council is taking steps to ensure that multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
complement each other should also be examined. The success of the Council’s efforts 
to promote international research cooperation during the evaluation period should be 
assessed and specific recommendations made for measures to equip the Research 
Council to address the challenges and developments in this area.  
A.4   Thematic areas of the evaluation – the main issues 
The two main themes of the evaluation are presented below, with an emphasis on the 
general questions that need to be addressed. The evaluator is requested to propose a 
plan and a set of questions for the evaluation that will effectively address these issues. 
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If possible the evaluation should suggest criteria for measuring successful goal 
achievement. The criteria must be based on broad empirical knowledge and be derived 
from relevant literature. The international perspective must be maintained throughout 
the evaluation (cf. the figure in section 3). 
A.4.1   Advisory function  
The Research Council provides advice on general research policy and more specific 
advice to sectors and institutions. The Council’s advice is important input to the 
government's work of drawing up research and innovation policy documents and on 
the ministries’ work on their budgets, as well as the work of the authorities and the 
research activities of academic institutions. The Council is expected to provide sound 
analyses of research needs and to propose measures for all relevant sectors based on 
systematised knowledge and the Council’s autonomy as a specialised institution. 
The Research Council has a statutory responsibility for evaluating Norwegian research 
and for providing sound advice based on such evaluations. The experience and 
expertise that the Council gains from its funding activities and its function as a 
meeting place for key stakeholders in the research system also place it in a good 
position to provide advice. The Council has a complex organisational framework with 
a wide range of governing boards representing the various stakeholders. Close 
cooperation between the various management levels and research divisions is essential 
for ensuring that its advice is of a high quality. The evaluation should consider how the 
Council’s tasks, functions and management system have defined, limited and 
institutionalised its advisory function, and whether this has contributed to the 
provision of independent expert advice. 
The ministries make use of advice from the Research Council when formulating 
research and innovation policy in white papers, strategies and so on, and in making 
decisions on research investments in the annual government budget. The Research 
Council’s annual budget proposal is one of its main advisory documents. In addition 
the Council must be able to meet the ministries’ need for advice and guidance at all 
times. However, the Council does not have a monopoly on advising the ministries. The 
various directorates, research institutions, trade and interest organisations and the 
other research and innovation policy agencies also advise the authorities on research 
policy. Given the large number of bodies providing advice, the evaluation should 
investigate how much weight is given to the Council’s recommendations compared 
with that of other bodies and to what extent its recommendations are taken into 
account in users’ decision-making processes.  
The Council’s cooperation and interface with other policy implementation agencies, 
and how this affects its advisory function, should also be examined.  
The university and university college sector, the institute sector, the research 
institutions in the business sector and the regional health authorities also make use of 
advice from the Research Council in the development of their activities. At the same 
time these bodies provide essential information on which the Research Council can 
base its own advisory activity. National and international development trends (see 
section 3.2) present new challenges that the Research Council must address if it is to 
fulfil the function expected of it by its users. The evaluation must consider whether the 
Council has the organisational capacity and expertise necessary to meet these 
expectations and to what extent the Council influences these institutions’ own 
priorities and decision-making processes. 
Given the increasing internationalisation of research, an assessment of the Research 
Council’s ability to supply its users with advice on international cooperation is an 
essential part of the evaluation. The evaluator must identify the challenges in this area, 
especially those related to the links between national and international initiatives, and 
propose measures for improving the advisory function to equip the Council to address 
new developments. 
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Another important point that needs to be examined is whether the establishment of 
meeting places and learning arenas serves to promote the application of research-
based knowledge and to inform different user groups about such application. The 
evaluator must examine the Council’s ability to document research results by means of 
performance indicators and reporting systems, and whether its organisation allows it 
to effectively monitor its own activities and instruments.  
A.4.2   Funding function 
In 2010 NOK 22.4 billion was allocated to research and development in the 
government budget, approximately 30% of which is administered by the Research 
Council. In that year the Council received approximately NOK 6.7 billion from the 
ministries. The Council also receives funds from various organisations, donations, 
administrative grants, etc, which in 2010 amounted to a budget of just over NOK 7 
billion. 
As the national competition arena for research in all fields, the Research Council is a 
strategic instrument for implementing national research policy. It is expected to 
provide added value in comparison with other sources of funding by bringing together 
different research institutions and academic fields through joint allocations. The aim 
is to ensure that funds are awarded to the best research activities. 
The Research Council is responsible for targeting its instruments so as to meet 
research policy priorities. It has a wide range of instruments, including open 
competitive arenas, initiatives directed toward strategic priority areas, policy-oriented 
programmes, basic funding and the launching and implementation of various centre 
schemes. The balance between, and the organisation and composition of, the various 
instruments should be examined, and also whether these are adequate from an overall 
perspective for achieving the Council’s goals. It is particularly important to examine 
how the increasing importance of international research cooperation will affect the 
organisation of national policy instruments and of the Council’s own organisation, 
priorities and activities in the time to come. The evaluation should also examine 
whether the Council’s portfolio of instruments has provided additionality in terms of 
for example input, results and behaviour, whether adjustments should be made, and if 
so, what kinds of adjustments. The effectiveness and transparency of the Council’s 
treatment of applications should also be examined. 
In addition to the competition-based allocations awarded by the Research Council, 
funds are channelled directly over the government budget to research and 
development at universities and university colleges, the regional health authorities and 
research institutes. The larger universities in particular have substantial resources for 
research at their disposal in the form of the basic allocations they receive from the 
Ministry of Education and Research. In order for the research system to function 
properly it is essential that the institutional resources and the funding measures used 
by the Council should complement each other. The evaluation should therefore 
describe the relationship between the various institutions’ autonomy, national 
priorities as implemented through the Council, and the organisation of the 
instruments in the context of the roles and tasks of the various institutions. 
Since the Research Council is not the only institution whose main task is to channel 
funds to research and innovation, we are particularly interested in information on the 
interfaces and cooperation between the Council and other research and innovation 
policy agencies, cf. section 3.2, including how such cooperation should be further 
developed. We are also interested in an evaluation of how the funding function of the 
Council is perceived by user groups.  
Another question to be considered is whether the Research Council has captured and 
met the research and development needs of the various user groups through the 
meeting places and learning arenas it provides, and whether this could be improved. 
The views of user groups on the Council’s efforts are also relevant here. 
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Appendix B The evaluation questions 
We chose not to use all the evaluation questions set out earlier as a way to structure 
this report as it would make it complex and difficult to read.  For the sake of order, 
here we briefly set out to answer those questions.   
B.1   Formative questions 
B.1.1   Create and provide strategic intelligence on research and innovation to 
stakeholders in the National Research and Innovation System (NRIS), including itself  
RCN maintains knowledge bases about its own funding activities and beneficiaries, 
monitoring and indicator reports and contributes to the national availability of a level 
of information abut the research and innovation system that is of a high standard by 
international comparison.  It is closely linked to the European Union programmes and 
other sources of intelligence about international research and innovation activity and 
policy such as TAFTIE.  Its advice to government is used in the development of 
research White Papers, whose priorities are in turn reflected in RCN’s own budget 
proposals and strategies.  Its ‘meeting places’ provide it with needed information but 
offer participants limited influence over RCN activities.  Its evaluation strategy is, 
however, not well developed though evaluation results are used in process and design 
improvement.  Evaluation and performance indicators do not focus sufficiently on 
impacts.   
B.1.2   Operate effective organisation structures and processes within a national 
division of labour among government authorities 
RCNs budget dialogues, the use of multi-ministry programmes and support to 
ministry strategy processes makes RCN both responsive to sector ministry demands 
and gives it influence over them.  Internal structures work effectively, even if they are 
complex in order to cope with the high coordination load, and RCN is itself able to 
reorganise to good effect, as in 2010.  The institutional boundary is clear and rational 
within the division of labour with Innovation Norway and SIVA.  Research funding 
process have been improved to reflect good international practice.   
B.1.3   Implement and add value to national research and innovation priorities and 
policies  
RCN has successfully focused funding on national priorities, to the apparent 
satisfaction of the ministries.  Cross-sector programmes and strategies and RCN 
structural interventions add value to sector ministry priorities. However, impacts of 
RCN funding are insufficiently explored.   
B.1.4   Play a developmental role in the NRIS, supporting the needs of the various 
component communities and institutions 
RCN funded Norwegian research is of higher quality than that funded from other 
sources, based on bibliometric indicators.  The performance-based research funding 
system for the institutes appears also to have increased their output of scientific 
papers.  RCN has funded a growing volume of research, suggesting that capacity is 
being built.  There is an implicit division of labour between the performance-based 
core funding systems (which drive quality and output within research performers’ 
existing fields of activity) and RCN thematic funding, which additionally steers the 
direction of research.  The distinction with ‘free’ research projects is not clearly 
articulated.  However, the higher performance of RCN-funded researchers suggests 
RCN may still have a more significant effect on quality (though that appearance could 
usefully be explored in more detail).  RCN instruments address both systemic and 
market failures.   
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B.1.5   Embed Norway in the changing international Research and Innovation System  
Participation in the Framework Programme, certain other multilateral programmes 
and bilateral agreements all embed Norwegian researchers in the international science 
system.  The high average quality of joint publications with foreign authors suggests 
that Norwegian researchers are able to work with successful people abroad.  Inward 
and outward mobility remain at low levels, however.  The internationalisation strategy 
needs clearer goals.   
B.2   Summative goals 
B.2.1   Goal 1: Increase quality, capacity and relevance in Norwegian research 
nationwide 
1.1 Strengthened research in nationally prioritised areas.  RCN spending in the 
priority areas has increased.  There is at least one RCN centre (SFF, SFI or FME) 
associated with each of the national priorities.  The priorities do not map easily 
onto the discipline categories used in the bibliometric study for this evaluation.  In 
most fields, impact factors for RCN-funded researchers are higher than for non-
funded ones.  However, in the following disciplines relevant to the priorities the 
reverse is true: basic medical sciences; biomedical sciences; Computer sciences; 
electrical engineering and telecommunications.  In economics and business, RCN-
funded researchers do better but their impact is low.  Much more detailed analysis 
would be needed to understand whether these apparent mismatches are of 
importance.  Research performers say RCN funding has strengthened their 
strategies.   
1.2 Strengthened breadth of long term, fundamental research and concentration of 
resources on the best research.  Structural instruments (centres, infrastructure), 
increased project sizes and a modest increase in FRIPRO have supported this goal.  
The SFFs attract further resources, so there is some evidence of concentration.  At 
the aggregate level, the impact of Norwegian research is not rising. 
1.3 Strengthened breadth of research-based innovation and concentration of 
resources on the best research and innovation milieux.  RCN spending has 
increased its focus on innovation and industry-linkage instruments.  Centres of 
excellence and large programmes exist in priority areas. The SFIs attract further 
resources, so there is some evidence of concentration. Some innovation-relevant 
disciplines have poor impact performance (see 1.1, above).  
1.4  More research in business, both in terms of breadth and excellence.  CIS data 
show declining Norwegian innovation performance. BERD has risen some 15% in 
real terms between 2001 and 2010. While Skattefunn began in 2002, BERD stayed 
flat at around $1.8 bn72 between 2001 and 2005 then rose sharply to a new plateau 
of about ¢2 bn from 2007 to 2010.   
1.5 Strengthened research to serve the knowledge needs of the sectors and the 
administration.  The amount and proportion of ministries research money spent 
through RCN has been rising.  RCN maintains programmes that the ministries 
fund.  Ministry feedback about RCN performance is positive.  Centres have been 
created in areas where ministry and national priorities overlap and that are clearly 
relevant to KD, NHD, OED, FKD, LD, HOD, BFD and UD.   
1.6 Increased returns from international research cooperation.  RCN has supported 
national participation in the Framework Programme. Norway has been involved in 
56 ERA-NETs, ESFRI and is very present in ERA instruments, including all 10 
JPIs.  It also participates in multi-lateral arrangements such as CERN and 
NordForsk.  The rate of return from the Framework Programmes is comparatively 
 
 
72 In constant 2005 US $ at PPPs.  Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
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low but this is mostly due to the contribution being high because of Norway’s high 
GDP.  
B.2.2   Goal 2: Good use of resources and appropriate division of labour, cooperation 
and structure in the research system 
2.1 A good relationship between the national research effort and international 
cooperation. A growing proportion of RCN projects have foreign participants.  
There are high levels of international co-publication among RCN-funded 
researchers, often with N America and countries outside as well as inside the EU. 
Researchers value international links.  RCN has an internationalisation strategy 
of mainstreaming; current programmes are developing specific strategies.  On 
RCN’s analysis (Annual Report, 2011) there is good correspondence between FP7 
and national priorities.   
2.2 Value added through efficient use of research funds.  Funding processes have been 
improved, standardised and codified to a greater extent than before and resemble 
good international practice.  Larger project sizes reduce administration costs.  
Programmes covering multiple sector interests have increased in scale and 
number.  Some measures are in place to promote gender equality but the 
proportion of projects led by women remains low (20%).   
2.3 Dynamic, efficient and effective cooperation and division of labour in the 
research system.  Centre programmes have tended to increase effective research 
group sizes and influence strategy.  Research performers say this is leading to 
increased thematic specialisation.  RCN funds research infrastructure and 
channels core funds to the institutes in ways intended to improve cooperation 
and division of labour.  Large programmes are intended to focus effort.   
2.4 Assuming strategic responsibility for the research institutes.  RCN monitors and 
reports on the institutes individually and by sector.  It operates the performance-
based core funding system and the strategic projects intended for capacity 
building in the sector.  It has largely stopped evaluating individual institutes and 
does not play a role in developing the strategy of individual institutes or groups of 
institutes.  There is a slow process of restructuring in the sector, in which RCN 
plays little role.  The institute sector is well regarded and continues to grow.   
B.2.3   Goal 3: Research results are used by business, society and administration 
throughout the country 
3.1 Good and appropriate communication of research to society and good learning 
arenas among companies, institutes and the higher education sector, the health 
sector and the administration.  The primary channel for communicating research 
results is scientific publications but RCN also maintains a considerable 
communications activity both centrally and decentralised in the programmes.  
There are dedicated activities aimed at children of various ages.  RCN’s web site is 
a major communications channel, where the main audience is researchers.  The 
small role of impact evaluation means RCN under-exploits opportunities to 
demonstrate the value of research and its own role.   
3.2 Increased commercialisation of research results.  RCN maintains indicators of 
actual and potential take-up of results from the research it funds.  However, these 
say little about socio-economic impact.  The FORNY evaluation suggests that 
activity’s direct economic impacts have been modest but the growth of technology 
transfer companies associated with the research performing sector means it has 
probably contributed less directly to a growing commercialisation activity.  
3.3 A strengthened knowledge base in RCN’s research policy and advisory work.  
RCN plays an important role in assembling and publishing a rich body of strategic 
intelligence and advice to government about research and innovation policy.  It 
has recently launched a research programme in the area, after a gap of some 
years.  Evaluation is being strengthened but still needs further to be integrated 
into RCN processes.   
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Appendix C List of background reports 
The background reports for the evaluation are available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/dep/kd 
 
 
 
1. Production of Strategic Intelligence and Advice 
2. Organisation, Governance and Institutional Boundaries of the Research Council of 
Norway (Report plus appendix) 
3. Ministry Steering of the Research Council of Norway 
4. RCN’s Management by Objectives System 
5. Implementing and Adding Value to the National Priorities and Developing the 
National Research and Innovation System 
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